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Article 
Criminal Affirmance:  Going Beyond the Deterrence 
Paradigm to Examine the Social Meaning of Declining 
Prosecution of Elite Crime 
MARY KREINER RAMIREZ 
Recent financial scandals and the relative paucity of criminal 
prosecutions against elite actors that spawned the crisis suggest a new 
reality in the criminal law system: some wrongful actors appear to be 
above the law and immune from criminal prosecution.  As such, the 
criminal prosecutorial system affirms much of the wrongdoing that gave 
rise to the crisis.  This leaves the same elites undisturbed at the apex of the 
financial sector, and creates perverse incentives for any successors.  Their 
incumbency in power results in massive deadweight losses due to the 
distorted incentives they now face.  Further, this undermines the legitimacy 
of the rule of law and encourages even more lawlessness among the entire 
population, as the declination of prosecution advertises the profitability of 
crime.  These considerations transcend deterrence, as well as retribution, 
as a traditional basis for criminal punishment.  Affirmance is far more 
costly and dangerous with respect to the crimes of powerful elites that 
control large organizations than can be accounted for under traditional 
notions of deterrence.  Few limits are placed on a prosecutor’s 
discretionary decision about whom to prosecute, and many factors against 
prosecution take hold, especially in resource-intensive white-collar crime 
prosecutions.  This Article asserts that prosecutors should not decline 
prosecution in these circumstances without considering the potential 
affirmance of crime.  Otherwise, the profitability of crime promises 
massive future losses. 
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Criminal Affirmance:  Going Beyond the Deterrence 
Paradigm to Examine the Social Meaning of Declining 
Prosecution of Elite Crime 
MARY KREINER RAMIREZ

 
“Governmental actions such as criminal prosecutions can be seen as 
ceremonial and ritual performances that designate the content of public 
morality and symbolize the public affirmation of social ideals and norms.”1 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Hindsight may be twenty-twenty, but the facts leading up to the 
financial crisis in 2008
2
 demonstrate that hindsight was not required to 
stave off the calamitous events in the financial markets over the past five 
years.  Whether government regulators, auditors, or credit rating 
companies should have stepped in to stem the financial blood-letting, the 
financiers in the industry knew better than to gamble with the nation’s 
economic health.
3
  Central to the American criminal justice system is an 
                                                                                                                          
 Professor of Law, Washburn University School of Law; J.D., 1986, St. Louis University School 
of Law.  In writing this Article, Professor Ramirez drew from her experiences serving thirteen years at 
the Department of Justice, as a Trial Attorney with the Antitrust Division and as a Senior Trial 
Attorney with the U.S. Attorney’s Office in Kansas.  She teaches White-Collar Crime, Criminal Law, 
and Criminal Procedure, among other courses. 
1 FRANCIS T. CULLEN ET AL., CORPORATE CRIME UNDER ATTACK: THE FIGHT TO CRIMINALIZE 
BUSINESS VIOLENCE 365 (2d ed. 2006) (referencing Joseph Gusfield). 
2 The financial crisis spans several years, culminating in the “profound events of 2007 and 2008” 
and continuing beyond those years with multiple bank failures, mortgage company bankruptcies, and 
real estate foreclosures, some of which continue even as this Article is penned.  See, e.g., FINANCIAL 
CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT xi, xv (2011) [hereinafter FCIC 
REPORT].  This Article refers to the “financial crisis” broadly to reference this period, or at times the 
“financial crisis of 2008” because 2008 is the year in which the general public became aware of the 
magnitude of the crisis, which began with the major bank collapses of Bear Stearns and of Lehman 
Brothers, the takeover of Merrill Lynch, and most pointedly, when Secretary of the Treasury Henry 
Paulson went to the President and Congress to recommend a bailout for the major banking institutions, 
among others.  See FCIC REPORT, supra at 280, 325, 353; infra Part II. 
3 But see Michiyo Nakamoto & David Wighton, Bullish Citigroup Is ‘Still Dancing’ to the Beat of 
the Buy-out Boom, FIN. TIMES, July 10, 2007, at 1 (reporting that Citigroup chief executive 
downplayed the fear of a downturn in the financial market).  Citigroup Chief Charles Prince admitted 
that a significant disruptive event would eventually cause cheap credit-fuelled buyout liquidity to exit 
the market and “the party would end,” but that Citigroup would “keep dancing” until the music 
stopped.  Id.  “When the music stops, in terms of liquidity, things will be complicated.  But as long as 
the music is playing, you’ve got to get up and dance.  We’re still dancing.”  Id. (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  
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expectation that a known breach of the criminal laws will yield 
punishment.  In the aftermath of the federal bailouts,
4
 expectations that 
CEOs would be held criminally accountable as had occurred after the fall 
of Enron abounded, and they still do.
5
  Yet, despite congressional 
investigations revealing knowing fraud
6
 and numerous fraud settlements 
worth billions,
7
 the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) has not criminally 
charged any of the key officers and managers of the financial institutions 
deemed “too big to fail” or even of those “too big” that were allowed to 
fail anyway.
8
  
                                                                                                                          
4 FCIC REPORT, supra note 2, at 386. 
5 In his 2012 State of the Union Address, President Obama advised the Attorney General to 
address the lack of criminal responsibility that led to the housing crisis.  President Obama remarked in 
a State of the Union address:  
And tonight I’m asking my Attorney General to create a special unit of Federal 
prosecutors and leading State attorney generals to expand our investigations into the 
abusive lending and packaging of risky mortgages that led to the housing crisis.  
This new unit will hold accountable those who broke the law, speed assistance to 
homeowners, and help turn the page on an era of recklessness that hurt so many 
Americans. 
Address Before a Joint Session of Congress on the State of the Union, 2012 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 
8 (Jan. 24, 2012); see also Edward Wyatt & Shaila Dewan, New Housing Task Force Will Zero in on 
Wall St., N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 2012, at B1 (reporting that “the unit would most likely focus on Wall 
Street firms, big banks and other entities that many people thought had escaped scrutiny for their role in 
the housing crisis,” and “could lead to charges of tax evasion, insurance fraud and securities fraud”). 
6 See, e.g., FCIC REPORT, supra note 2, at xxii–xxiii (explaining that the Financial Crisis Inquiry 
Commission found high rates of mortgage fraud and executives continued even with the threat of a 
“financial and reputational catastrophe”).  
7 See, e.g., Edward Wyatt, Citigroup to Pay Millions to End Fraud Complaint, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 20, 2011, at A1 (reporting on $285 million civil fraud settlement with SEC on charges that 
Citigroup misled investors by creating mortgage-related investments intended to fail, sold them to 
unsuspecting investors, and bet against their success); Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of 
Pub. Affairs, Fed. Gov’t and State Attorneys Gen. Reach $25 Billion Agreement with Five Largest 
Mortg. Servicers to Address Mortg. Loan Servicing and Foreclosure Abuses (Feb. 9, 2012), available 
at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/February/12-ag-186.html (reaching $25 billion settlement with 
nation’s five largest mortgage servicers); Goldman Sachs to Pay Record $550 Million to Settle SEC 
Charges Related to Subprime Mortgage CDO, Litigation Release No. 21,592, 98 SEC Docket 3135–36 
(Feb. 28, 2011) (alleging that Goldman Sachs committed securities fraud in connection with a subprime 
mortgage product); Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, J.P. Morgan to Pay $153.6 Million to 
Settle SEC Charges of Misleading Investors in CDO Tied to U.S. Hous. Mkt. (June 21, 2011) (charges 
concerned misleading investors in complex mortgage securities transaction).  
8 Wyatt & Dewan, supra note 5 (noting that no major prosecutions have come out of the housing 
crisis); Scot J. Paltrow, Insight: Top Justice Officials Connected to Mortgage Banks, REUTERS (Jan. 20, 
2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/01/20/us-usa-holder-mortgage-idUSTRE80J0PH20120120 
(reporting that Justice Department has failed to bring any criminal cases against companies involved in 
mortgage crisis); Gabriel Sherman, The Meltdown Fall Guys, NYMAG.COM (Aug. 23, 2009), 
http://nymag.com/guides/fallpreview/2009/businessmedia/58519/ (reporting that two hedge fund 
managers are facing trial for their role in the June 2007 collapse of two hedge funds at Bear Stearnes, 
yet no senior executives at Bear Stearnes, Lehman Brothers, Bank of America, Merrill Lynch, or AIG, 
have been charged with wrongdoing).   
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Classic theories of punishment identify utilitarian
9
 and retributivist
10
 
justifications for punishing criminal wrongdoing.  Deterrence, a utilitarian 
principle, suggests that by punishing the wrongdoer, he will learn that 
criminal behavior has consequences; moreover, others will see the criminal 
punished and also take away the message that crime doesn’t pay.11  The 
retributivist justifies punishment of the wrongdoer as just payment for his 
breach of society’s rules.  Sometimes, however, the wrongdoer is not 
criminally pursued.  No charges are brought, no trial heard, no conviction 
assessed, and no punishment imposed.  Indeed, for most crimes, this is the 
situation.  Each decision not to pursue criminality is an exercise of 
discretion.   
Reasons for exercising discretion against pursuing criminality may be 
varied.
12
  For the prosecutor, a weak case, an overload of cases, resource 
                                                                                                                          
9 Jeremy Bentham, Principles of Penal Law, in 1 THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 396 (John 
Bowing ed., 1838) (“General prevention ought to be the chief end of punishment as it is its real 
justification.  If we could consider an offence that has been committed as an isolated fact, the likes of 
which would never recur, punishment would be useless.  It would be only adding one evil to another.”). 
10 IMMANUEL KANT, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW: AN EXPOSITION OF THE FUNDAMENTAL 
PRINCIPLES OF JURISPRUDENCE AS THE SCIENCE OF RIGHT 195–98 (W. Hastie trans., 1887) (rejecting 
criminal punishment as a means to promote further good to society, but rather asserting that 
punishment must be meted out to one convicted of a crime because the individual has committed that 
crime); John Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, 64 PHIL. REV. 3, 7 (1955) (“[R]etributionists have rightly 
insisted . . . that no man can be punished unless he is guilty [of having] broken the law.”).  
11 Deterrence as a theory of punishment seeks to alter human behavior by reminding individuals 
that breaches of the law will be punished.  Nonetheless, it is difficult to create an empirical study to 
prove the efficacy of deterrence, since if it is effective, there is no means by which to identify those 
who might otherwise have breached the law.  See TED HONDERICH, PUNISHMENT: THE SUPPOSED 
JUSTIFICATION REVISITED 79–82 (2006) (identifying various alternative explanations aside from 
deterrence as to why individuals may choose to not break the law).  Nevertheless, Honderich identifies 
“bits of evidence of a different kind” to support the efficacy of deterrence.  Id. at 82.  In 1944, the 
Danish police were deported by the German occupying forces, leaving behind only a local guard force 
that was unable to address the immense rise in property crimes—robberies, theft, fraud—although 
“there was no comparable increase in murder or sexual crimes.”  Id.  The change in crime levels in 
1944 Denmark might suggest that deterrence is more effective against certain economic crimes while 
having virtually no impact on crimes that tend to involve “strong passions or deep psychological 
problems.”  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing HOWARD JONES, CRIME AND THE PENAL 
SYSTEM: A TEXTBOOK OF CRIMINOLOGY 123 (1956)). 
12 See generally T. KENNETH MORAN & JOHN L. COOPER, DISCRETION AND THE CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE PROCESS (1983) (exploring the exercise of discretion in the criminal justice process at various 
stages).  A victim may fail to report the crime, for instance, out of personal embarrassment, fear, or 
hopelessness.  See id. at 18–21.  The police or other governmental investigative arm may choose not to 
pursue a complaint or may decide to abandon investigation for myriad reasons including lack of 
suspects or leads, other more pressing cases, lack of resources, lack of credibility of sources, 
discouragement, bad publicity, or simply lack of motivation.  See, e.g., Carrie Johnson, SEC 
Enforcement Cases Decline 9%; Staff Reduced Because of Budget Crunch, WASH. POST, Nov. 3, 2006, 
at D3 (reporting on recent budget cuts and hiring freezes at the SEC); Eric Lichtblau et al., F.B.I. 
Struggling to Handle Wave of Finance Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 2008, at A1 (reporting on a loss of 
625 agents—36% of its 2001 levels—for white-collar crime investigations as the administration shifted 
its focus to antiterrorism).  “[E]xecutives in the private sector say they have had difficulty attracting the 
[FBI’s] attention in cases involving possible frauds of millions of dollars.”  Id.      
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considerations, or more compelling cases, to name a few, may factor into 
that discretionary decision.
13
  Beyond these reasons lay other possibilities, 
such as community remedies, civil alternatives to criminal punishment, or 
perceived blameworthiness.
14
  Whatever the reason, one casualty of the 
decision not to pursue justice in the face of a crime is the message that 
“crime doesn’t pay.”  Perhaps a minor casualty in minor crimes; however, 
if the crime costs billions of dollars or more, or involves abuse of 
economic power, the more likely message to both the wrongdoer and the 
rest of us is one of “affirmance”: crime does pay.15  Some criminals will 
                                                                                                                          
13 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL §§ 9-27.000, 9-28.000 
(1997) [hereinafter U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL] (Principles of Federal Prosecution, and Principles of 
Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations, respectively).  The DOJ has explicit policies regarding 
considerations for initiating and declining prosecution.  See id. § 9-27.200, Initiating, and Declining 
Prosecution—Probable Cause Requirement; § 9-27.220, Grounds for Commencing or Declining 
Prosecution; § 9-27.230, Initiating and Declining Charges—Substantial Federal Interest; § 9-27.240, 
Initiating and Declining Charges—Prosecution in Another Jurisdiction; § 9-27.250, Non-Criminal 
Alternatives to Prosecution; § 9-27.260, Initiating And Declining Charges—Impermissible 
Considerations; § 9-27.270, Records of Prosecutions Declined; see also Stephen Holmes, The Spider’s 
Web: How Government Lawbreakers Routinely Elude the Law, in WHEN GOVERNMENTS BREAK THE 
LAW: THE RULE OF LAW AND THE PROSECUTION OF THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION 121, 130 (Austin 
Sarat & Nasser Hussain eds., 2010).  Holmes observes: 
In general, individuals who are plugged into especially powerful networks receive 
considerable advantages through the legal system administered by members of 
privileged networks, who went to the same universities, belong to the same 
congregations and clubs, vacation in the same locales, and so forth.  The same 
cannot be said for their socially marginalized or dispossessed cocitizens.  Well-
connected insiders usually receive more indulgent treatment than poorly connected 
outsiders, even in the case of undeniable lawbreaking.  The effect of this skewed 
distribution of leniency and severity on legal liability of government malefactors 
goes without saying. 
An important exception to impunity for the rich and powerful occurs when a 
member of a socially influential network seriously injures a member of the same or 
another socially powerful network.  (Bernie Madoff is a recent example.)   
Id. at 125. 
14 See Darryl K. Brown, Street Crime, Corporate Crime, and the Contingency of Criminal 
Liability, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1295, 1297 (2001). 
15 See MICHAEL LEWIS, THE BIG SHORT: INSIDE THE DOOMSDAY MACHINE xiv–xv (2010).  In the 
prologue to The Big Short, Lewis reflected on the response to his first book, Liar’s Poker, which 
described his experience in the bond market as an associate working at Salomon Brothers on Wall 
Street from 1985 to 1988.  While Lewis anticipated that the tale of reckless speculation in the bond 
market yielding lucrative salaries to associates but massive losses to investors would warn young 
people against careers in the financial markets, six months after the book was published he was 
inundated with letters from college students using his book “as a how-to manual” and asking him to 
share additional secrets about Wall Street.  Id. at xiii–xv; see also Geraldine Szott Moohr, The Balance 
Among Corporate Criminal Liability, Private Civil Suits, and Regulatory Enforcement, 46 AM. CRIM. 
L. REV. 1459, 1478 (2009) (observing that regulatory, civil enforcement, and criminal prosecution 
ideally “work in tandem to prevent business misconduct through a system of graduated penalties,” but 
in practice, regulatory agencies “are beset with inherent barriers to effective enforcement” and “civil 
actions do not provide effective remedies for or deterrence of business frauds,” leaving only criminal 
law “to monitor business practices and to respond to public pressure for redress”).  Professor Moohr 
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persist in obtaining their fortunes no matter the risks, while others are 
opportunistic players who jump in the game when the risk of punishment 
for their acts is diminished.  The failure by regulators, as well as other 
individuals, to seize early opportunities to shut down subprime misconduct 
arguably emboldened both groups, delivering tremendous financial 
rewards to them and affirming their actions with every dollar that they 
made.
16
 
This Article argues that “affirmance” is as critical to appropriate 
criminal law decision making as any of the extant theories of punishment.  
Just as the belief that punishment restores order to society or 
communicates messages that may deter future wrongdoing, affirmance 
stands for the proposition that not pursuing or not punishing elite crime 
adequately can undermine the rule of law,
17
 diminish confidence in 
government,
18
 and promote further costly criminality.
19
  This Article 
                                                                                                                          
asserts that resorting to criminal prosecutions may “divert the public and legislators from the task of 
devising more effective ways to control corporate misconduct.” This concern, however, ignores the 
very nature of the problem, in that the same corporate leaders who engage in financial wrongdoing 
spearhead limiting the effectiveness of regulatory oversight and weakening civil litigation as a means 
of redressing misconduct.  Id. at 1474, 1476, 1479.  Indeed, criminal prosecution is the last resort for 
the very reasons she observes.     
16 See infra Parts I, V.D. 
17 The rule of law is undermined when misconduct is reinforced through benefits gained to the 
perpetrator by shirking the rules.  See, e.g., JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, FREEFALL: AMERICA, FREE MARKETS, 
AND THE SINKING OF THE WORLD ECOMONY 135 (2010) (describing how the repeated bailouts of banks 
in the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s “sent a strong signal to the banks not to worry about bad lending, as the 
government will pick up the pieces”); see also B.F. SKINNER, SCIENCE AND HUMAN BEHAVIOR 64–65 
(1953) (explaining that operant conditioning changes or establishes behavior by reinforcing an 
individual’s response to events or stimuli in the environment).  A reinforcer, or operant, is an 
environmental response to an individual’s behavior that increases the probability of repeating the 
behavior, ultimately strengthening the behavior and its frequency.  SKINNER, supra at 65.  Positive 
reinforcement occurs when a rewarding environmental stimulus or consequence follows an individual’s 
behavior.  Id. at 73.  Negative reinforcement occurs when the environmental consequence allows the 
individual to avoid an unpleasant consequence when the individual’s behavior occurs. Id.  
Reinforcement differs from punishment, which intends to weaken or eliminate a response, rather than 
to increase a behavior’s frequency through gained benefits.  Id. at 182.   
18 Confidence is diminished when members of the group perceive that the rules are unfairly 
applied.  See FRANS DE WAAL, THE AGE OF EMPATHY: NATURE’S LESSONS FOR A KINDER SOCIETY 
162, 167, 188 (2009) (discussing how human sense of fairness and trust fuel our society and how the 
2008 bailouts highlighted public distrust of the wealthy and the government); Steven M. Sheffrin & 
Robert K. Triest, Can Brute Deterrence Backfire? Perceptions and Attitudes in Taxpayer Compliance, 
in WHY PEOPLE PAY TAXES: TAX COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT 193, 195, 210–13 (Joel Slemrod 
ed., 1992) (reporting on study showing that reading about the tax gap and the $100 billion not collected 
by the IRS negatively impacted students’ confidence in the tax system and compliance compared to 
reading about IRS’s increased compliance efforts).  
19 Criminality is promoted in two ways.  First, the risk of punishment is lessened so that a moral 
hazard is created; the criminal actor pursues criminal conduct because no deterrent measures are 
expected, so the actor reaps the gains from the criminal act while the losses are borne by the victims.  
In the case of massive fraud or environmental destruction requiring taxpayers to bear the losses, the 
hazard extends even further because the failure to prosecute is widely viewed as undermining the rule 
of law.  See generally GARY H. STERN & RON J. FELDMAN, TOO BIG TO FAIL: THE HAZARDS OF BANK 
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focuses upon affirming “elite crimes” (particularly corporate and financial 
elites) committed by those who may be perceived to be “above the law” 
due to the position held at the time the crime was committed, to favorable 
socioeconomic status, or to political ties to power.  Given the prominence 
of their acts and the costs to society, affirming crimes by these elites is far 
more costly than mere failure to deter crimes such as auto theft.
20
 
Part II of this Article reviews the recent financial crisis, identifies some 
indicators of criminal conduct and its cost to the American and global 
economies.  Setting forth the specific facts supporting a criminal case for 
the prosecution of particular individuals is beyond the scope of this Article.  
The purpose of the review is merely to suggest that given what is known, 
one would expect some criminal actions by the DOJ.
21
  Indeed, the Article 
highlights relevant considerations that ought to be included in making an 
assessment about whether to pursue criminal charges.   
Part III surveys the numerous factors embedded in prosecutors’ 
discretionary decisions, some explicit and others implicit in the process.  
These factors take into account competing demands for resources, case-
specific sufficiency assessments, ethical obligations, and community 
interests in alternative non-criminal resolutions, among others.  Noticeably 
absent from this traditional list is any consideration of the cost associated 
with allowing society’s wealthiest and best-connected citizens to escape 
prosecution. 
Part IV briefly discusses the punishment theories underlying criminal 
justice.  Central to understanding affirmance is recognizing that it goes 
beyond concepts of retribution or deterrence.  Affirmance focuses on the 
                                                                                                                          
BAILOUTS 17 (2004) (describing how insurance policies create a moral hazard because they may 
encourage risk taking by the insured, since the losses will be borne by the insurer).  Second, bad 
behavior is modeled for others, who may face greater risk of punishment but disregard that risk because 
of an expectation of fair play.  See Albert Bandura, Social Learning Analysis of Aggression, in 
ANALYSIS OF DELINQUENCY AND AGGRESSION 203, 204–06, 212 (Albert Bandura & Emilio Ribes-
Inesta eds., 1976) (explaining that affirmance functions as a modeling influence and is an effective way 
to encourage people to behave as they have observed others behaving).   
20 See, e.g., Gretchen Morgenson, Case on Mortgage Official Is Said to Be Dropped, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 20, 2011, at A20 (reporting that federal prosecutors have closed the criminal investigation of 
former CEO of Countrywide Financial, Angelo R. Mozilo, who settled on insider trading charges by 
the SEC in October 2010 for $67.5 million, $45 million of which was paid by Countrywide and its 
successor in bankruptcy, Bank of America; Mozilo received total compensation of $521.5 million while 
heading up Countrywide from 2000 to 2008).  In 2006, Countrywide’s revenues peaked at $11.4 
billion.  Id.  Countrywide, which had 62,000 employees and assets of $200 billion during the housing 
boom, barely avoided bankruptcy when Bank of America acquired it in 2008 with a value of $2.8 
billion.  Countrywide Financial Corporation, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 21, 2011), http://topics.nytimes.com/to
p/news/business/companies/countrywide_financial_corporation/index.html?inline=nyt-org.  Mozilo left 
when Bank of America acquired Countrywide. Id. 
21 But see Paltrow, supra note 8 (highlighting a federal conflict of interest between U.S. Attorney 
General Eric Holder and Lanny Breuer, head of the Justice Department’s criminal division, due to their 
prior employment representing big banks who are now at the center of the alleged foreclosure fraud).   
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costs and consequences of failing to strip the powerful of their continued 
wealth and position.  Offenders enjoy the rich desserts of their 
wrongdoing, rather than the “just desserts” of retribution.  Affirmance is 
the flip side to deterrence because affirmance encourages both specific 
criminality and general criminality.  It extends beyond both approaches to 
punishment—especially in the case of well-publicized wrongdoing of the 
elite class—because the accompanying infamy advertises exponential 
future wrongdoing, while wrongdoers undermining the rule of law remain 
in power and are often richly compensated from their crime.   
Part V considers the social meaning behind the choices of who is 
punished and what crimes are punished.  The converse is also considered: 
who is not punished and what ideas are expressed by decisions declining 
criminal investigation or punishment.  This meaning is central to the 
bloated effects of affirmance of elite crime.  Whether the individuals’ 
actions through powerful corporations result in the death of customers or 
employees, the destruction of an ecosystem or, as considered in this 
Article, the financial ruin of families or countries, under-punishment, or 
failure to prosecute these actors redefines the rule of law, affirms their 
behavior, and further invites moral hazard.  Affirmance of high-profile 
crimes results in high-profile advertisement of criminal profitability, and 
thus incentivizes far more costly criminality and cynicism.
22
   
This Article concludes by suggesting that prosecutors must exercise 
their discretion to decline prosecutions, accept plea bargains, or offer non-
criminal alternative sanctions, all the while bearing in mind the affirming 
effect of that decision, particularly in elite crimes.  Ignoring affirmance to 
gain politically expedient resolutions
23
 expresses a social meaning at odds 
with a cohesive criminal justice system, and thereby undermines the 
                                                                                                                          
22 See, e.g., Colin Barr, Where Are the Subprime Perp Walks?, CNNMONEY.COM (Sept. 15, 
2009), http://money.cnn.com/2009/09/15/news/subprime.perpwalk.fortune/index.htm (noting the lack 
of prosecutions of high profile subprime mortgage executives whose excesses led to the financial crisis 
in 2007); Jean Eaglesham, Criminal Mortgage Probes Fizzle Out, WALL ST. J., Aug. 6, 2011, at B1 
(reporting that three high-profile investigations into the subprime mortgage crisis have gone dormant or 
have been closed without any criminal prosecutions); Editorial, Soft on Crime Our View o [sic] Skating 
Free After Bringing the Economy to Its Knees, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, July 28, 2011, at A16 
(“Americans [have] a gnawing sense that no justice was done, that the guys who wrecked everything 
got away with it.”).  
23 See Gretchen Morgenson & Louise Story, A Financial Crisis with Little Guilt, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 14, 2011, at A1 (reporting that Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner met with then-New York 
Attorney General Andrew M. Cuomo to express concern about the fragility of the financial system and 
a desire to calm markets, “a goal that could be complicated by a hard-charging attorney general”); Jon 
Talton, WaMu: No Justice, No Peace (of Mind), SEATTLE TIMES (Aug. 12, 2011, 10:15 AM), 
http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/soundeconomywithjontalton/2015891715_wamu_no_justice_no
_peace_of_mi.html (observing that U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder has not prosecuted a single 
major figure behind the “greatest financial collapse since 1929”).  In his article, Talton asks, “Any 
curiosity at all, Mr. Holder?  Or are you planning for your next job at Goldman after the 2012 
elections.”  Talton, supra.   
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opportunity to positively shape society through law.
24
   
II.  THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 
The financial crisis in the United States in the fall of 2008 manifested 
itself much earlier than first reported.  Prior to former Treasury Secretary 
Henry Paulson’s alarm in September 2008 warning of a financial market 
meltdown unless billions in bailout funds were handed to him for 
disbursement,
25
 the average American may have been unaware of the 
trillions of dollars trading in derivatives
26
 in virtually unregulated 
markets,
27
 and may not have known that the subprime mortgage industry 
was handing out liar’s loans like candy bars on Halloween.28  Nevertheless, 
                                                                                                                          
24 See Carolyn B. Ramsey, Homicide on Holiday: Prosecutorial Discretion, Popular Culture, and 
the Boundaries of the Criminal Law, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 1641, 1642–44 (2003) (arguing the exercise of 
prosecutorial discretion shapes the law).  Paul Horwitz observes there is a distinction “between the rule 
of law as an ideal, and the implementation of the rule of law,” and whatever the absolute state of the 
rule of law demands, “it still requires implementation in practical forms, and those mechanisms of 
implementation may vary depending on the context.”  Paul Horwitz, Democracy as the Rule of Law, in 
WHEN GOVERNMENTS BREAK THE LAW, supra note 13, at 153, 157.  In a democracy, the people define 
the rules of the game, but may also redefine those rules through voting, legislation, or even 
constitutional amendment.  See id. at 159 (describing voting as “a form of controlled revolutionary 
activity” in a democratic society).  Moreover, in a democratic society, the rules of the game must 
ultimately be subject to popular control in order “to command the respect and obedience of the people 
who are subject to it.” Id. at 159–60.  Affirmance, through prosecutorial discretion, undermines 
democratic society. 
25 See Andrew R. Sorkin et al., As Credit Crisis Spiraled, 36 Hours of Alarm and Action as Crisis 
Spiraled, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2008, at A1 (noting that the request for $700 billion dollars in funds was 
parsed in the fear of total economic meltdown); Treasury’s Bailout Proposal, CNNMONEY.COM (Sept. 
20, 2009, 11:47 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2008/09/20/news/economy/treasury_proposal/index.htm 
(requesting an authorized limit of $700 billion in bailout funds for the purchase of mortgage-related bad 
assets).  
26 See FCIC REPORT, supra note 2, at xviii (noting the widespread failure in self-regulation and 
the trillions of dollars risked through “shadow banking” and “over-the-counter derivatives markets”). 
Derivatives are financial contracts whose prices are determined by, or “derived” 
from, the value of some underlying asset, rate, index, or event.  They are not used 
for capital formation or investment, as are securities; rather, they are instruments for 
hedging business risk or for speculating on changes in prices, interest rates, and the 
like.  Derivatives come in many forms; the most common are over-the-counter 
swaps and exchange-traded futures and options. . . . A firm may hedge its price risk 
by entering into a derivatives contract that offsets the effect of price movements.  
Losses suffered because of price movements can be recouped through gains on the 
derivatives contract. 
Id. at 45–46 (emphasis added). 
27 See generally andré douglas pond cummings, Still “Ain’t No Glory in Pain”: How the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996 and Other 1990s Deregulation Facilitated the Market Crash of 2002, 
12 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 467, 529–36 (2007) (explaining how the Commodities Futures 
Modernization Act does not allow for the regulation of derivatives). 
28 See Joe Nocera, In Prison for Taking a Liar Loan, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 2011, at B1 
(discussing an example of a loan borrower being imprisoned for lying on mortgage forms at the 
encouragement of his broker); see also RICHARD BITNER, CONFESSIONS OF A SUBPRIME LENDER: AN 
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there were early indications that something was amiss.
29
 
As early as 1998, Commodity Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”) 
Chairwoman Brooksley Born registered concern about the expansion in the 
unregulated derivatives markets and related losses, and sought to impose 
regulations on the derivatives market.
30
  Not only were her efforts derailed, 
but Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin, Federal Reserve Chairman Alan 
Greenspan, and Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) Chairman 
Arthur Levitt lobbied successfully to prohibit derivatives trading from 
being regulated, and ultimately affirmatively removed derivatives from 
coming within the purview of the CFTC.
31
  Their efforts to derail 
derivatives regulation were nearly foiled by the meltdown of Long-Term 
Capital Management (“LTCM”) in September 1998,32 but despite a 
glimpse of catastrophic losses that could arise from the unregulated 
derivatives trading,
33
 Congress was persuaded to place a moratorium on the 
                                                                                                                          
INSIDER’S TALE OF GREED, FRAUD, AND IGNORANCE 73, 80–96 (2008) (describing “[t]he [a]rt of 
[c]reative [f]inancing” in subprime mortgage lending to qualify borrowers for mortgage loans, which 
the author termed “[m]aking [c]hicken [s]alad [o]ut of [c]hicken [s]hit”) . 
29 See Over-the-Counter Derivatives, 63 Fed. Reg. 26,114, 26,114 (May 12, 1998) (noting the 
increased sophistication and volume of over-the-counter derivatives and encouraging new safeguards). 
30 Frontline: The Warning (PBS television broadcast Oct. 20, 2009) (interview with Brooksley 
Born, former Chairperson, CFTC), available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/warning/inter
views/born.html.  
31 See FCIC REPORT, supra note 2, at 47–48 (noting that in October 1998, Congress passed a 
moratorium on the CFTC’s ability to regulate over-the-counter derivatives, as requested by Rubin, 
Greenspan, and Levitt); cummings, supra note 27, at 530–31 (describing the response to Director 
Born’s study and the CFTC concept release as being ultimately “quashed by Congress”); Press Release, 
U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, Joint Statement by Treasury Secretary Robert E. Rubin, Fed. Reserve Bd. 
Chairman Alan Greenspan, and Sec. & Exch. Comm’n Chairman Arthur Levitt (May 7, 1998), 
available at http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/rr2426.aspx (questioning the 
“jurisdiction” of the CFTC in the derivatives market). 
32 See FCIC REPORT, supra note 2, at 56–58.  “LTCM” was a hedge fund that experienced 
“devastating losses on its $125 billion portfolio” after Russia defaulted on part of its national debt, 
causing a panic in junk bonds and emerging market debt.  Id. at 56–57.  LTCM had a high-risk 
leveraging strategy that borrowed $24 for every $1 of investors’ equity, so that when the capital market 
panicked, the fund lost 80% of its equity ($4 billion) resulting in $120 billion in debt.  Id.  LTCM also 
had derivative contracts worth about $1 trillion, and the concern was that because of the limited equity 
in the firm, it could fail if the fund’s counterparties attempted to liquidate their positions 
simultaneously.  Id. at 57.  Behind-the-scenes emergency maneuvering by the Federal Reserve Bank of 
New York organized fourteen of the largest financial institutions with large exposures to LTCM (later 
central players in the taxpayer bailout of those banks) “to inject $3.6 billion into LTCM in return for 
90% of its stock.”  Id.  All but one of the fourteen institutions (Bear Stearns declined) contributed 
between $100 million and $300 million.  Id. 
33 See FCIC REPORT, supra note 2, at 46–47 (noting the “wave of significant losses and scandals 
[that] hit the market” between 1994 to 1998 after the CFTC “exempt[ed] certain nonstandardized OTC 
derivatives” from trading on a regulated exchange).  But see Private-Sector Refinancing of the Large 
Hedge Fund, Long-Term Capital Management: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Banking & Fin. 
Servs., 105th Cong. (1998) (statement of Alan Greenspan, Federal Reserve Chairman), available at 
www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/testimony/1998/19981001.htm (claiming that there was a “relative 
absence of such examples over the past five years” and that “[d]ynamic markets periodically engender 
large defaults”).   
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CFTC’s ability to regulate over-the-counter (“OTC”) derivatives.  In 
December 2000, Congress “in essence deregulated the OTC derivatives 
market and eliminated oversight by both the CFTC and the SEC.”34  In 
2004, Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) agents were asking for more 
investigators to address fraud in the mortgage industry; their pleas were 
ignored.
35
  In 2005, a cover story from The Economist reported on the 
worldwide rise in house prices as “the biggest bubble in history,” and 
urged Americans to “[p]repare for the economic pain when it pops.”36  In 
2006, New York University economist Nouriel Roubini warned the 
audience at an International Monetary Fund meeting in Washington, D.C. 
of a coming crisis; he was not alone.
37
  In August 2007, more warning bells 
                                                                                                                          
34 FCIC REPORT, supra note 2, at 48; see also Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000, 
Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763 (2000) (deregulating OTC derivatives by enacting H.R. 5660 into 
law); cummings, supra note 27, at 533 (describing how Congress refused to regulate OTC derivatives 
by removing OTC transaction regulations). 
35 As early as 2004, the FBI suspected fraud in the mortgage and subprime mortgage market, but 
did not pursue the investigation due to a lack of funding and staffing after overall FBI staffing 
decreased between 2001 and 2007 and resources were shifted to post-September 11, 2001 national 
security priorities.  See Lichtblau et al. supra note 12, at A1 (reporting a loss of 625 agents—36% of 
the FBI’s 2001 levels).  Executives in the private sector also complained of “difficulty attracting the 
bureau’s attention in cases involving possible frauds of millions of dollars.”  Id.  Emblematic of 
governmental disregard for the rampant financial abuses beginning in May 2000 and continuing to 
2008, regulators at the SEC repeatedly ignored the persistent claims by a citizen whistleblower named 
Harry Markopolis that Bernie Madoff was running a Ponzi scheme.  Assessing the Madoff Ponzi 
Scheme and Regulatory Failures: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Capital Mkts., Ins., & Gov’t 
Sponsored Enters. of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 111th Cong. 5 (2009) [hereinafter Hearing on 
Regulatory Failures] (statement of Harry Markopolos, Chartered Financial Analyst and Certified Fraud 
Examiner); David Gelles & Gillian Tett, From Behind Bars, Madoff Spins His Story, FIN. TIMES (Apr. 
8, 2011 5:04 PM), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/a29d2b4a-60b7-11e0-a182-
00144feab49a.html?ftcamp=traffic/email/regsnl//memmkt/#axzz1JMG01lMV (noting that the firm was 
founded in 1960 and Madoff claims that the Ponzi scheme first began in the early 1990s, whereas 
Irving Picard, the trustee seeking to retrieve assets for Madoff’s victims, asserts that the fraud began as 
early as 1983).  Although Markopolis’s efforts to gain the attention of SEC investigators continued 
over a period of eight and a half years, and included his own undercover investigation and supporting 
documents to aid the SEC, Madoff was not investigated by the SEC until after he confessed 
spontaneously to his sons.  See Amir Efrati et al. Top Broker Accused of $50 Billion Fraud, WALL ST. 
J., Dec. 12, 2008, at A1 (describing the manner in which Madoff confessed to his sons).  By then, the 
losses had grown to an estimated $50 billion to $65 billion. Hearing on Regulatory Failures, supra; see 
also Efrati, supra (placing the value of the Ponzi scheme at $50 billion); Gelles & Tett, supra (placing 
the value of the Ponzi scheme at $65 billion).  Madoff, who in 2009, at age 70, pled guilty to eleven 
counts of fraud, money laundering, perjury, and theft, is serving a 150-year federal sentence. Diana B. 
Henriques, Madoff, Apologizing, Is Given 150 Years, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 2009, at A1; Diana B. 
Henriques & Jack Healy, Madoff Jailed After Pleading Guilty to Fraud, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 2009, at 
A1.  
36 Special Report: The Global Housing Boom; in Come the Waves, THE ECONOMIST, June 16, 
2005. 
37 NOURIEL ROUBINI & STEPHEN MIHM, CRISIS ECONOMICS: A CRASH COURSE IN THE FUTURE 
OF FINANCE 1–3 (2010).  Roubini and Mihm identify a number of respected experts who issued 
warnings of coming disaster: 
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sounded when credit markets tightened.
38
  Prior to their collapses, several 
of the banks showed stress.
39
  By the time Paulson approached President 
George W. Bush in 2008, financial markets were on the brink of collapse
40
 
and losses were in the trillions of dollars.
41
  To stave off implosion of the 
American financial markets, banks, investment banks, mortgage 
companies, insurance companies, and others received billions of dollars in 
bailouts for their firms at taxpayers’ expense.42  One insurance company, 
                                                                                                                          
Robert Shiller [of Yale University], was far ahead of almost everyone in warning of 
the dangers of a stock market bubble in advance of the tech bust; more recently, he 
was one of the first economists to sound the alarm about the housing bubble. . . . In 
2005[,] University of Chicago finance professor Raghuram Rajan told a crowd of 
high-profile economists and policy makers in Jackson Hole, Wyoming, that the 
ways bankers and traders were being compensated would encourage them to take on 
too much risk and leverage, making the global financial system vulnerable to a 
severe crisis. . . . Wall Street legend James Grant warned in 2005 that the Federal 
Reserve had helped create one of “the greatest of all credit bubbles” in the history of 
finance; William White, chief economist at the Bank for International Settlements, 
warned about the systemic risks of asset and credit bubbles; financial analyst Nassim 
Nicholas Taleb cautioned that the financial markets were woefully unprepared to 
handle “fat tail” events that fell outside the usual distribution of risk; economists 
Maurice Obstfeld and Kenneth Rogoff warned about the unsustainability of current 
account deficits in the United States; and Stephen Roach of Morgan Stanley and 
David Rosenberg of Merrill Lynch long ago raised concerns about consumers in the 
United States living far beyond their means.  The list goes on. 
Id. at 3. 
38 See Les Christie, Mortgage Meltdown Contagion: A Grim Forecast Has Economists More 
Pessimistic Over How Far the Collapse Will Spread to the Rest of the Economy, CNNMONEY.COM 
(Aug. 13, 2007, 11:49 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2007/08/10/real_estate/mortgage_meltdown_crushi
ng_other_markets/index.htm (noting that the housing market’s collapse sparked fears that “tighter 
credit will have a broader impact on consumers, markets and the economy”). 
39 See STIGLITZ, supra note 17, at 136 (stating that in the first two weeks of August 2007, the 
European Central Bank and the Federal Reserve supplied “massive liquidity to the market” with the 
European Central Bank injecting around $274 billion, and the Federal Reserve injecting $38 billion 
“[a]t the first signs of problems”); see also Shawn Tully, Wall Street’s Money Machine Breaks Down, 
CNNMONEY.COM (Nov. 12, 2007, 12:13 PM), http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune_archiv
e/2007/11/26/101232838/ (archiving the list of banks and financial institutions damaged by the 
financial collapse). 
40 See HENRY M. PAULSON, JR., ON THE BRINK: INSIDE THE RACE TO STOP THE COLLAPSE OF THE 
GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM 254 (2010) (stating that the mortgage crisis was the “economic equivalent 
of war” and that the markets were “ready to collapse”). 
41 See Richard Frost & Kyung Bok Cho, Asian Stocks Rally, Treasuries Drop on Fannie, Freddie 
Takeover, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 8, 2008), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=
aq8tCTiwjJmY (reporting that “[m]ore than $17 trillion in global equity value has been wiped out since 
October as the collapse of the subprime debt market and a U.S. housing recession slowed global 
economies”); see also PAULSON, supra note 40, at 255–56 (describing the Presidential briefing 
regarding the financial collapse). 
42 See NOMI PRINS, IT TAKES A PILLAGE 13–14 (2009) (calculating that in the summer of 2009 the 
federal government’s bailout of the banks was approximately $13.3 trillion—which “is more money 
than the combined costs of every major U.S. war at that time—and observing that “$50 trillion in 
global weath was erased between September 2007 and March 2009”); ANDREW ROSS SORKIN, TOO BIG 
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responsible for guaranteeing a large amount of subprime mortgages, 
received $182 billion alone.
43
 
While the financial markets careened toward disaster and narrowly 
escaped total collapse due to taxpayer-funded bailouts, unemployment 
skyrocketed to near-Great Depression levels.
44
  Unemployment benefits 
were extended several times in an effort to address high long-term 
unemployment rates.
45
  Spiraling unemployment rates left homeowners 
jobless just as low-interest teaser rates on the easy mortgage loans expired 
and were replaced by higher rates and monthly payments that exceeded the 
income levels of the mortgagors.
46
  As foreclosures flooded the real estate 
                                                                                                                          
TO FAIL 396–99 (2009) (describing how even prior to the Troubled Asset Relief Program (“TARP”), 
which was adopted by Congress in 2008 to bail out the financial markets and despite the fact that it was 
an insurance company, AIG received $85 billion from the Federal Reserve, pulling it from the brink of 
bankruptcy); Steven A. Ramirez, Subprime Bailouts and the Predator State, 35 U. DAYTON L. REV. 81, 
89–90 (2009) (describing the $96 billion effort to bail out government sponsored entities, Fannie Mae 
and Freddie Mac, and the “Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program” by which the FDIC guaranteed 
all bank debt); David Goldman, CNNMoney.com’s Bailout Tracker, CNNMONEY.COM, http://money.cn
n.com/news/storysupplement/economy/bailouttracker/ (last visited Oct. 8, 2012) (using sources from 
the Federal Reserve, Treasury, FDIC, CBO, and White House to track the various federal programs 
used to bailout the economy and reporting that, as of November 16, 2009, $11 trillion had been 
committed for bailouts with $3 trillion of those funds extended by that date).  In all, AIG received a 
total of $182 billion in federal bailout money.  Christian Plumb, U.S. Drops Criminal Probe of AIG 
Executives, REUTERS (May 22, 2010), http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/05/23/us-aig-doj-
idUSTRE64L09W20100523.  Whether the bailout of AIG was a consequence of its political ties, or a 
necessity because its bankruptcy would have left so many major banks and other financial institutions 
“holding the worthless mortgage investments, including Goldman Sachs,” Treasury Secretary Henry 
Paulson’s former company, and subject to cascading bankruptcies, remains a subject of debate.  Carol 
D. Leonnig, AIG Founder Wielded Personal Influence in Washington, WASH. POST, Oct. 1, 2008, at 
A15.   
43 Plumb, supra note 42.  Among those companies that received bailouts, some of it has been 
repaid.  See Goldman, supra note 42 (tracking companies that have repaid some of the bailout money). 
44 See, e.g., STIGLITZ, supra note 17, at 63 (calculating that the economy lost eight million jobs 
between December 2007 and October 2009, and that, given the number of new entrants to the job 
markets, twelve million jobs would be required to restore the economy to full employment); Eleni 
Theodossiou & Steven F. Hipple, Unemployment Remains High in 2010, 134 MONTHLY LAB. REV., 
Mar. 2011, at 3, available at http://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2011/03/art1exc.htm (reporting that “the 
number of long-term unemployed reached a record high” in the fourth quarter of 2010, and that the 
9.6% unemployment rate was the first improvement in the rate since the 2007–2009 recession and was 
“down from a 26-year high of 10.0 percent a year earlier”).  
45 See Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2012, H.R. 3630, 112th Cong.  
§§ 2121–24 (2012) (extending unemployment benefits by modifying the end dates of the emergency 
employment compensation program, the Unemployed Workers and Struggling Families Act, and 
benefits under the Railroad Unemployment Insurance Act); Carl Hulse, Senate Is Set to Extend Aid to 
the Jobless, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 2010, at A1 (detailing the political battle within the Senate over 
whether unemployment benefits should be extended); Robert Pear & Jennifer Steinhauer, Congress 
Passes Tax Cut Extension, and Everyone Claims a Win, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 2012, at A16 (reporting 
on compromise that extended tax cuts and unemployment benefits).  
46 STIGLITZ, supra note 17, at 16; see PRINS, supra note 42, at 54 (calculating losses at $6 trillion 
in the U.S. housing market, $7.5 trillion in pension plans and household portfolios, $5.6 trillion in other 
assets, and an increase in joblessness from 7.5 to 14.7 million as unemployment nearly doubled in the 
eighteen months between January 2008 and June 2009).  
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market with bargain-priced homes for sale, the buyers retreated to wait out 
the shift as real estate prices dropped, leaving over a quarter of all 
homeowners with homes valued below their outstanding mortgage owed.
47
  
The Mortgage Bankers’ Association warned consumers that walking away 
from mortgage obligations was irresponsible
48
 only one month before it 
reportedly refused to provide the terms of a deal it made with creditors 
after vacating its new facilities.
49
  Foreclosures since the crisis have 
reached record numbers, with more waiting to be processed.
50
   
American Insurance Group (“AIG”) was the world’s largest insurance 
company and one of its units, AIG Financial Products Corporation  
(“AIG FP”), “dominated dealing in OTC derivatives,” accumulating a one-
half trillion dollar position in credit default swaps.
51
  AIG recognized the 
income from these derivatives without creating any reserves for possible 
losses,
52
 basically insuring subprime mortgages through these derivatives.  
                                                                                                                          
47 See Beth Braverman, Homeowners Abandoning Houses En Masse, CNNMONEY.COM (Apr. 30, 
2010, 4:12 PM), http://moremoney.blogs.money.cnn.com/2010/04/30/homeowners-abandoning-
houses-en-masse/ (“A quarter of all borrowers—11.3 million homeowners—were underwater on their 
mortgages at the end of 2009.”).  
48 Roger Lowenstein, Just Walk Away, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 2010, at MM15.  In May 2010, the 
CBS news show 60 Minutes reported on “strategic default[s]” in which borrowers walked away from 
mortgage obligations when the value of the property falls significantly below the obligations, also 
known as being “underwater” on one’s loan.  60 Minutes: Mortgages: Walking Away (CBS television 
broadcast May 9, 2010), available at http://www.cbsnews.com/video/watch/?id=6470184n&tag=relate
d;photovideo.  The Wall Street Journal has also reported on strategic defaults.  Dawn Wotapka, So 
You’re Underwater, What’s Next?, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 24, 2009, 12:02 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/devel
opments/2009/11/24/so-youre-underwater-whats-next/.  
49 See James R. Hagerty, Mortgage Group in Property Pinch, WALL ST. J., Feb. 8, 2010, at C1 
(reporting that the Mortgage Bankers Association’s was selling its headquarters building for 
substantially less than it owes its lenders).  The Mortgage Bankers Association purchased the 
Washington, D.C. building for $79 million, and after sold the building to CoStar Group for a mere 
$41.3 million, it moved five blocks away into rental space.  Id. 
50 See RealtyTrac Reports Foreclosure Activity Dips 15 Percent in Q1 of 2011, 
NATIONALMORTGAGEPROFESSIONAL.COM (Apr. 15, 2011, 11:24 AM), http://nationalmortgageprofessi
onal.com/news24664/realtytrac-reports-foreclosure-activity-dips-15-percent-q1-2011 (March 2010 had 
the highest monthly total of foreclosure notices since the inception of RealtyTrac monthly reports in 
January 2005, with 367,056 homeowners receiving a foreclosure notice.).  In the first quarter of 2011, 
foreclosures fell to a three-year low, with one in every 191 U.S. housing units receiving a foreclosure 
filing.  Id.  
51 FCIC REPORT, supra note 2, at 50. The report stated: 
A key OTC derivative in the financial crisis was the credit default swap. . . . The 
purchaser of a CDS transferred to the seller the default risk of an underlying debt.  
The debt security could be any bond or loan obligation.  The CDS buyer made 
periodic payments to the seller during the life of the swap.  In return, the seller 
offered protection against default or specified “‘credit events”’ such as a partial 
default.  If a credit event such as a default occurred, the CDS seller would typically 
pay the buyer the face value of the debt.  
Id. 
52 Id.  Although a CDS is often compared to insurance, there are two key distinctions: (1) CDS 
can be used to speculate on the losses of others’ property or interests because the purchaser of the CDS 
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When borrowers began defaulting on subprime mortgages, financial 
institutions holding the credit default swaps sought to have AIG post 
collateral under the terms of the credit default swaps.
53
  When the housing 
bubble burst, AIG FP had guaranteed billions of dollars worth of subprime 
mortgages for which it could not pay.
54
  Yet, AIG told investors that it had 
no material exposure to subprime losses even though it posted $2 billion in 
collateral to Goldman Sachs to cover losses.
55
   
At the same time that the U.S. government was bailing out the largest 
banks in America from their high-risk gambles arising from trading 
derivatives in the mortgage and subprime mortgage markets,
56
 calls to aid 
homeowners who were unable to meet their repayments were met with 
objections from the financial markets, arguing that doing so would create a 
moral hazard
57—that is, a disincentive to pay their mortgages because 
owners would hold out hope of a bailout.
58
  Moral hazard did not impede 
the flow of bailout funds to lenders. 
                                                                                                                          
need not have a property interest in the underlying debt (somewhat akin to being able to insure your 
neighbor’s car and then hoping the car will crash so that you may cash in on the insurance policy); and 
(2) the seller of the CDS is not required to put aside financial reserves in case of loss as regulated 
insurers must.  Id. 
53 Id. at 273–74. 
54 Id.  
55 Id. at 270. 
56 PAULSON, supra note 40, at 364, 368.  On Monday, October 13, 2008, nine banks agreed to 
receive $125 billion to address massive undercapitalization in the banking system:  Citigroup, Wells 
Fargo, and JPMorgan all received $25 billion; Bank of America received $15 billion; Merrill Lynch, 
Goldman Sachs, and Morgan Stanley each received $10 billion; Bank of New York Mellon received $3 
billion; and State Street Corporation received $2 billion.  Id. at 364.  Among the basic conditions of 
each bank’s loan, their CEOs signed on to as a condition of the loans was to “expand the flow of credit 
to U.S. consumers and businesses; and to work diligently, under existing programs, to modify the terms 
of residential mortgages, as appropriate.”  Id. at 366 (internal quotation marks omitted).  Subsequent 
events would reveal that the bankers did not diligently work to modify residential mortgage terms and, 
in some cases, seemed to actively delay or even undermine modification.  See, e.g., State of Nevada v. 
Bank of Am. Corp., Case No. A-10-631557-B XXV (D. Ct. Clark Cnty., Nev., Dec. 17, 2010) 
(Complaint), available at  http://www.s355160796.onlinehome.us/_oneclick_uploads/2012/03/state-of-
nevada-vs-ank-of-america.pdf); Andrew Martin and Michael Powell, Two States Sue Bank of America 
Over Mortgages, NY TIMES, Dec. 18, 2010, at B3, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/18/b
usiness/18mortgage.html (reporting on complaints filed by the attorneys general of Arizona and 
Nevada that “accused Bank of America of assuring customers that they would not be foreclosed upon 
while they were seeking loan modification, only to proceed with foreclosures anyway; of falsely telling 
customers that they must be in default to botain a modification; of promising that the modifications 
would be made permanent if they completed a trial period, only to renege on the deal; and of conjuring 
up bogus reasons for denying modifications”).  
57 See Richard Eskow, Foreclosures and Guilt: The “Home Loan Moral Hazard Scorecard,” 
OURFUTURE.ORG (Oct. 18, 2010, 2:45 AM), http://www.ourfuture.org/blog-
entry/2010104218/foreclosures-and-guilt-home-loan-moral-hazard-scorecard (providing a “scorecard” 
comparing the moral hazard of bankers versus borrowers in the wake of the 2008 subprime mortgage 
crisis); PRINS, supra note 42, at 37, 108 (citing statements made by Treasury Secretary Paulson that 
government intervention to aid home mortgage borrowers would be inappropriate).  
58 STIGLITZ, supra note 17, at 16. 
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Bankruptcies also hit record levels as businesses failed due to lack of 
available credit,
59
 while the bailed-out banks hoarded funds due to the need 
for liquidity,
60
 favorable interest rates from the federal reserve,
61
 and the 
lucrative investment opportunities in the derivatives market.
62
  In fact, as of 
September 2012, the bailed-out banking sector sat on nearly $1.5 trillion in 
excess reserves.
63
  
By 2010, courts began to realize that banks and their representatives 
had been using forged documents and fraudulent affidavits to foreclose on 
properties in thousands of cases.
64
  Rather than acting contrite, the CEOs of 
the bailed out corporations gave themselves and their top managers hefty 
bonuses and “retention grants.”65  
                                                                                                                          
59 See, e.g., Christine Dugas, Small Businesses Vital to Economic Recovery Go Bankrupt, USA 
TODAY (July 2, 2009, 10:35 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/money/smallbusiness/2009-06-30-small-
businesses-bankruptcy_N.htm (citing the difficulty in getting small business loans due to the credit 
crunch and the inability to rely upon credit cards among reasons for the bankruptcies); Michael J. de la 
Merced, General Growth Properties Files for Bankruptcy, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Apr. 16, 2009, 2:34 
AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2009/04/16/general-growth-properties-files-for-bankruptcy/ (stating 
that the company president “cit[ed] ‘the unprecedented disruption in the real estate financing markets 
and the need to extend maturing debt’ as the reason [his] company filed” for bankruptcy). 
60 See Ramirez, Subprime Bailouts and the Predator State, supra note 42, at 97–99 (stating that 
“zombie banks” hurt the economy by hoarding capital to repay the government and averting 
intervention by the government when losses were imminent). 
61 See STIGLITZ, supra note 17, at 138 (suggesting that the Federal Reserve’s decision to begin 
paying interest on bank reserves held in deposit at the Federal Reserve was “counterproductive” 
because it encouraged banks to keep the money at the Federal Reserve rather than lending it out to 
borrowers). 
62 See Matt Wirz & Serena Ng, Subprime Bonds Are Back—As Encomony Recovers, Long-Term 
Investors Willing to Take on More Risks, WALL. ST. J., Apr. 1, 2011, at A1 (reporting that banks, and 
even bailed-out insurance giant, AIG, have returned to investing in subprime and other residential 
mortgage bonds because the higher risk associated with those bonds also provides the opportunity for 
higher yields on the investments). 
63 Excess Reserves of Depository Institutions (EXCRESNS), FED. RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS 
(Sept. 7, 2012, 9:49 AM), http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/EXCRESNS. 
64 See, e.g., Joe Rauch & Clare Baldwin, BofA, Wells, Citi See Foreclosure Probe Fines, 
REUTERS (Feb. 25, 2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/02/26/us-banks-foreclosures-
idUSTRE71P0AT20110226 (“The biggest U.S. mortgage lenders are being investigated by 50 state 
attorneys general and U.S. regulators for foreclosing on homes without having proper paperwork in 
place or without having properly reviewed paperwork before signing it.”). 
65 See, e.g., STAFF OF S. COMM. ON HOMELAND SEC. & GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, PERMANENT 
SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, 112TH CONG., WALL STREET AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: ANATOMY 
OF A FINANCIAL COLLAPSE 154 (Comm. Print 2011) (describing how the executive committee 
members at Washington Mutual were exempted from the 2008 bonuses after public outcry and instead, 
quietly given “retention grants”); STIGLITZ, supra note 17, at 56 (stating that despite the banks 
tightened lending decisions, executives received near record bonuses); Edmund L. Andrews & Peter 
Baker, At A.I.G., Huge Bonuses After $170 Billion Bailout, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 2009, at A1 
(reporting that AIG planned to pay about $165 million in bonuses to executives that brought the 
company to the brink of collapse the prior year); Peter Cohan, Goldman Sachs: $1 Billion  for Charity, 
$23 Billion for Banker Bonuses, DAILY FIN. (Oct. 13, 2009, 10:15 AM), 
http://www.dailyfinance.com/story/goldman-sachs-1-billion-for-charity-23-billion-for-banker-
bo/19193897/ (criticizing Goldman Sachs for giving $23 billion in bonuses in light of the $12.9 billion 
taxpayer dollars used to bail the company out of a bad CDS bet with AIG); Eric Dash & Louise Story, 
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Not surprisingly, such catastrophic failures of capital management led 
to calls for criminal investigations into the practices of the financial 
corporations and the people who ran them.
66
  Those who benefited from 
creating the subprime mortgage debacle faced civil and regulatory fines, 
yet no senior executives, nor their firms, have been criminally charged.
67
  
Although the financial crisis extended across the globe and a number of 
corporations failed or were bailed out, corporations at the center of the 
crisis typify the pervasive recklessness and misconduct yielding outrageous 
fortunes to the few at the expense of the many.
68
   
                                                                                                                          
Citigroup’s Top Officers to Decline ’08 Bonuses, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 2009, at B1 (detailing that in 
2008, financial executives and senior bankers received lower bonuses due to earning results); Stephen 
Grocer, Banks Set for Record Pay, WALL ST. J., Jan. 15, 2010, at A1 (reporting that major U.S. banks 
and securities firms are still paying their employees a massive $145 billion for 2009, despite public 
frustration with Wall Street’s pay culture); Ben White, What Red Ink? Wall Street Paid Hefty Bonuses, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2009, at A1 (reporting that despite losses and bailouts, employees at financial 
companies in New York collected an estimated $18.4 billion in bonuses in 2008); see also ROUBINI & 
MIHM, supra note 37, at 68–69 (explaining how the financial industry’s reliance upon bonuses as a 
compensation mechanism created the moral hazard of encouraging excessive risk-taking to incur short-
term profits that would enhance bonuses). 
66 See, e.g., FCIC REPORT, supra note 2, at 241 (reporting that two Bear Sterns executives were 
criminally charged with fraud for communications with investors after major losses in two 
hedgefunds); Morgenson & Story, supra note 23 (reporting that the regulators’ failure to compile 
information that could lead to criminal prosecution has slowed efforts to charge senior executives); 
Matt Taibbi, Why Isn’t Wall Street in Jail?, ROLLING STONE, Mar. 3, 2011, at 44 (criticizing regulatory 
agencies for failing to hold financial companies and executives on Wall Street criminally accountable 
for the economic collapse). 
67 See, e.g., Sarah Childress, Report: DOJ Criminal Chief Lanny Breuer Stepping Down, PBS 
FRONTLINE (Jan. 23, 2013), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/business-economy-financial-
crisis/untouchables/report-doj-criminal-chief-lanny-breuer-stepping-down/ (reporting that the 
Washington Post report that Breuer is stepping down came a day after a PBS Frontline report aired in 
which Breuer defended the lack of criminal prosecutions against Wall Street executives or their 
companies that were at the center of the 2008 financial meltdown); Jason M. Breslow, Too Big to Jail? 
The Top Ten Civil Cases Against the Banks, PBS FRONTLINE (Jan. 22, 2013), 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/business-economy-financial-crisis/untouchables/too-big-to-
jail-the-top-10-civil-cases-against-the-banks/ (describing the top civil cases brought in lieu of criminal 
prosecutions against the banks at the center of the 2008 financial meltdown); Eaglesham, supra note 22 
(reporting on three separate DOJ investigations against Washington Mutual Inc., IndyMac Bancorp, 
and New Century Financial Corp. that were either stalled or closed); Joe Nocera, Biggest Fish Face 
Little Risk of Being Caught, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 2011, at B1 (describing the lack of prosecution of 
many executives of financial corporations that led to the demise of the global financial system); E. 
Scott Reckard, Criminal Probe Dropped Against Countrywide CEO Mozilo, WASH. POST, Feb. 19, 
2011, at A04, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2011/02/18/AR2011021807930.html; Amir Efrati, AIG Executives Won’t Face 
Criminal Charges, WALL ST. J.  (May 22, 2010), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704
852004575259240428335282.html (explaining the decision by federal prosecutors not to bring 
criminal charges against current and former American International Group, Inc. executives for their 
role in the financial crisis).  In August 2012, the DOJ announced that it would not bring criminal 
charges against Goldman Sachs or any of its employees for financial fraud in connection with the 
mortgage crisis, citing no “viable basis to bring a criminal prosecution.”  Reed Albergotti & Elizabeth 
Rappaport, U.S. Not Seeking Goldman Charges, WALL ST. J., Aug. 10, 2012, at C1.  
68 One example is the now-defunct Countrywide Mortgage, absorbed by Bank of America during 
the crisis.  Over 105 years after its founding and numerous mergers, acquisitions, and name changes, 
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The subprime mortgage crisis, in which “lenders made loans that they 
knew borrowers could not afford” and in which “lenders . . . put borrowers 
into higher-cost loans so [lenders] would get bigger fees, often never 
disclosed to borrowers,” fueled a speculative housing bubble in which 
borrowers were expected to default, causing massive losses to investors in 
mortgage securities.
69
  Countrywide Financial originated more subprime 
loans than any other company.
70
  The fees from the easy mortgages granted 
by Countrywide yielded financial riches for Angelo Mozilo, the former 
CEO of Countrywide, whose income included $102 million in 2006, a total 
of $259 million in 2007, and a retirement benefit package of $58 million in 
2008.
71
  Mozilo settled a civil suit brought by the SEC for $67.5 million, in 
which Mozilo and two other Countrywide executives were accused of 
misleading investors, but no criminal charges were brought.
72
  
Countrywide, once valued with assets of $200 billion, was acquired by 
Bank of America in 2008, then valued at $2.8 billion.
73
 
Executives at the financial firms made millions in salary, perks, fees, 
and bonuses, while many of the companies they commanded yielded 
negative shareholder returns.
74
  Nearly $17 trillion in household net wealth 
                                                                                                                          
Bank of America had assets of $2.3 trillion in September 2009, absorbing both Countrywide and 
Merrill Lynch after the 2008 global financial meltdown. SIMON JOHNSON & JAMES KWAK, 13 
BANKERS: THE WALL STREET TAKEOVER AND THE NEXT FINANCIAL MELTDOWN 180 (2010).  Indeed, 
in March 2009, Bank of America’s assets were 16.4% of GDP.  Id. at 1, 12. 
69 FCIC REPORT, supra note 2, at xxii. 
70 Steven A. Ramirez, Lessons from the Subprime Debacle: Stress Testing CEO Autonomy, 54 ST. 
LOUIS U. L.J. 1, 24 (2009) [hereinafter Lessons from the Subprime Debacle]; see also STEVEN A. 
RAMIREZ, LAWLESS CAPITALISM: THE SUBPRIME CRISIS AND THE CASE FOR AN ECONOMIC RULE OF 
LAW 192 (2012) [hereinafter LAWLESS CAPITALISM].   
71 Ramirez, Lessons from the Subprime Debacle, supra note 70, at 25.  For 2006, Mozilo’s 
compensation included salary plus a bonus of $20.5 million; in 2007, he earned $102 million in salary, 
$30 million in options compensation, and $127 million in sales of Countrywide stock, which were sold 
immediately prior to the firm’s announcement of a $388 million write down due to loan losses.  
RAMIREZ, LAWLESS CAPITALISM, supra note 70, at 192.  
72 Morgenson, supra note 20; see also RAMIREZ, LAWLESS CAPITALISM, supra note 70, at 192; 
Nocera, supra note 67 (“On the eve of the trial date last fall, the S.E.C. blinked and settled with Mr. 
Mozilo.  One of the S.E.C.’s charges was insider trading—that Mr. Mozilo sold nearly $140 million 
worth of stock after he knew the company was in trouble.”); Ramirez, Lessons from the Subprime 
Debacle, supra note 70, at 24 (detailing the civil suit brought by eleven states for over $8 billion on the 
grounds that Countrywide misled consumers and actively lied about its “no closing cost loans”). 
73 Countrywide Financial Corporation, supra note 20. 
         74 See Lucian A. Bebchuk et al., The Wages of Failure: Executive Compensation at Bear Stearns 
and Lehman 2000–2008, 27 YALE J. ON REG. 257, 272–73 (2010) (analyzing the net financial payoff 
for Bear Stearns and Lehman executive teams during 2000–2008 and concluding that “performance 
based compensation” more than made up for paper losses from exposing the firms to high risk 
investments); Ramirez, Lessons from the Subprime Debacle, supra note 70, at 6 (discussing the 
distorted consequences of risk-taking conduct by CEOs that leads to high financial payoffs in executive 
compensation “while offloading staggering risks” of losses onto the corporation and the global 
economy); Sanjai Bhagat & Brian Bolton, Investment Bankers’ Culture of Ownership? 4–5, 18–20 
(Aug. 24, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1664520 (reviewing 
executive compensation structure of the CEOs for the fourteen largest firms involved in the U.S. 
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vanished in the financial crisis, while over two dozen emergency programs 
were implemented “to stabilize the financial system and to rescue specific 
firms.”75  The Attorney General of the United States, Eric Holder, in 
assuring an audience that the Justice Department was still investigating the 
crisis, recently defended the lack of criminal prosecutions against banking 
and financial executives, by suggesting that “unethical and irresponsible 
[conduct,] . . . while morally reprehensible—may not necessarily have 
been criminal.”76  Morally reprehensible conduct, however, tends to be 
sanctioned by criminal law, particularly fraud.   
The Justice Department appears to be operating under a new policy 
because even in the very recent past, business leaders went to jail despite a 
business-friendly administration.  Most notably, President George W. 
Bush’s Administration addressed fraud by imposing prison sentences.77  
                                                                                                                          
financial crisis during 2008—the U.S. Treasury-required TARP participants, Bank of America, Bank of 
New York Mellon, Citigroup, Goldman Sachs, JPMorgan Chase, Morgan Stanley, State Street, Wells 
Fargo, Merrill Lynch, Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, Countrywide Financial, and AIG—and 
concluding that the compensation structures created financial incentives for executive risk-taking that 
resulted in positive payoffs for the CEOs from 2000–2008, while the investor shareholders experienced 
negative returns); see, e.g., M.P. Narayanan et al., The Economic Impact of Backdating of Executive 
Stock Options, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1597, 1601 (2007) (finding that backdating options result in losses 
of $400 million per firm while executives gained $500,000).    
75 See FCIC REPORT, supra note 2, at 375–76, 391 (In addition to TARP, included among the 
programs are the Federal Reserve’s Term Securities Lending Facility and Primary Dealer Credit 
Facility programs, at $483 billion and $156 billion, respectively; money market funding peaked at $350 
billion, Commercial Paper Funding Facility peaked at $365 billion; and the Federal Reserve’s purchase 
of agency mortgage-backed securities of $1.25 trillion.).  Household net wealth decreased from the 
decline in housing prices, as well as from the declining value of financial assets.  Id. at 391; see also 
Thomas Ferguson & Robert Johnson, Too Big to Bail: The “Paulson Put,” Presidential Politics, and 
the Global Financial Meltdown, Part I: From Shadow Financial System to Shadow Bailout, 38 INT’L J. 
POL. ECON. 3 (2009) (analyzing the origins of the global financial meltdown in the U.S. subprime 
mortgage markets and the proliferation of extensive financial risk by Wall Street); Ramirez, Lessons 
from the Subprime Debacle, supra note 70, at 1 (arguing that, among other factors, “[c]orporate 
governance in the United States played a central role in the historic subprime debacle now gripping the 
global economy” (footnote omitted)).  
76 Peter Lattman, Holder Defends Efforts to Fight Financial Fraud, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Feb. 
23, 2012, 9:30 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/02/23/holder-defends-efforts-to-combat-
financial-fraud/.  
77 See, e.g., Kamelia Angelova, Top 10 White-Collar Criminals in Jail, BUS. INSIDER (Jul. 16, 
2009, 2:05 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/white-collar-criminals-in-jail-2009-7 (listing the 
executives of major corporations that are serving prison sentences for fraud and embezzlement).  
Former WorldCom CEO Bernard Ebbers, convicted of false financial reporting and fraud, is serving 
twenty-five years; former Enron CEO Jeffrey Skilling, convicted on securities fraud and other crimes, 
has an expected release date from federal prison of 2028.  Id.  Former HealthSouth Corp. founder and 
CEO Richard M. Scrushy served a seventy-month sentence for a 2006 conviction for paying $500,000 
in campaign contributions in exchange for a hospital regulatory board seat.  Sophia Pearson, Ex-
HealthSouth Chief Scrushy’s Prison Term Cut to 70 Months, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Jan. 25, 
2012), http://www.businessweek.com/news/2012-01-26/ex-healthsouth-chief-scrushy-s-prison-term-
cut-to-70-months.html.  Former Tyco International CEO Dennis Kozlowski is serving a ninety-eight 
month to twenty-five year prison term for a 2005 accounting fraud conviction.  Kozlowski in NYC Work 
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The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, as well as Congress, found 
evidence of fraud and made referrals to the Justice Department.
78
  This 
Article maintains that given the enormous costs of the crisis, the DOJ’s 
timidity toward pursuing prosecutions is simply inexplicable.
79
  The 
continued failure to impose criminal sanctions affirms white-collar 
misconduct, threatening to lay the seeds for the next crisis.   
III.  DISCRETION AND THE PROSECUTOR 
The nature of criminal law is such that it is impossible to define rules 
to cover every possible combination of facts that might be defined as 
criminal.
80
  Indeed, scholars have long recognized that legal systems 
compromise between the certainty of rules and the discretion of 
“informed” officials based upon particular facts.81  Consequently, the 
prosecutor is given broad discretion in making criminal charging 
decisions.
82
  “So long as there is probable cause to support the charges, 
prosecutors can decide how many counts to bring, the severity of the crime 
to charge, and which suspects to use as witnesses and which to charge as 
defendants.”83  Many factors impact the prosecutor’s decision.  Some 
factors are explicit and are often set forth in prosecutorial guidelines, 
                                                                                                                          
Release, N.Y. POST (Mar. 15, 2012, 12:07 AM), http://www.nypost.com/p/news/business/kozlowski_in
_nyc_work_release_CzB8HN8Nldrmqy2Y7VNZ3K. 
78 See Phil Angelides, Will Wall Street Ever Face Justice?, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 2012, at A25 
(reporting that both the FCIC and the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations referred 
potential violations to the Justice Department—for example, the FCIC report contains evidence about 
Clayton Holdings—yet, while others have relied on this evidence to support claims of fraud and 
misrepresentation, the Justice Department has failed to devote appropriate resources or attention to this 
case or others, which is in stark contrast to the massive efforts to address the savings-and-loan debacle 
of the late 1980s); see also FCIC REPORT, supra note 2, at 169–70, 187 (detailing the Commission’s 
analysis of fraud by the corporate executives leading to the financial crisis and its conclusion that the 
firms securitizing mortgages violated due diligence).  
79 See, e.g., Interview by Chris Martenson with Gretchen Morgenson, Columnist, N.Y. Times, 
(Mar. 23, 2012), available at http://www.chrismartenson.com/blog/gretchen-morgenson-wall-street-
really-does-enjoy-different-set-rules-rest-us/72774 (“There were 1,100 criminal referrals in the S&L 
crisis and there were 839 convictions.  That is a sizable number and far, far, far more than we have 
seen.  I mean I think I can name one senior level person at a mortgage company who is in jail at the 
moment.” (quoting Gretchen Morgenson)). 
80 See MORAN & COOPER, supra note 12, at 10 (“It is now firmly believed by those who work in 
the process, and by those who observe it, that strict adherence to the rules of law, precisely as they are 
narrowly laid down, certainly as it relates to the criminal law, would be socially intolerable.  This is to 
say that society, not the criminal justice system, would not stand for full enforcement of the laws.  Here 
is clearly a basis for a high degree of discretion in the process.” (footnote omitted)).  
81 See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 127 (1961).  
82 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 680 (4th ed. 2004) (“The notion that the 
prosecuting attorney is vested with a broad range of discretion in deciding when to prosecute and when 
not to is firmly entrenched in American law.”). 
83 ERWIN CHEMERINSKY & LAURIE L. LEVENSON, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: ADJUDICATION 29 
(2008); see United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114 (1979) (holding that prosecutors are not required 
to charge a defendant with the most lenient statute). 
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ethical rules, or court opinions; others are implicit, possibly even 
unrecognized, factors, such as racial bias, relationships among supervisors 
and suspects, or the socioeconomic status of the offender and her perceived 
ability to finance a defense.
84
  These latter implicit factors are often not 
readily identifiable in a particular instance (although a bias may be 
discernible), but the explicit factors provide easy cover for any decision a 
prosecutor might make.  When wealth or power are implicit factors 
discouraging prosecution, a prosecutor cannot ignore the affirmance effect.  
A.  Sufficiency of the Evidence 
Every prosecutor must consider the sufficiency of the evidence in 
assessing whether a crime should be charged and what crime can be proved 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  Depending upon the size of a particular 
prosecutor’s office, charging guidelines may be expressly stated or 
informally applied, but these constraints are not typically statutorily 
bound.
85
  Further, because the probable cause standard required to charge a 
crime is lower than the proof beyond a reasonable doubt standard required 
to convict a defendant charged with a crime, prosecutors may vary 
considerably in their charging models.  Three decision-making models that 
have been identified as governing prosecutorial choices along the charging 
continuum are the legal sufficiency model, the trial sufficiency model, and 
the system efficiency model.
86
  
Prosecutors fitting the legal sufficiency model make charging 
decisions based upon the minimum level of proof necessary to meet the 
elements of the crime charged.
87
  The success of this model relies upon the 
expectation that many cases will resolve in a plea bargain before trial, and 
thus will not be tested by the high burden of proving the charged crime 
beyond a reasonable doubt.
88
  The risk of a type II error, that is, proceeding 
with a criminal charge when the defendant is not guilty, is highest with this 
model.
89
  The costs of such an error are borne by the defendant to a large 
                                                                                                                          
84 See id. at 30–32 (describing the relevant factors when prosecutors are deciding whether to bring 
a case, such as economic realities, the defendant’s background, and the strengths of each case). 
85 See MARC L. MILLER & RONALD F. WRIGHT, CRIMINAL PROCEDURES: PROSECUTION AND 
ADJUDICATION 135−36, 143 (4th ed. 2011) (noting that prosecutors usually have the most important 
voice in determining what charges to select, among other factors such as criminal codes and policies 
and procedures of the particular office). 
86 See Joan E. Jacoby, The Charging Policies of Prosecutors, in THE PROSECUTOR 75, 82−86 
(William F. McDonald ed., 1979) (describing four prosecutorial models, including Legal Sufficiency, 
System Efficiency, and Trial Sufficiency). 
87 Id. at 82. 
88 See id. at 82−83 (noting that with the Legal Sufficiency policy, prosecutors want to maximize 
plea bargaining due to the overload of the court with less serious misdemeanor cases).  
89 The Oxford Dictionary of Economics states:  
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extent (e.g., cost of defense, potential loss of reputation or employment, 
and loss of liberty if the defendant is convicted at trial or agrees to plea 
bargain to gain a discount in punishment), but also by the public generally 
(e.g., cost of prosecuting and punishing the wrong person, failure to 
identify, prosecute, and punish the actual wrongdoer, or undermining 
support for the rule of law). 
Prosecutors employing a trial sufficiency model evaluate cases more 
closely to assess the weight of evidence and the likelihood of success at 
trial.
90
  This more cautious approach promotes a high rate of success for 
the prosecutor, in that only those cases that are likely to result in conviction 
are charged.
91
  Here, the risk of a type I error is greatest in that an early 
decision not to charge risks leaving the guilty unchallenged and 
unpunished.
92
  Inevitably, prosecutors screening cases with a view toward 
trial sufficiency are less likely to pursue those whose guilt is more difficult 
to prove.
93
   
The third model, system efficiency, falls in the middle of the 
continuum, relying on early screening to weed out difficult cases of proof, 
yet incorporating a strong dose of plea bargaining to some degree less than 
the legal sufficiency model.
94
  This mixed model is often employed in 
urban communities where prosecutors face heavy caseloads.
95
  Plea 
bargaining facilitates system efficiency, but at the inherent cost of those 
                                                                                                                          
There are two types of mistakes that can be made when deciding whether or not to 
accept a hypothesis.  A type I error is rejecting a true hypothesis, that is, when there 
is really no good reason for rejecting.  A type II error is accepting a false hypothesis, 
that is, accepting it as true when it should really have been rejected.  When 
hypothesis testing there is a trade-off between the two types of error.  The best 
combination to choose depends on the losses arising from making the two types of 
error; in economic decisions these are frequently asymmetrical.   
The Oxford Dictionary of Economics, available at http://www.enotes.com/econ-encyclopedia/type-
and-ii-errors (last visited Aug. 16, 2011); see also A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Legal Error, 
Litigation, and the Incentive to Obey the Law, 5 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 99, 99 (1989) (explaining that type 
I errors denote when “truly guilty defendants escape liability” and type II errors describe those in which 
“truly innocent defendants are found liable”). 
90 Jacoby, supra note 86, at 92, 94. 
91 Id. at 90; see U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL, supra note 13, § 9-27.220(A) (“The attorney for the 
government should commence or recommend Federal prosecution if he/she believes that the person’s 
conduct constitutes a Federal offense and that the admissible evidence will probably be sufficient to 
obtain and sustain a conviction . . . .”); Jeffrey B. Bumgarner, Community-Related Correlates to 
Prosecutorial Decisions Regarding Accidental Killers: An Examination of Child Hyperthermia 
Automobile Deaths 2003–2006, 44 CRIM. L. BULL. 679, 681 (2008) (“[T]he trial sufficiency model . . . 
is often adopted by federal prosecutors in the United States Attorney[s’] offices.”).  
92 Supra note 89; see Jacoby, supra note 86, at 87 (“[T]he Trial Sufficiency policy . . . logically 
should result in a substantial rejection rate at intake . . . .”). 
93 See Jacoby, supra note 86, at 87.   
94 Bumgarner, supra note 86, at 681. 
95 Id. 
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with less bargaining power (the poor and marginalized) and to the inherent 
benefit of those with more status and resources.
96
     
In affirming white-collar crimes committed by the rich or powerful, 
sufficiency of evidence is a likely place to hang the prosecutor’s discretion 
hat.  If a corporation is involved, there may be many actors who have 
touched on a part of the activities, for example, either making relevant 
decisions or approving those decisions.
97
  The complicated relationships of 
a large corporation regarding who has the authority to hire, fire, promote, 
and compensate the various actors assures that an investigation into 
potentially fraudulent activity will also require the time and resource-
consuming tasks of assessing whether all of the actors conspired to breach 
the law, whether some actors recognized that their activities supported 
lawlessness, or whether all actors believed their conduct was lawful 
because it was approved by others who held expertise and should have 
been expected to alert them of likely misconduct.
98
  Communicating this 
complexity and cutting through it to present a case to a jury takes skill, 
patience, and resources.
99
   
Complexity in financial transactions complicates both the investigation 
and any eventual jury trial.  The prosecution’s ability to locate evidence of 
wrongdoing may require sorting through thousands of documents and 
hundreds of witnesses in numerous locations.
100
  Once pieced together, the 
prosecutor must organize the information in a cohesive and straight-
forward manner to a jury to gain a conviction.
101
  Moreover, for lower-
                                                                                                                          
96 See, e.g., Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 
1909, 1924, 1935 (1992) (discussing efficiencies that incentivize prosecutors to conduct plea bargains); 
Michael W. Smith, Making the Innocent Guilty: Plea Bargaining and the False Plea Convictions of the 
Innocent, 46 CRIM L. BULL. 965, 968–69, 974–76 (2010) (discussing judicial and prosecutorial 
identification of system efficiencies as a benefit of plea bargaining, and identifying “less objective 
elements” influencing plea bargaining, such as the “race of the defendant and the victim,” the “socio-
economic and immigration status of the defendant,” and “whether the defendant is represented by a 
public defender or private attorney,” among others).  
97 See RICHARD D. HARTLEY, CORPORATE CRIME 41 (2008) (“[M]ost corporate criminal activity 
involves employees at all levels and stems from existing circumstances in the corporation.”). 
98 See Mary Kreiner Ramirez, Prioritizing Justice: Combating Corporate Crime from Task Force 
to Top Priority, 93 MARQ. L. REV. 971, 998–99 (2010) [hereinafter Prioritzing Justice] (“[T]he 
complexity of multidistrict corporate structures requires greater expertise to investigate and  
analyze. . . . Moreover, the complexity of the laws that govern corporate conduct . . . require[s] legal 
and financial expertise that is often not available in the typical U.S. Attorney’s Office.”). 
99 See id. (arguing that the unique demands associated with investigating and prosecuting 
corporate crimes warrant the creation of a dedicated Corporate Crimes Division within the DOJ). 
100 See, e.g., DAVID O. FRIEDRICHS, TRUSTED CRIMINALS: WHITE COLLAR CRIME IN 
CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 270 (2d ed. 2004) (“Corporate and finance crime cases . . . pose problems in 
obtaining appropriate witness or victim cooperation.  These cases may require sifting through masses of 
dull and difficult-to-understand records . . . .” (citation omitted)). 
101 See id. at 281–82 (suggesting that prosecutors face an inherently delicate task in undertaking 
complex white-collar trials by noting that at least some studies of such cases show “jurors could not 
accurately remember important . . . economic information”). 
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level employees in the corporate food chain who were involved in the 
misconduct, complexity adds cover to their claims that they were just 
doing their jobs and were thus unaware of their complicity in criminal 
conduct.
102
  Complexities in structured mortgage transactions typically 
require expertise, such as forensic accountants or other experts, adding 
another layer of resource demands and another courtroom obstacle as the 
obscurity of the experts’ industry-laden language often confuses jurors and 
the battle of the experts creates doubt.
103
  
Finally, cases, such as those involving fraud, typically require a high 
level of mens rea, such as knowing or intentional misrepresentation.
104
  
The complexity in an organization, from documents to employee 
relationships, can undermine successful prosecution, as the prosecutor 
must often rely upon circumstantial evidence to prove the mental element 
of the crime.
105
 
B.  Case-Specific, Non-Sufficiency Factors 
In addition to sufficiency considerations informing the discretion of 
prosecutors, several case-specific and defendant-specific factors impact the 
decision-making process.  Prosecutors consider the nature of the crime; the 
gravity of the offense; the history of the defendant, including the 
defendant’s age, background, and prior offenses or contact with law 
enforcement; economic realities, such as administrative costs and other 
available resources; the need for the defendant’s cooperation; the impact 
                                                                                                                          
102 See HARTLEY, supra note 97, at 71 (stating that complexities in corporate operations may 
provide insulation from scrutiny because they make it “difficult to determine which actions were 
deliberately undertaken”). 
103 See, e.g., Linda Sandler et al., JPMorgan, Citigroup Helped Doom Lehman, Report Says, 
BLOOMBERG (Mar. 12, 2010), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=ab1XUyb
pK4Vg (reporting that the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy examiner spent a year and $38 million 
producing a 2200-page bankruptcy report); see also Jean Eaglesham & Liz Rappaport, Lehman Probe 
Stalls; Chance of No Charges, WALL ST. J., Mar. 12, 2011, at B1 (reporting that the SEC is doubtful it 
will be able to bring charges against Lehman Brothers and that the DOJ is unlikely to pursue criminal 
charges if the SEC does not move forward); Greg Farrell, Justice Department Ends Two-Year Criminal 
Probe into AIG, FIN. TIMES, May 24, 2010, at 23 (reporting that the DOJ determined there was 
insufficient evidence to pursue charges against AIG or its senior executives). 
104 See John C. Coffee, Jr. & Charles K. Whitebread, The Federalization of Fraud: Mail Fraud 
and Wire Fraud Statutes, in WHITE COLLAR CRIME: BUSINESS AND REGULATORY OFFENSES § 9.05 
(Otto Obermaier & Robert Morvillo eds., 2011). 
105 J. KELLY STRADER, UNDERSTANDING WHITE COLLAR CRIME § 1.02B (3d ed. 2011); see also 
Reckard, supra note 67 (contasting simple “cook the books” accounting fraud cases such as Enron with 
Countrywide’s activity where “blame could be assigned to an entire chain of players: mortagage 
brokers who falsified applications; investment bankers who concocted complex and ‘opaque’ mortgage 
bonds; rating firms that provided high ratings on the bonds but said they were lied to; and institutional 
investors that relied on dubious ratings because the securities carried above-market interest while 
promising to be risk-free”). 
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on victims, law enforcement, and the community; and punishment goals.
106
  
Considerations of mercy,
107
 excuse,
108
 or justification
109
 may also persuade 
a prosecutor to decline prosecution rather than risk acquittal or jury 
nullification.   
Some of these factors tend to favor the elite white-collar offender.  The 
nature of financial crimes involves no overt violence, so direct harm is 
financial, not physical.  The history of such offenders and their ties to the 
community typically feature well-educated, middle-aged suspects with no 
criminal felony record who are often pillars of their communities—active 
in charitable organizations and generous with the resources of the 
corporate entities they run.
110
  They are gainfully employed (unless they 
                                                                                                                          
106 F. Andrew Hessick III & Reshma M. Saujani, Plea Bargaining and Convicting the Innocent: 
The Role of the Prosecutor, the Defense Counsel, and the Judge, 16 BYU J. PUB. L. 189, 194–96 
(2002) (noting that prosecutorial consideration is given to the nature and gravity of a crime, the 
defendant’s personal characteristics and criminal history, the victim’s wishes, and punishment goals); 
Wayne R. LaFave, The Prosecutor’s Discretion in the United States, 18 AM. J. COMP. L. 532, 533–35 
(1970) (noting prosecutorial consideration given to administrative costs, limitations in enforcement 
resources, and the potential for the defendant to cooperate as an informant, among other factors).  
107 See Bumgarner, supra note 86, at 689–90 (observing that the exercise of prosecutorial 
discretion to decline prosecution in favor of mercy could be an agent of goodness when there is a 
sympathetic offender, such as in cases where a parent has accidentally killed a child and deterrence is 
an insufficient reason to punish).   
108 Excuse defenses may be raised by defendants in cases where the prosecution is able to 
establish all elements of the criminal offense, however, “conviction is deemed inappropriate because of 
a lack of responsibility on the part of the defendant.” LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 109, at 447–
48; see also Peter Arenella, Convicting the Morally Blameless: Reassessing the Relationship Between 
Legal and Moral Accountability, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1511, 1523 (1992) (“Satisfaction of the culpable 
conduct requirement creates a defeasible presumption that the defendant was morally culpable for his 
crime.  But, the defendant can defeat this presumption of moral fault by denying that he was morally 
responsible for engaging in the culpable conduct . . . .”).  Excuse defenses include insanity, 
intoxication, infancy, and duress.  LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 109, at 448, 450.  
109 Justification defenses, such as self-defense or necessity, are raised when the harm caused by 
the defendant “is outweighed by the need to avoid an even greater harm or to further a greater societal 
interest.”  1 PAUL H. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW DEFENSES § 24(a) (1984); cf. Anthony M. Dillof, 
Unraveling Unknowing Justification, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1547, 1599 (2002) (arguing that 
justification defenses should not be available to actors who engage in harmful conduct without 
knowledge that the conduct was objectively justified); Joshua Dressler, New Thoughts About the 
Concept of Justification in the Criminal Law: A Critique of Fletcher’s Thinking and Rethinking, 32 
UCLA L. REV. 61, 63–64 (1984) (critiquing justification constructs advanced by George Fletcher as too 
rigid to properly account for “important moral gradations” and arguing that “justifications need not 
always involve objectively right conduct”). 
110 See, e.g., Russell Hubbard, Scrushy’s Charitable Donations Continue as Trial Approaches, 
BIRMINGHAM NEWS, Nov. 18, 2003, available at http://www.al.com/specialreport/birminghamnews/in
dex.ssf?healthsouth/healthsouth146.html (reporting on the potential influence in the Alabama 
community of the millions of dollars given by the Richard M. Scrushy Charitable Foundation, 
including contributions to thirty-eight organizations during 2003, when its founder (the former CEO of 
HealthSouth Corp.) was facing a jury trial on eighty-five criminal counts).  Scrushy was acquitted of 
the accounting fraud charges in 2005, but convicted in 2006 of paying $500,000 in campaign 
contributions to then-Alabama governor Don Siegelman for a seat on a hospital regulatory board.  
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have been asked to resign), and may be able to marshal significant personal 
resources—and often corporate resources111—for their defense.  If the 
financial scheme in question was complicated, law enforcement may 
require the cooperation of the defendant to unravel the scheme to restore 
order and potentially provide restitution to as many victims as possible.
112
  
All of these factors may weigh heavily in favor of declining prosecution 
and choosing non-criminal alternatives. 
As discussed above, investigations and prosecutions of elite crimes are 
often resource-intensive.
113
  The decision to pursue a single case may take 
years to investigate, incur thousands of dollars in expenses, consume 
weeks of court time, and yield uncertain results due to the high burden of 
proof and complexity of issues and evidence.
114
  Consequently, the 
economic reality is often that pursuing an elite crime may draw those 
resources from dozens of other cases.
115
 
On the other hand, the nature of the offense is often a breach of trust or 
abuse of power (such as fraud), and is motivated by greed or power rather 
than need or misfortune.  More importantly, the gravity of the harm and the 
impact on the community can be extensive.  When Enron finally collapsed 
under the weight of its criminal conduct, it had caused power outages in 
Northern California,
116
 emptied pension funds,
117
 and decimated the 
                                                                                                                          
Scrushy was resentenced to seventy months imprisonment for that crime in January 2012.  Pearson, 
supra note 74. 
111 See, e.g., Alicia Mundy, Forest Chief Prevails Over U.S., WALL ST. J., Aug. 6, 2011, at B1 
(reporting that Forest Labs’ CEO enlisted the aid of the corporation, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, 
and the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America Trade Association, among others, in 
successfully convincing the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services to drop efforts to force his 
resignation after the corporation pled guilty to misdemeanors for actions committed while he was 
CEO). 
112 See, e.g., Mary Kreiner Ramirez, Just in Crime: Guiding Economic Crime Reform After the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 34 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 359, 399–400 & n.219 (2003) [hereinafter Just in 
Crime] (describing Michael Milken’s assistance in the bankruptcy settlement of Drexel Burnham 
Lambert by unraveling the junk bond market he created while working there, and the consequent 
reduction in his term of imprisonment from ten years to about twenty-two months).   
113 Supra notes 95–98 and accompanying text.  
114 Supra notes 98–100 and accompanying text.  
115 Cf. Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2463, 
2470–72 (2004) (recognizing that prosecutors may also have some personal incentives to avoid 
resource-intensive criminal trials, such as lightening workloads to have personal time with families, 
enhancing job successes through negotiated deals that count as wins for the government, and avoiding 
the risk of losing at trial and potential associated embarrassment). 
116 See, e.g., Jason Leopold, Enron Linked to California Blackouts, MARKET WATCH (May 16, 
2002, 11:56 AM), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/enron-caused-california-blackouts-traders-say 
(reporting that numerous former Enron traders admitted that manipulative energy trading led to an 
energy crisis in California).   
117 See, e.g., Eric Berger, Feds Suing Enron Over Workers’ Pension Losses, HOUSTON 
CHRONICLE, June 26, 2003, available at http://www.chron.com/business/enron/article/Feds-suing-
Enron-over-workers-pension-losses-2125174.php (reporting that the U.S. Labor Department was suing 
Enron and its former executives for failing to properly oversee the employee pension funds while 
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Houston community.
118
  During the financial crisis of 2008, the global 
economy crashed, unemployment sky-rocketed, and millions lost their 
homes to foreclosure.
119
 
C.  Guidance on Discretionary Decision Making 
The operation of federal criminal law is key to combatting complex 
financial crime carried out on a nationwide or global scale.  While there are 
innumerable federal crimes that are relevant to white-collar crime, at its 
broadest level, federal law gives federal prosecutors broad powers to 
combat fraud—particularly mail fraud,120 wire fraud,121 bank fraud,122 and 
securities fraud.
123
  The DOJ sets forth its policies in the U.S. Attorneys’ 
Manual for exercising prosecutorial discretion to charge or decline 
prosecution.
124
  In those cases which meet the trial sufficiency standard, the 
prosecutor may decline prosecution because: “(1) No substantial Federal 
interest would be served by prosecution; (2) The person is subject to 
effective prosecution in another jurisdiction; or (3) There exists an 
adequate non-criminal alternative to prosecution.”125   
The first two considerations encompass dual sovereignty, federal 
priorities, and allocation of limited resources.  Although federal laws may 
apply to certain crimes, and therefore may be utilized to bring defendants 
to justice, often state laws also are available to prosecute offending 
conduct.  Dual sovereignty may permit dual prosecutions, but the DOJ has 
a long-standing policy of discouraging dual prosecutions and successive 
federal prosecutions where a prosecution would be based on “substantially 
                                                                                                                          
knowing that the Enron shares in its fund were overvalued); Steven Greenhouse, Enron’s Many 
Strands: Retirement Money; Public Funds Say Losses Top $1.5 Billion, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 29, 2002),  
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/01/29/business/enron-s-many-strands-retirement-money-public-funds-
say-losses-top-1.5-billion.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm (describing significant losses to state 
government employee pension funds that held Enron shares due to their sharp drop in value). 
118 See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Justices Face Issue of How to Resolve Juror Bias Claims in the 
Internet Age, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 2010, at A12 (observing that widespread harm to the Houston 
economy caused by Enron’s collapse arguably made it difficult to find untainted jurors in the criminal 
case against Jeffrey K. Skilling, the company’s former CEO). 
119 See, e.g., FCIC REPORT, supra note 2, at xv–xvi (providing a brief synopsis of the global 
financial crisis of 2008 and noting that, at the time the report went to print, approximately four million 
American families had lost their homes to foreclosure and more than twenty-six million Americans 
remained unemployed). 
120 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2006). 
121 Id. § 1343. 
122 Id. § 1344. 
123 Id. § 1348; 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (outlawing fraud in connection with the purchase or sale of 
securities); 15 U.S.C. § 78ff (2006) (imposing up to twenty years imprisonment for violations of rules 
such as Section 10b-5). 
124 See U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL, supra note 13, § 9-27.220(A) (describing when an attorney 
for the government should commence or decline prosecution). 
125 Id. 
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the same act(s) or transaction(s)” unless there is “a substantial federal 
interest” that is “demonstrably unvindicated” despite prior state 
prosecution.
126
  Moreover, given the breadth of federal laws, the DOJ must 
prioritize potential cases to effectively allocate limited prosecutorial 
resources.
127
  Focusing on cases that will serve key federal interests that 
have not been otherwise vindicated rations those resources.  In this regard, 
a listed item under the DOJ’s strategic goal to “[p]revent [c]rime, [e]nforce 
[f]ederal [l]aws, and [r]epresent the [r]ights and [i]nterests of the American 
[p]eople,” is the effort to “[c]ombat public and corporate corruption, fraud, 
economic crime, and cybercrime.”128  Thus, despite the heavy demand of 
resources to pursue corporate corruption, fraud, and economic crime, the 
DOJ has identified specifically a substantial public interest in such crime-
fighting efforts and its role in representing the interests of the American 
people.  Given the cost to the American public, which was imposed due to 
fraud in the financial markets during the financial crisis, the return on 
investment of resources to root out criminal actors is very much in the 
interests of the American people.
129
  Moreover, the visiblility and 
widespread impact of high-profile financial frauds demands prosecutorial 
attention lest their ubiquity impose the greater cost of undermining the rule 
of law and thereby driving a stake in the heart of the American justice 
system.  
With respect to the third consideration, a number of non-criminal 
alternatives to prosecution have evolved, especially in the white-collar 
crime arena.  Private parties may bring civil actions for tortious conduct or 
                                                                                                                          
126 Id. § 9-2.031(A).  In addition to the above conditions, approval to move forward with a federal 
prosecution requires approval by the appropriate Assistant Attorney General.  Id.  The policy is 
commonly referred to as the “Petite Policy,” due to the Supreme Court’s reference to the policy in 
Petite v. United States, 361 U.S. 529 (1960).  Id.  Although there is generally no statutory bar to 
prosecuting an individual in both federal and state court for the same acts or transaction, Congress has 
expressly prohibited by statute dual prosecutions where there is a “state judgment of conviction or 
acquittal on the merits” for a narrow set of offenses.  Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 659, 660, 1992, 2101, 
2117 (2006); 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-36, 1282 (2006)). 
127 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 2007–2012 STRATEGIC PLAN 13–14, available at 
http://www.justice.gov/archive/mps/strategic2007-2012/goals_and_objectives.pdf (identifying three 
key goals and objectives: “Prevent Terrorism and Promote the Nation’s security . . . Prevent Crime, 
Enforce Federal Laws, and Represent the Rights and Interests of the American People . . . [and] Ensure 
the Fair and Efficient Administration of Justice”).  
128 Id. at 14.  
129 See supra Part I (stating that the financial crisis caused multiple bank failures, mortgage 
company bankruptcies, and real estate foreclosures); see also FCIC REPORT, supra note 2, at 389–401 
(stating that the financial crisis led to a fall in gross domestic product (“GDP”), employment, household 
net worth, real estate values, and local government tax revenues).  In Part V of the FCIC Report, The 
Aftershocks, the subtitles of the contents sum up the extensive impact of the financial crisis, especially 
the losers and winners: Household: “I’m not eating.  I’m not sleeping”; Businesses: “Squirrels storing 
nuts”; Commercial real estate: “Nothing’s moving”; Government: “States struggled to close shortfalls”; 
The financial sector: “Almost triple [securities industry profits over] the level of three years earlier.”  
Id. at 389. 
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other civil violations of law, or they may bring qui tam actions on behalf of 
the government under the False Claims Act when the defendants have 
defrauded the government.
130
  Many white-collar criminal federal statutes 
provide for or have civil counterparts.
131
  Consequently, government agents 
may choose to file civil suits rather than criminal charges.
132
  Many 
administrative agencies have authority to press administrative proceedings 
to address individual or corporate misconduct and parallel criminal 
prosecutions are often possible;
133
 however, a skilled defense attorney may 
be able to avoid such risks through a global settlement that resolves the 
risk of criminal charges by using tools such as deferred prosecution or non-
prosecution agreements.
134
  Civil asset forfeitures, state license revocation 
                                                                                                                          
130 False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–30 (2006).   
131 See, e.g., Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006) (stating that any person who is found guilty for 
violating antitrust laws can be punished by fine or by imprisonment); Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt 
Organization Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1963, 1964 (2006) (providing that criminal and civil penalties 
can be imposed on any person found guilty of racketeering); Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1319 (2006) 
(imposing civil and criminal penalties for violations of the Clean Water Act); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 7413 (2006) (allowing the EPA to commence civil and criminal actions if a state is not acting in 
compliance with the Clean Air Act); see also United States v. Stringer, 535 F.3d 929, 936–37 (9th Cir. 
2008) (discussing overlapping civil and criminal parallel investigations for violations of securities 
laws).   
132 See J. KELLY STRADER, UNDERSTANDING WHITE COLLAR CRIME 5–7, 365–66 (2d ed. 2006) 
(“[V]iolations of white collar criminal statutes may lead to civil and/or administrative remedies in 
addition to or instead of criminal penalties.”).   
133 JEROLD H. ISRAEL ET AL., WHITE COLLAR CRIME: LAW AND PRACTICE 670 (3d ed. 2009); see, 
e.g., U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL, supra note 13, § 9-27.250(B) (describing alternatives to criminal 
prosecution carried out by administrative agencies, such as “civil tax proceedings; civil actions under 
the securities, customs, antitrust, or other regulatory laws; and reference of complaints to licensing 
authorities or to professional organizations such as bar associations”).   
134 See Gretchen Morgenson & Louise Story, Behind the Gentler Approach to Banks by U.S., 
N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 2011, at A1 (observing that the federal prosecutors are moving away from criminal 
prosecutions in white-collar cases to lesser alternatives, such as deferred prosecutions or civil 
litigation).  The deferred prosecution agreement (“DPA”) permits a corporation to resolve a criminal 
investigation by agreeing to similar terms that might be included in a corporate criminal sentence, 
including terms such as restitution, fines, additional auditing measures, termination of responsible 
individuals, and probation.  U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL, supra note 13, § 9-22.010; see Ryan D. 
McConnell et al., Plan Now or Pay Later: The Role of Compliance in Criminal Cases, 33 HOUS. J. 
INT’L L. 509, 557–62 (2011) (discussing the prevalence of deferred prosecution agreements and non-
prosecution agreements (“NPA”) since 2002 and providing a table listing the numerous corporations 
that have obtained a DPA or NPA since 2005); Steven R. Peikin, Outside Counsel; Deferred 
Prosecution Agreements: Standard for Corporate Probes, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 31, 2005, at 28 (stating that 
deferred prosecution agreements “have become a standard means of resolving major corporate 
investigations”); F. Joseph Warin & Jason C. Schwartz, Deferred Prosecution: The Need for 
Specialized Guidelines for Corporate Defendants, 23 J. CORP. L. 121, 124 (1997) (“The cases 
involving Salomon Brothers, Sequa Corporation, Prudential Securities, and Coopers & Lybrand 
provide useful examples of alternative dispositions of cases involving corporate defendants.”).  The 
DPAs offer corporations the opportunity to avoid the collateral consequences of a criminal conviction, 
while offering the prosecution the opportunity to set fines and collect restitution outside the limits of 
the judicial process, and the opportunity to gain the corporation’s cooperation.  Mary Kreiner Ramirez, 
The Science Fiction of Corporate Criminal Liability: Containing the Machine Through the Corporate 
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proceedings, professional disciplinary proceedings, and self-regulatory 
organization enforcement proceedings are additional alternatives (or 
parallel processes) to criminal prosecution.
135
  Although these alternatives 
obtain some measure of compensation from the wrongdoers, that 
compensation may come from the corporate treasury rather than personal 
funds, it may refund direct losses of those willing to take legal action but 
not sanction the misconduct, or in the case of governmental civil actions, it 
may impose fines without requiring admission of wrongdoing.
136
   
Each non-criminal alternative may exact some recovery of assets from 
the elites or their companies, but their personal reputations, and often their 
ill-gotten riches, remain substantially intact.
137
  Moreover, a small portion 
of the spoils may be used to further protect their interests in the form of 
lobbying for preferred legislation,
138
 supporting favored politicians who 
                                                                                                                          
Death Penalty, 47 ARIZ. L. REV. 933, 952 (2005) [hereinafter The Science Fiction of Corporate 
Criminal Liability].  Both parties benefit from resource savings.  Id. at 953.  In addressing general 
considerations for corporate criminal liability, the U.S. Attorneys’ Manual states the following: 
In certain instances, it may be appropriate, upon consideration of the factors set forth 
herein, to resolve a corporate criminal case by means other than indictment.  Non-
prosecution and deferred prosecution agreements, for example, occupy an important 
middle ground between declining prosecution and obtaining the conviction of a 
corporation. . . . Likewise, civil and regulatory alternatives may be appropriate in 
certain cases . . . . 
U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL, supra note 13, § 9-28.200.   
135 See ISRAEL ET AL., supra note 117, at 643–47, 676–77, 679–80 (describing those forms of 
proceedings). 
136 See SEC v. Vitesse Semiconductor Corp., 771 F. Supp. 2d 304, 308–09 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) 
(issuing an order accepting settlement but criticizing the SEC’s practice of agreeing to consent 
judgments that do not require defendants to admit or deny the allegations of the complaint).  “Only one 
thing is left certain: the public will never know whether the S.E.C.’s charges are true, at least not in a 
way that they can take as established by these proceedings.”  Id. at 309. 
137 See Morgenson, supra note 20 (stating that Countrywide and Bank of America paid $45 
million of the $67.5 million settlement by former CEO of Countrywide Financial, and it was reported 
that he made $521 million during his tenure at Countrywide).   
138 See PBS Frontline, The Long Demise of Glass-
Steagall, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/wallstreet/weill/demise.html (last visited Jan. 
7, 2013) (recounting efforts by Sandy Weill, then-head of Travelers Insurance Company, to lobby 
Congress, the Federal Reserve, Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin, and then-President Bill Clinton to 
support and pass legislation that would repeal portions of the Glass-Steagall Act and the Bank Holding 
Company Act that impeded an intended merger between Travelers and Citicorp, the parent company of 
Citibank).  In 1998 and 1999, having gained authority from the Federal Reserve to merge the 
companies into Citigroup (the biggest corporate merger in history at that time) by promising to divest 
itself of the Travelers insurance business within the next two years if Congress did not pass legislation 
allowing Citigroup to retain the insurance business, Weill and John Reed of Citicorp intensely lobbied 
for regulatory change; in the 1997–1998 election cycle, the finance, insurance, and real estate industries 
targeted $150 million in political campaign donations to congressional banking committees and other 
financial services committee members, and spent more than $200 million on lobbying efforts.  Id. 
Congress passed the Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999, 12 U.S.C. § 1811, repealing those 
provisions of the Glass-Steagall and Bank Holding Company Acts.  Id.  Treasury Secretary Rubin 
resigned his post to join Citigroup in October 1999 as a director and chair of Citigroup’s executive 
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share their views and are willing to promote their interests, and hiring legal 
teams to defend their interests before any hostile legal actions can take 
hold.  Given that the benefits of the elite crimes are the wealth or power 
acquired, the civil alternatives further affirm the lawlessness and remind 
others that the criminal law does not always penalize their misconduct.
139
  
The U.S. Attorneys’ Manual policies are intended to guide the exercise of 
prosecutorial discretion, but do not create a “right or benefit, substantive or 
procedural, enforceable at law by a party to litigation with the United 
States.”140 The policies may, in fact, be modified by United States 
Attorneys “in the interests of fair and effective law enforcement within the 
district.”141  Thus, prosecutors hold discretion in exercising discretion. 
The ABA Standard for Criminal Justice offers further guidance 
regarding the charging decision and is explicit in its instruction regarding 
the need to allow the prosecutor broad exercise of discretion.
142
  ABA 
Standards for Criminal Justice promotes standards for prosecutors, 
addressing sufficiency, public interest, and ethical concerns in exercising 
discretion.
143
   
                                                                                                                          
committee, days after the Clinton Administration agreed to support the legislation on October 22, 1999.  
Id.; see also Mara Der Hovanesian, Citigroup’s Rubin Resigns, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, Jan. 9, 
2009, http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/content/jan2009/db2009019_851357.htm (noting 
that Rubin reportedly earned about $115 million in his advisory role over the ten years with Citigroup). 
139 See Bob Van Voris, Goldman’s Tourre Travels to Rwanda While Awaiting Trial, BLOOMBERG 
(Mar. 24, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-03-23/goldman-s-tourre-travels-to-rwanda-
while-awaiting-trial.html (reporting that Fabrice Tourre, Goldman Sachs Group Inc. executive director, 
is a defendant in a federal case in New York in which he is accused of defrauding investors in a 
collateralized debt obligation known as Abacus 2007-AC1, while Goldman Sachs settled claims for 
$550 million).  Public offerings are seldom a one-man show.  See, e.g., Press Release, Sec. & Exch. 
Comm’n, Goldman Sachs to Pay Record $550 Million to Settle SEC Charges Related to Subprime 
Mortgage CDO (July 15, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010-123.htm 
(reporting that Goldman agreed to a civil settlement without admitting or denying allegations, where 
$250 million will be distributed to harmed investors and $300 million will be paid to the U.S. 
Treasury); Press Release, The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc., Goldman Sachs Reports Earnings Per 
Common Share of $13.18 for 2010 (Jan. 19, 2011), available at http://www.goldmansachs.com/media-
relations/press-releases/current/pdfs/2010-q4-earnings.pdf (reporting net revenues of $39.16 billion and 
net earnings of $8.35 billion for the year ending December 31, 2010).  
140 U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL, supra note 13, § 9-27.150.  The manual explains further that the 
principles have been “developed purely as [a] matter of internal Departmental policy and [are] being 
provided to Federal prosecutors solely for their own guidance in performing their duties.”  Id.  
141 Id. § 9-27.140 (requiring approval by the Assistant Attorney General and the Deputy Attorney 
General if there is “[a]ny significant modification or departure contemplated as a matter of policy or 
regular practice”).  
142 See ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE 
FUNCTION 3-3.9(a)–(d) (3d ed. 1993) (describing the standards for charging discretion). 
143 ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE at 3-3.9(a)–(d) provides the following: 
(a)  “A prosecutor should not institute, cause to be instituted, or permit the continued 
pendency of criminal charges in the absence of sufficient admissible evidence to 
support a conviction.” 
(b)  A prosecutor “may . . . for good cause consistent with the public interest decline 
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One ABA standard implicitly imports affirmance considerations in that 
it permits declining prosecution “for good cause consistent with the public 
interest.”144  By recognizing that public interest considerations rightly 
factor into exercising discretion, the ABA standards implicitly support 
affirmance considerations, but fail affirmatively to call attention to them.  
The public interest in having an equitable rule of law, applicable to all, is 
central to democratic ideals.  Thus, while sufficiency of evidence alone 
may not require prosecution, the public interest is undermined in instances 
where it would appear that by failing to prosecute, the government is 
affirming conduct imposing great harm on society through lawlessness by 
the favored wealthy and powerful.  Permitting those few to reap great 
rewards from their criminality, while imposing such oppressive harm on 
society, creates a moral hazard of repeated lawlessness by that group while 
undermining the rule of law to all.  The public has a deep, abiding interest 
in decisions declining to investigate or prosecute elite crime.
145
  
Prosecutors, thus, are ethically bound to consider affirmance because it is 
central to the public’s interest.  
D.  Plea Bargaining 
Prosecutorial discretion extends to whether to settle a case pursuant to 
a plea bargain.  The prosecutor has discretion to offer a plea, but that 
discretion is limited in that acceptance of the plea is subject to court 
approval.
146
  Resolving a case through a plea agreement may leave some 
feeling that the government could do more.
147
  Given the uncertainty 
inherent in trial litigation, if the outcome of the trial is anything less than 
guilty (e.g., a hung jury or an acquittal), the government has lost the 
opportunity to recover any part of the losses, and in the case of a mistrial, 
                                                                                                                          
to prosecute, notwithstanding . . . sufficient evidence” to support a conviction. 
(c)  “A prosecutor should not be compelled by his or her supervisor to prosecute a 
case in which he or she [the prosecutor] has a reasonable doubt about the guilt of the 
accused.” 
(d)  A “prosecutor should give no weight to personal or political advantages or 
disadvantages” that the prosecutor may be subjected to or which may “enhance his 
or her record of convictions.” 
Id. 
144 Id. at 3-3.9(b).  
145 See Morgenson & Story, supra note 134 (reporting on declinations policies in the DOJ); 
Taibbi, supra note 66 (same).  
146 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(3)(A) (stating that “the court may accept the agreement, reject it, or 
defer a decision”). 
147 See, e.g., Jim Carlton, Ex-EPA Official Faults Probe of BP Alaska Oil Spill, WALL ST. J., Nov. 
19, 2008, at A6 (reporting on former FBI special agent in charge of investigation of two British 
Petreuleum (“BP”) oil spills in 2006, and his concern that the investigation had been quashed mid-
investigation by the DOJ after BP agreed to plead to a misdemeanor and a substantially lower fine than 
recommended by the EPA to settle the charges). 
 898 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:865 
the government would have to assess whether a retrial is available and 
worth the additional resources given the outcome of the first trial.  Even if 
the government wins at trial, the defendant could delay the outcome 
through appeals.  Negotiated deals yield certainty and finality while 
conserving limited resources.
148
  Moreover, the resolution is usually 
considered a “win” for the government.   
Defendants may consider such resolutions a “win” too.  A settlement 
diminishes costly litigation expenditures.  Moreover, an agreement may 
eliminate the ability for private litigants to use a criminal conviction as a 
basis for civil litigation recovery, since the government may resolve the 
criminal cases without requiring an admission of guilt.
149
  Otherwise, a 
                                                                                                                          
148 One of the oft-cited purposes of a plea agreement is to provide certainty.  See MORAN & 
COOPER, supra note 12, at 60 (stating that when a “prosecutor negotiates a deal with an accused, he is 
actually invoking the right of the court to sentence a convicted person”).  Another justification for plea 
agreements is a mutually beneficial exchange in terms of lesser charge bargaining or sentencing 
bargaining for the defendant and conservation of resources for the government.  For example, the U.S. 
Attorneys’ Manual provides: 
The basic policy is that charges are not to be bargained away or dropped, unless the 
prosecutor has a good faith doubt as to the government’s ability readily to prove a 
charge for legal or evidentiary reasons.  There are, however, two exceptions.  
First, if the applicable guideline range from which a sentence may be imposed 
would be unaffected, readily provable charges may be dismissed or dropped as part 
of a plea bargain. . . . 
Second, federal prosecutors may drop readily provable charges with the specific 
approval of the United States Attorney or designated supervisory level official for 
reasons set forth in the file of the case.  This exception recognizes that the aims of 
the Sentencing Reform Act must be sought without ignoring other, critical aspects of 
the Federal criminal justice system.  For example, approvals to drop charges in a 
particular case might be given because the United States Attorney’s office is 
particularly over-burdened, the case would be time-consuming to try, and 
proceeding to trial would significantly reduce the total number of cases disposed of 
by the office. 
U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL, supra note 13, § 9-27.400 (emphasis added).  One key difficulty in 
prosecuting white-collar crimes is that the evidence to support such charges is often found by piecing 
together information gleaned from hundreds of documents, emails, invoices, and interviews.  See 
Darryl K. Brown, The Problematic and Faintly Promising Dynamics of Corporate Crime Enforcement, 
1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 521, 527–28 (2004) (discussing the difficulty in detection of criminal activity, 
the complexity of financial records, and the comparatively overwhelming resources of corporate 
conglomerates as compared to government resources to fight corporate crime); Ramirez, Prioritizing 
Justice, supra note 98, at 1007–08 (proposing a Corporate Crimes Division of the DOJ to centralize 
expertise and resources necessary to address complex litigation associated with corporate and white-
collar criminality).  Thus, the hallmark of a white-collar crime case is that it will be time consuming to 
try.  When compared to a simple drug bust or violent offense that can be tried in a day or disposed of 
by plea agreement without dropping charges, most major corporate and white-collar crime prosecutions 
are likely to reduce significantly the total number of cases disposed by the office.  Thus, this exception 
has the potential to swallow the rule.  See U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL, supra note 13, § 9-28.200 
(suggesting that it may at times be appropriate to resolve a corporate criminal case by means other than 
indictment). 
149 If the parties are in agreement and the court is amenable, this can be accomplished in several 
ways depending upon the jurisdiction, such as through a plea of nolo contendere, an Alford plea (where 
 
 2013] CRIMINAL AFFIRMANCE 899 
criminal conviction could preclude retrial on factual issues in subsequent 
civil cases, since the burden of proof in a civil trial is always less than the 
“guilty beyond a reasonable doubt” burden of proof required in a criminal 
trial.  Because private civil litigation may expose defendants to great 
losses, defendants have powerful incentives to force plaintiffs to meet their 
burden of proof on all elements of their claims.  Resolving litigation early 
in an investigation, moreover, will likely lead to halting or limiting the 
government’s investigation.  Thus, private litigants will not only be unable 
to use the “guilty” outcome of a criminal trial to their advantage, but they 
will also have to bear the costs of any additional investigation of the 
wrongdoing.  If the government loses the criminal trial, the defendant 
cannot use the verdict against private litigants because the burden of proof 
is lower in civil trials. 
Although a plea is often superior to declination in terms of expressing 
community disapproval,
150
 criminal prosecution is the most powerful tool 
                                                                                                                          
permitted), or a global civil settlement that resolves the criminal charges.  North Carolina v. Alford, 
400 U.S. 25, 37–38 (1970) (stating that a court may accept a guilty plea where the defendant maintains 
innocence, provided there is strong evidence of actual guilt, a strong factual basis for criminal charge, 
the defendant was advised by competent counsel, and the defendant intelligently concluded that he 
should plead guilty to second degree murder to avoid risk of death penalty if convicted for first degree 
murder); Ramirez, The Science Fiction of Corporate Criminal Liability, supra note 134, at 950 n.100 
(describing the use of global settlements to resolve criminal, civil, and regulatory violations). 
150 The U.S. Attorneys’ Manual offers instruction for plea bargaining.  See U.S. ATTORNEYS’ 
MANUAL, supra note 13, § 9-27.430 (providing that with certain narrow exceptions, when a 
prosecution is concluded pursuant to a plea agreement, the prosecutor should require the defendant to 
plead guilty to a charge “[t]hat is the most serious readily provable charge consistent with the nature 
and extent of  [the defendant’s] criminal conduct”).  The Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business 
Organizations also directs federal prosecutors to “seek a plea to the most serious, readily provable 
offense charged.”  Id. § 9-28.1300; Memorandum from Paul J. McNulty, Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. 
Dep’t of Justice, to Heads of Dep’t Components, U.S. Att’ys, Principles of Federal Prosecution of 
Business Organizations § XIII (Dec. 12, 2006) [hereinafter McNulty Memorandum], available at 
http://www.justice.gov/dag/speeches/2006/mcnulty_memo.pdf; see also Press Release 06-828, Dep’t of 
Justice, U.S. Deputy Attorney General Paul J. McNulty Revises Charging Guidelines for Prosecuting 
Corp. Fraud (Dec. 12, 2006), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2006/December/06_odag_828.
html (explaining the McNulty Memorandum policy change and what factors prosecutors should 
consider when charging fraud). 
Another possibility is that charges are brought against or a plea is negotiated with a corporate 
entity associated with the parent entity, but the plea grossly understates the criminality or under-
punishes because it includes a relatively meager fine, requires a non-participating subsidiary to enter a 
plea rather than the initial corporate target, or includes additional misconduct as covered in the plea for 
which no charges are filed.  See, e.g., Kurt Eichenwald, HCA to Pay $95 Million in Fraud Case, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 15, 2000, at C1 (reporting that “[a]lthough the [fraudulent] practices involve widespread 
criminal actions in HCA’s hospital system, the guilty pleas will be formally entered by two inactive 
subsidiaries”).  By permitting the subsidiaries to plead guilty, HCA avoided debarment from 
government contracting, which would have effectively put the corporation out of business.  Id.; see also 
Amy Schofield & Linda Weaver, Health Care Fraud, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 617, 621 (2000) 
(describing provisions applicable to healthcare providers and suppliers that could lead to exclusion or 
debarment from federally funded programs); Ken Ward, Jr., Massey Firm to Plead Guilty in Mine 
Deaths, CHARLESTON GAZETTE, Dec. 23, 2008 (reporting on global settlement by Massey Energy Co. 
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society has to address very costly antisocial behavior.   
E.  Ambiguity in Declination Obscures Implicit Motivations  
“[T]he power to be lenient is the power to discriminate.”151  Given the 
vast numbers of crimes that are available to charge, “the substantive 
criminal law amounts to ‘an arsenal of weapons to be used against such 
persons as the police or prosecutor may deem to be a menace to public 
safety.’”152  The standards described above were developed to guide the 
prosecutor’s discretion but tend to focus on circumstances discouraging the 
prosecutor from abusing prosecutorial power by prosecuting upon less than 
sufficient evidence.  Nonetheless, “there are—as a practical matter—no 
comparable checks upon his discretionary judgment of whether or not to 
prosecute one against whom sufficient evidence exists.”153  Moreover, such 
discretionary power may hinge “unjustifiably on the relative weakness or 
strength of the networks to which perpetrator and victim belong.”154  Little 
guidance or limits exist regarding a decision to refrain from prosecuting 
the powerful. 
1. Unlimited Discretion to Decline Prosecution 
Prosecutors are permitted to forge forward with virtually no limit on 
their discretion not to charge since the party not charged will not challenge 
the decision, and parties favoring charges against another generally lack 
standing to raise the issue in litigation.
155
  The U.S. Supreme Court has 
recognized prosecutorial freedom in exercising discretion, placing limits 
on that discretion in extremely limited circumstances.
156
  Indeed, the only 
parties able and available to challenge charging decisions are those who 
challenge their own charges by claiming an abuse of prosecutorial 
discretion to charge a crime: vindictive prosecution in violation of due 
                                                                                                                          
that resolved over 1300 violations of the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act at Massey energy 
subsidiaries).   
151 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 82, at 683. 
152
 Id. (quoting Thurman W. Arnold, Law Enforcement—An Attempt at Social Dissection, 42 
YALE L.J. 1, 17 (1932)).  
153 Id. at 685; see, e.g., Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607–08 (1985) (stating that court 
oversight in prosecutorial discretion delays proceedings, chills law enforcement, and undermines 
prosecutorial effectiveness); United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 382 (1982) (“A prosecutor 
should remain free before trial to exercise the broad direction entrusted to him to determine the extent 
of the societal interest in prosecution.”). 
154 Holmes, supra note 13, at 126.   
155 See, e.g., In re Dean, 527 F.3d 391, 395–96 (5th Cir. 2008) (denying standing of victims to 
challenge plea).   
156 The U.S. Supreme Court has concluded that “a citizen lacks standing to contest the policies of 
the prosecuting authority when he himself is neither prosecuted nor threatened with prosecution.”  
Linda R. S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973).   
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process
157
 or selective or discriminatory enforcement in violation of the 
Equal Protection Clause.
158
  Beyond such specific and identifiable 
instances of review of prosecutorial discretion for violations of 
constitutional protections, courts have identified the separation of powers 
doctrine in declining to interfere with prosecutorial discretion.
159
  The 
Supreme Court has expressed a reluctance toward further inquiry because 
“[s]uch factors as the strength of the case, the prosecution’s general 
deterrence value, the Government’s enforcement priorities, and the case’s 
relationship to the Government’s overall enforcement plan are not readily 
susceptible to the kind of analysis the courts are competent to 
undertake.”160  Mandamus is thus deemed an inappropriate remedy in this 
context because of the longstanding acceptance of the notion that a 
prosecutor has discretion in deciding when to prosecute. 
                                                                                                                          
157 See, e.g., Goodwin, 457 U.S. at 379–80 (affording prosecutors wide latitude in reevaluating 
charging decisions, even after defendant has exercised his constitutional right to request a jury trial); 
Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 365 (1978) (finding no presumption of vindictiveness when 
prosecutor threatens to increase charges if defendant rejects plea offer); Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 
21, 28–29 (1974) (presuming vindictive prosecution where state responded to defendant’s successful 
exercise of his statutory right to appeal by bringing a more serious charge against him prior to the trial 
de novo). 
158 See, e.g., Wayte, 470 U.S. at 610 (stating that discretion is broad, but not unfettered; the 
defendant must show not just the discriminatory effect but also the discriminatory purpose of 
punishment); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373 (1886) (holding that a defendant may 
demonstrate that prosecutorial discretion of a law is “directed so exclusively against a particular class 
of persons . . . with a mind so unequal and oppressive [that it effects] a practical denial” of equal 
protection of the law). 
159 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 82, at 686–87; see, e.g., United States v. Friday, 525 F.3d 938, 960 
(10th Cir. 2008) (declining to review prosecutorial discretion in deciding to prosecute Native 
Americans and power companies differently); United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 171 (5th Cir. 1965) 
(“[T]he courts are not to interfere with the free exercise of the discretionary powers of the attorneys of 
the United States in their control over criminal prosecutions.”).  Reliance on the separation of powers 
reasoning as a justification for refusing to interfere in the prosecutor’s exercise of discretion has been 
criticized by some scholars for ignoring the many Supreme Court decisions claiming entitlement to 
judicial review of the exercise of executive discretion, and for accepting that prosecution is exclusively 
an executive function.  See KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 
210 (1969) (criticizing the court’s reasoning in United States v. Cox, and observing that “more than a 
hundred Supreme Court decisions spread over a century and three-quarters will have to be found 
contrary to the Constitution” if the judiciary is barred from reviewing executive decisions); Rebecca 
Krauss, The Theory of Prosecutorial Discretion in Federal Law: Origins and Developments, 6 SETON 
HALL CIR. REV. 1, 12–13 (2009) (criticizing judicial review of executive discretion because it does not 
comport with the separation of powers doctrine in Administrative Law); see also Lawrence Lessig & 
Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 15–16 (1994) 
(explaining that historical accounts suggest that the U.S. Constitution did not compel exclusive 
executive control over prosecutors). 
160 Wayte, 470 U.S. at 607.  In Wayte, the Court further elaborated on its conviction that “the 
decision to prosecute is particularly ill-suited to judicial review. . . . Judicial supervision in this area . . . 
entails systematic costs of particular concern.”  Id.  The Court stated that: “Examining the basis of a 
prosecution delays the criminal proceeding, threatens to chill law enforcement by subjecting the 
prosecutor’s motives and decisionmaking to outside inquiry, and may undermine prosecutorial 
effectiveness by revealing the Government’s enforcement policy.”  Id. 
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2. Networks and Revolving Doors 
One cannot ignore the impact of the “revolving door” of private 
business leaders who cycle through government leadership positions and 
back into private businesses after relatively short terms.
161
  Prosecutors, 
like most government agents, do not expect to spend their entire careers in 
the government sector.  If one is a political appointee, the length of service 
is marked, and the employee may wish to return to a prior position or move 
forward into the private sector utilizing their government service-gained 
expertise.  Conflict-of-interest rules may place some restraints on the 
employee or former employee.
162
  Often such rules have a limited time 
period,
163
 but they will not invariably provide the transparency necessary 
for public confidence, especially when the discretionary activities 
encompass a broad range of considerations, as is true of prosecutorial 
discretion.
164
  Moreover, if government leaders choose to appoint industry 
leaders who may have violated the laws they are now hired to oversee, it is 
difficult to believe that such employees will not consider their own risk of 
liability in making decisions about pursuing regulatory investigations or 
recommending actions against other industry actors who engaged in 
conduct similar to the appointee.
165
   
                                                                                                                          
161 See, e.g., Richard W. Painter, Bailouts: An Essay on Conflicts of Interest and Ethics When 
Government Pays the Tab, 41 MCGEORGE L. REV. 131, 141–43 (2009) (reviewing a history of 
revolving door appointments from the banking industry, including the two ethics waivers Henry 
Paulson received as Treasury Secretary, allowing him to participate in matters affecting Goldman 
Sachs, his former employer). 
162 See, e.g., Louise Story & Gretchen Morgenson, S.E.C. Hid Its Lawyer’s Madoff Ties, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 21, 2011, at B1 (reporting that the SEC’s Inspector General referred the actions taken by 
the SEC’s general counsel David M. Becker—including recommending a compensation plan for the 
victims of the Bernard Madoff Ponzi scheme that was favorable to Becker’s personal interests in an 
inheritance from a Madoff account—to the DOJ); Edward Wyatt, Ex-Official at S.E.C. Settles Case for 
$50,000, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 2012, at B3 (reporting that Spencer Barasch, former enforcement 
director for the SEC’s Fort Worth Regional office from 1998 to 2005, who was accused of discoursing 
or blocking three investigations into the alleged Ponzi scheme by Stanford Financial Group during his 
SEC tenure, agreed to a civil fine for violating federal conflict-of-interest rules by later representing 
Stanford Financial Group before the Commission); Press Release, Dep’t of Justice Off. of Pub. Affairs 
(U.S.A.O. E.D. Tex.), Former SEC Head of Enforcement for the Fort Worth Office Settles Conflict of 
Interest Allegations (Jan. 13, 2012), available at www.justice.gov/usao/txe/News/2012/edtx-barasch-
011312.html (reporting that Spencer Barasch entered into a settlement offer to pay $50,000 dollars for 
his representation of Stanford Financial Group despite a permanent conflict of interest). 
163 President Obama extended the timeframe from one year to two years.  See Paltrow, supra note 
8 (reporting that the extended two year conflict-of-interest period for U.S. Attorney General Eric 
Holder and DOJ Criminal Division Chief Lanny Breuer expired in spring 2011).  
164 See, e.g., id. (reporting that while U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder and DOJ Criminal 
Division Chief Lanny Breuer were partners at Covington & Burling, the firm’s clients included Bank of 
America, Citigroup, JPMorganChase, Wells Fargo, and Freddie Mac, and that the firm provided legal 
opinion letters needed to create MERS; moreover, in 2010, both Holder’s and Breuer’s chiefs-of-staff 
returned to Covington). 
165 See, e.g., Andrew Ross Sorkin, Revolving Door at S.E.C. Is Hurdle to Crisis Cleanup, N.Y. 
TIMES (Aug. 1, 2011), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/08/01/revolving-door-at-s-e-c-is-hurdle-to-
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3. Unaccountable Discretion 
Prosecutors are not required to identify their reasons for declining 
prosecution.
166
  Information obtained through grand jury proceedings is 
secret and only available to the public in limited circumstances.
167
  By 
affording the prosecutor consideration of so many factors in deciding 
whether or not to prosecute, an ambiguous reality emerges in which the 
decision to forgo prosecution can be based on myriad factors such that it is 
impossible to detect any underlying attitudinal aversion to prosecuting the 
powerful.
168
  When civil alternatives to criminal prosecution are factored 
into the decision, further ambiguity arises since those with strong networks 
may advance construction of any number of civil alternatives to 
punishment,
169
 especially in the corporate and white-collar arena where 
regulatory action is often a potential alternative offered to support the 
decision against criminal prosecution.
170
     
                                                                                                                          
crisis-cleanup/ (reporting that Adam Glass, who joined the SEC two years ago and is now co-chief 
counsel, previously served as outside counsel to a major New York hedge fund that made billions 
shorting the subprime mortgage market, and in one widely reported derivative deal (termed “Abacus”), 
the hedgefund was permitted to select some of the transactions that formed the basis of Abacus, 
intending to short the deal—that is, betting that the deal would fail; the firm paid $550 million to settle 
the case with the SEC, without admitting or denying guilt). 
166 See, e.g., Letter from Brian A. Benczkowski, Principal Deputy Asst. Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice to Bart Stupak & John D. Dingell, U.S. Reps. (Apr. 3, 2008), available at 
http://democrats.energycommerce.house.gov/images/stories/Documents/investigations/energy/BP.0403
08.respto031208.BP.ltr.pdf (responding to an inquiry about BP plea agreements by advising “about 
relevant Department of Justice policy” and explaining that many considerations factor into the exercise 
of prosecutorial discretion in negotiating plea agreements, but refusing to “disclose non-public 
information about . . . prosecutorial decisions” in the case). 
167 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e) (listing the rules for recording and disclosing grand jury 
proceedings).  The purpose of secrecy is not to shield the prosecutor, but rather to protect against 
witness tampering or influencing grand jurors, and to encourage testimonial forthrightness, thereby 
reducing the likelihood of flight by those being investigated and protecting those who are investigated 
but exonerated from negative consequences.  WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 449 
(5th ed. 2009). 
168 See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943, 1010–
12 (1995) (discussing the effect of blurring an act which is to be regulated by providing an alternate 
meaning).  
169 Large organizations or powerful corporations are able to use their size and resources to protect 
themselves and their employees from criminal prosecutions for decisions made by individuals on behalf 
of the corporations, even when those decisions result time and again in death, great financial calamity, 
or harm to the corporation itself.  See, e.g., Mundy, supra note 111 (reporting that after Forest 
Laboratories Inc.’s guilty plea to misdemeanors for health care fraud, CEO Howard Soloman was able 
to avoid debarment by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services—a move that would have 
excluded him from jobs in the health care industry that do business with the U.S. government—by 
hiring a lobbyist for $80,000 to argue against the exclusion and by marshalling support from the U.S. 
Chamber of Commerce and the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America, among 
others). 
170 This is especially true when there is an established regulatory presence or perception that civil 
litigation is sufficient to address wrongdoing.  See CULLEN ET AL., supra note 1, at 292 (recognizing 
private civil lawsuits as the legal remedy of choice in defective product cases and the heightened safety 
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Today, many corporations have become conglomerates wielding both 
political and economic power.
171
  Multinational corporations have driven 
the wave of globalization, promoting free-trade agreements that permit the 
free flow of goods and services, while allowing these entities to lobby for 
and take advantage of favorable legal conditions.
172
  With threats of 
corporations that are “too big to fail”173 or claims that corporate 
                                                                                                                          
threshold for consumer products regulated by the federal government).  Thus, for health and safety 
violations in the United States, the FDA and the Occupational Health and Safety Administration have 
been the primary governmental vehicles for expressing societal expectations in the workplace and in 
consumer goods.  See id. at 292, 298 (asserting that “criminal sanctions . . . have been brought almost 
exclusively by federal regulatory agencies—especially the Food and Drug Administration,” and that 
there is a general unwillingness to prosecute workplace safety violation cases). 
171 MARSHALL B. CLINARD, CORPORATE CORRUPTION: THE ABUSE OF POWER 4–5 (1990); 
HARTLEY, supra note 97, at 14; see also Nancy Folbre, Risks, Radiation and Regulation, N.Y. TIMES 
(Mar. 18, 2011), http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/03/18/risks-radiation-and-regulation (“The 
threat of social meltdown arises not from excessive growth of the state and its regulatory role but from 
its capture by groups able to translate market power into political power: socialism for big investors, 
capitalism for everyone else.”).  Marshall Clinard connected the contributions of corporations and 
industry political action committees (“PACs”) to the democratic process.  CLINARD, supra, at 6–7.  In 
Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, the Supreme Court effectively gutted bipartisan 
campaign finance reform legislation, stating that “we now conclude that independent expenditures, 
including those made by corporations, do not give rise to corruption or the appearance of corruption.”  
130 S. Ct. 876, 909 (2010).  In January 2011, Public Citizen, a national, non-profit advocacy 
organization, released a report on the effects of the Citizens United decision on the 2010 election cycle.  
Press Release, Public Citizen, Citizens United: One Year Later (Jan. 18, 2011), available at 
http://www.citizen.org/12-months-after.  Among its findings were the following facts:   
[1] spending by outside groups jumped to $294.2 million in the 2010 election cycle 
from just $68.9 million in the 2006 cycle; [2] the uncharacteristically high spending 
in 2010 presages blockbuster spending in the upcoming 2012 elections; [3] nearly 
half of the money spent ($138.5 million, or 47.1 percent) came from only 10 groups; 
[4] groups that did not provide any information about their sources of money 
collectively spent $135.6 million—46.1 percent of the total spent by outside groups 
during the election cycle . . . ; and [5] of 75 congressional contests in which partisan 
power changed hands, spending by outside groups favored the winning candidate in 
60 contests. 
Id. 
172 See HARTLEY, supra note 97, at 14 (describing favorable legal conditions); U.S. GOV’T 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-09-157, INTERNATIONAL TAXATION: LARGE U.S. CORPORATIONS AND 
FEDERAL CONTRACTORS WITH SUBSIDIARIES IN JURISDICTIONS LISTED AS TAX HAVENS OR FINANCIAL 
PRIVACY JURISDICTIONS 4 (2008) (reporting that eighty-three of the one hundred largest U.S. 
corporations have subsidiaries in tax havens or international financial privacy jurisdictions); FCIC 
REPORT, supra note 2, at xviii, 52–56 (concluding that the financial industry, which had contributed 
generously to political campaigns from 1999 to 2008, was able to use its wealth and power to weaken 
key regulatory constraints); see also Press Release, Remarks by the President on Int’l Tax Policy 
Reform (May 4, 2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-By-The-
President-On-International-Tax-Policy-Reform/ (announcing proposals to “crack down on illegal 
overseas tax evasion, close loopholes, and make it more profitable for companies to create jobs here in 
the United States,” and to ensure that companies are not rewarded “for moving jobs off our shores or 
transferring profits to oversees tax havens”).       
173 See JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 68, at 175 (“[V]irtually everyone involved acknowledged 
that the megabanks were too big to fail, because if any one of them collapsed the system as a whole 
might collapse.”); ROGER LOWENSTEIN, THE END OF WALL STREET 252 (2010) (“Citigroup was seen 
as truly too big to fail, and any upset to it horrified the Fed.”); SORKIN, supra note 42, at 7 (stating that 
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prosecution could cost thousands of jobs to innocent employees,
174
 there is 
significant temptation for the prosecutor to hide behind the numerous and 
noncontentious discretionary factors available to a prosecutor in choosing 
not to charge criminal conduct or to enter into a deferred prosecution 
agreement.
175
  Certainly when charges are brought against a corporation for 
criminal conduct, but not against any individual actors, there is at least 
some confidence in asserting that individual liability should also exist; a 
corporation cannot act except through its agents,
176
 so someone has broken 
a criminal law.  In instances where a corporation negotiates a deferred 
                                                                                                                          
decision makers on Wall Street and in Washington thought they themselves were too big to fail); 
STIGLITZ, supra note 17, at 40 (“The banks had grown not only too big to fail but also too politically 
powerful to be constrained.”). 
174 See, e.g., Elizabeth K. Ainslie, Indicting Corporations Revisited: Lessons of the Arthur 
Andersen Prosecution, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 107, 107 (2006) (discussing the Arthur Andersen 
investigation).  Arthur Andersen, formerly one of the “Big Five” accounting and auditing firms in the 
United States in 2002, was criminally investigated for destroying Enron-related documents.  Id.; Darin 
Bartholomew, Is Silence Golden When It Comes to Auditing?, 36 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 57, 57 (2002).  
Andersen was charged with a single-count indictment for obstruction of justice, and was convicted by a 
federal jury in Houston, Texas.  Ainslie, supra, at 107; Eric L. Talley, Cataclysmic Liability Risk 
Among Big Four Auditors, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1641, 1663 (2006).  After its conviction, the firm 
surrendered its accounting licenses and thus ended its accounting and auditing functions.  See ISRAEL 
ET AL., supra note 117, at 345.  The Fifth Circuit affirmed the convictions, but it was reversed and 
remanded by a unanimous Supreme Court.  Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696, 697–
98 (2005) (holding that the jury instructions failed to properly convey the elements of “corrupt 
persuasion” for a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)).  The DOJ subsequently moved to dismiss the 
charges against the firm.  Move by Ex-Andersen Partner Could Affect Enron Case, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 24, 2005, at C9.  It was the criminal indictment, however, and not the conviction that sealed the 
firm’s fate.  See Lawrence D. Finder & Ryan D. McConnell, Devolution of Authority: The Department 
of Justice’s Corporate Charging Policies, 51 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1, 3 n.8 (2006) (discussing the fallout 
from the prosecution of Arthur Andersen).  Although the criminal investigation of Arthur Andersen 
involved a limited number of employees in the Houston office of the nationwide firm, the demise of the 
firm reportedly led to the loss of 28,000 U.S. jobs.  See Ainslie, supra, at 107–08 (stating that 
documents were shipped to Andersen’s Houston office for shredding at the direction of a Houston-
based partner); Finder & McConnell, supra, at 3 (noting that 28,000 jobs were lost after Andersen’s 
indictment).  The Enron-related conviction of Arthur Andersen in June 2002 came on the heels of a 
large 2001 settlement with the SEC for the firm’s accounting and auditing work for Waste Management 
Corporation, and an SEC suit against five Arthur Andersen officers and the lead partner for its work 
with the Sunbeam Corporation; neither of these investigations was centered on the Houston office.  
Ainslie, supra, at 107.  Thus, by the time Arthur Andersen was charged with accounting fraud related 
to Enron, the firm had demonstrated actionable misconduct on other accounts and in other locations, 
suggesting a deficit in executive ethical leadership, implicating a broader firm culture of misconduct.  
175 See Frontline: The Untouchables (PBS television broadcast Jan. 22, 2013) (interview with 
Lanny Breuer, DOJ Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, in which Breuer offered up several 
reasons why banks and senior executives were not prosecuted), available at 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/untouchables/; Ramirez, The Science Fiction of Corporate 
Criminal Liability, supra note 134, at 974–76 (observing that removing management that engaged in, 
or failed to stem, misconduct is one means of salvaging a firm and protecting investors and innocent 
employees).   
176 See 1 KATHLEEN F. BRICKEY, CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY 89 (2d ed. 1992) (describing 
theories by which corporate criminal liability may be imputed through the acts of a corporation’s 
agents). 
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prosecution agreement, a non-prosecution agreement, or a civil alternative 
to criminal charges, it would be difficult to prove that, but for political 
connections or a well-financed legal team, these negotiated deals 
demonstrate certitude that criminal charges could have, or more to the 
point, should have been brought against individuals.
177
 
In exercising discretion, prosecutors consider numerous factors, some 
explicit and others implicit in the process.  These factors take into 
consideration case-specific sufficiency assessments, ethical obligations, 
competing demands for resources, and community interests in alternative 
non-criminal resolutions, among others.
178
  Legal limitations upon such 
decisions are few, and courts will seldom interfere with the process and 
only in narrow circumstances.
179
  Most significantly, the decision not to 
investigate or prosecute is even less susceptible to interference.
180
  
Consequently, no mechanism exists to require the prosecutor to reflect 
upon the affirmance effect of declining prosecution.  Nevertheless, the 
social meaning of such declinations persists in elite crimes, affirming the 
misconduct and undermining the rule of law.   
                                                                                                                          
177 Early studies of white-collar crime included both civil liability and criminal liability cases.  
MARSHALL B. CLINARD, ILLEGAL CORPORATE BEHAVIOR 22 (1979); see also EDWIN H. SUTHERLAND, 
WHITE COLLAR CRIME: THE UNCUT VERSION 13–14, 45–53 (1983) (analyzing violations of law and 
crimes committed by corporations).  But see Leonard Orland, Reflections on Corporate Crime: Law in 
Search of Theory and Scholarship, in CORPORATE AND WHITE COLLAR CRIME: AN ANTHOLOGY 127, 
129 (Leonard Orland ed., 1995) (criticizing the empirical work of Edwin Sutherland and Marshall 
Clinard and his associates for including adverse adjudications by civil courts and non-criminal 
administrative agencies against corporations and classifying them as crimes).  These early sociological 
studies of white-collar crime refused to accede to the labels placed by legislators designating certain 
fraudulent actions as “crimes” while others were labeled “violations.”  See Laureen Snider, 
Researching Corporate Crime, in UNMASKING THE CRIMES OF THE POWERFUL: SCRUTINIZING STATES 
& CORPORATIONS 49, 51 (Steve Tombs & Dave Whyte eds., 2003).  Snider observes: 
The underlying assumption of th[e] critique . . . of Sutherland’s . . . views, is that 
“crime” is a real thing that legislators, informed by science and law, discover.  If 
they haven’t discovered a particular act, it is therefore not crime.  Sutherland argued 
against only one half of this equation, pointing out that power (not to mention self-
interest, political lobbying, media-generated moral panic, and a myriad of other 
factors) sometimes prevented legislators from criminalizing the harmful acts of 
business.  Thus the fact that anti-competitive practices and false advertising were 
proscribed, albeit through regulatory or administrative statute [and] not criminal 
law, was sufficient to indicate the “real” intentions of legislators, and to justify 
studying these acts as criminal. 
Id. at 51; see also Ramirez, Just in Crime, supra note 112, at 372 n.72 (describing the difficulty in 
reaching a consensus as to what conduct should be included in the term “white collar crime”). 
178 See Sandra Caron George, Prosecutorial Discretion: What’s Politics Got to Do with It?, 18 
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 739, 744 (2005) (discussing typical considerations of prosecutors). 
179 Brandon K. Crase, When Doing Justice Isn’t Enough: Reinventing the Guidelines for 
Prosecutorial Discretion, 20 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 475, 480 (2007). 
180 See Austin Sarat & Conor Clarke, Beyond Discretion: Prosecution, the Logic of Sovereignty, 
and the Limits of Law, 33 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 387, 390 (2008) (asserting that decisions not to 
prosecute are “actions that are legally authorized, but not legally regulated”). 
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IV.  THEORIES OF PUNISHMENT 
Civil law holds individuals accountable for their actions by demanding 
that they pay for the harm imposed on others.  In contrast, criminal law 
punishes individuals.
181
  It may also require payment or accountability, but 
at its core, it is society’s decision that the acts performed by the accused 
are sufficiently reprehensible to a well-ordered society that the actor should 
be punished and also labeled “a criminal.”182  Serious or very costly crimes 
usually result in incarceration.  Serious criminal sanctions like 
incarceration operate as society’s strongest condemnation of anti-social 
behavior.
183
 
In creating criminal laws, society must decide that certain conduct 
requires criminal punishment and cannot be sufficiently addressed by civil 
penalties.  Theories of punishment identify reasons a society punishes 
through criminal laws.
184
  The theories fall into two broad categories: 
retributive and utilitarian.
185
  Retributive theories are backward-looking, 
asserting the need for affirmative punishment deserved by the individual 
for breaking societal rules.
186
  Under this label, several theorists have 
further expanded upon the type of message and need for the message; 
affirmative retribution,
187
 negative retribution,
188
 and assaultive 
                                                                                                                          
181 See Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 401, 404 
(1958) (“What distinguishes a criminal from a civil sanction and all that distinguishes it . . . is the 
judgment of community condemnation which accompanies and justifies its imposition.”). 
182 See id. at 405 (stating a “criminal” penalty is “conduct which, if duly shown to have taken 
place, will incur a formal and solemn pronouncement of the moral condemnation of the community”). 
183 See, e.g., Paula C. Johnson, At the Intersection of Injustice: Experiences of African American 
Women in Crime and Sentencing, 4 AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 1, 70–71 (1995) (“The mandatory 
minimum sentence of fifteen years with the prospect of incarceration for life represents one of the most 
severe penalties prescribed under New York State law.  It expresses society’s and the Legislature’s 
highest level of condemnation for the most serious offenders who commit the most reprehensible 
crimes.”). 
184 See Hart, supra note 181, at 410 (discussing why it is difficult to have only one theory of 
criminal punishment). 
185 Kent Greenawalt, Punishment, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND JUSTICE 1282, 1284 
(Joshua Dressler ed., 2d ed. 2002). 
186 JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 16–17 (4th ed. 2006); see also 
HONDERICH, supra note 11, at 17 (explaining that retribution theories of punishment find justification 
in the offender’s freely chosen actions).  Honderich is critical of retributive theories of punishment as 
“conceptually inadequate” in part because they “fail to give an adequate or real reason for punishment” 
and “presuppose that the offender had the power of origination or free will.”  Id. at 201. 
187 See Michael S. Moore, The Moral Worth of Retribution, in RESPONSIBILITY, CHARACTER, AND 
THE EMOTIONS: NEW ESSAYS IN MORAL PSYCHOLOGY 179, 179–82 (Ferdinand Schoeman ed., 1987) 
(“The distinctive aspect of retributivism is that the moral desert of an offender is a sufficient reason to 
punish him or her.”). 
188 See HONDERICH, supra note 11, at 20–21 (observing that negative retributive justice entails the 
ideas that one “who has obeyed the law must not be made to suffer even if this would have the good 
effect . . . of keeping him from committing offences he is otherwise thought likely to commit,” and that 
“an offender’s penalty must not be increased over what is deserved for his action even if . . . a more 
severe penalty is needed as an example to deter others”). 
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retribution
189
 all focus on the message conveyed to the law-breaker.   
Utilitarian principles are forward-looking, seeking to maximize the 
utility of society through punishment of the individual so that punishment 
is worthy only if the pain caused through punishment will result in greater 
benefit to society.
190
  Thus, through incapacitation, the law-breaker is 
imprisoned to protect society from his acts.
191
  Rehabilitation allows 
society to focus on the individual offender in order to teach him to become 
a more productive member of society, one who is willing and able to 
follow the law.
192
  Specific deterrence aims to influence future individual 
behavior and thereby improve society by conveying to the law-breaker in 
advance that punishment will follow his breach of the laws.
193
  General 
deterrence punishes the individual law-breaker so that society is reminded 
to avoid deviance and is assured that breaking the rules incurs 
punishment.
194
   
While many accept the retributivist idea that it is moral or just to 
punish those who violate the criminal laws and impose their criminality 
upon others, this lex talionis
195
 approach is not universally accepted.
196
  
Likewise, while many accept the utilitarian theory that criminals must be 
punished to influence their future behavior and that of society, that view is 
disavowed by the Kantian camp.
197
  Because punishment can be justified 
by more than one theory, legal philosophers need not reconcile their 
                                                                                                                          
189 See 2 JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 81–82 
(1883) (maintaining that it is “highly desirable that criminals should be hated, [and] that the 
punishments inflicted upon them should be so contrived as to give expression to that hatred”); see also 
JEFFRIE G. MURPHY & JEAN HAMPTON, FORGIVENESS AND MERCY 3 (1988) (stating James Stephen 
thought criminals should be treated as “noxious insects to be ground under the heel of society”). 
190 See Bentham, supra note 9 (“General prevention ought to be the chief end of punishment as it 
is its real justification.  If we could consider an offence that has been committed as an isolated fact, the 
likes of which would never recur, punishment would be useless.  It would be only adding one evil to 
another.”).  Bentham identified three ways to prevent crime through punishment: to incapacitate; to 
deter individuals and others; and to reform or rehabilitate.  HONDERICH, supra note 11, at 75. 
191 TERANCE D. MIETHE & HONG LU, PUNISHMENT: A COMPARATIVE HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
17–18 (2005). 
192 Id. at 22–23. 
193 Id. at 20. 
194 Id. at 21. 
195 HONDERICH, supra note 11, at 20.  Lex talionis is the latin term for “law of retaliation,” 
sometimes explained as “an eye for an eye” from the Bible.  Exodus 21:22–26. 
196 See HONDERICH, supra note 11, at 22–29 (highlighting the circularity of arguing that one 
deserves punishment for breaking the law because he broke the law).  “Circular retributivism is an 
instance of the fallacy where the supposed reason is identical with the supposed conclusion.”  Id. at 24.  
197 See KANT, supra note 10, at 195–97 (“Juridical [p]unishment can never be administered 
merely as a means for promoting another [g]ood either with regard to the [c]riminal himself or to [c]ivil 
[s]ociety, but must in all cases be imposed only because the individual on whom it is inflicted has 
committed a [c]rime.  For one man ought never to be dealt with merely as a means subservient to the 
purpose of another.”). 
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differences.
198
  The retributivists accept criminal punishment pursuant to 
the justifications they find acceptable, while the utilitarians accept 
punishment for its prospective impact on society.
199
    
When criminal laws are created and potential penalties are assigned to 
breaches of the law, society has (theoretically) considered what message to 
convey to the law-breaker so that the law-breaker and non-law-breaker 
alike can see that meaning is attached to our decision to punish.
200
  When 
society’s criminals are prosecuted, we convey our disapproval, and the 
law-breaker and other would-be law-breakers can appreciate the 
seriousness that society places on such misconduct.  Affirmance is also a 
utilitarian approach to criminal justice in that it too is forward looking, but 
rather than a theory of punishment, affirmance is a theory of anti-
punishment or failure to punish.
201
  Whereas specific deterrence 
                                                                                                                          
198 Congress statutorily required that in determining the appropriate sentences under the U.S. 
Sentencing Guidelines, the Sentencing Commission was to take into account the purposes of 
sentencing.  See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006) (stating that the court must consider various factors to 
impose a sentence that is “sufficient, but not greater than necessary”).  Thus, in determining the 
particular sentence to be imposed, the courts must consider, among other things, “the need for the 
sentence imposed . . . [t]o provide just punishment for the offense; . . . afford adequate deterrence to 
criminal conduct; . . . protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and . . . provide . . . 
educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment . . . .”   
Id. §§ 3553(a)(2)(A)–(D).  The Sentencing Commission recognized that, as to the competing 
philosophies underlying the purposes of punishment, different purposes have greater or lesser value 
with different defendants.  See Steven Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key 
Compromises upon Which they Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 15–18 (1988) (stating that when faced 
with advocates of deterrence and those of “just deserts,” listing criminal behavior in rank order of 
severity and applying punishment, the Sentencing Commission focused on “typical, or average, actual 
past practice” in punishment). 
199 But see PAUL H. ROBINSON, DISTRIBUTIVE PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW:  WHO SHOULD BE 
PUNISHED HOW MUCH? 50–58 (2008) (suggesting that the aggregated-effect studies of deterrence do 
not “demonstrate a capacity to reduce crime rates as would justify the deterrence orientation that 
dominates criminal law rule-making”). 
200 Often the criminal prohibition of conduct and the assigned options for punishment may fit into 
several theories of punishment, so that by imprisoning one for a crime, such as sexual assault, society 
may convey the retributive idea that one must be punished for breaching societal rules, the utilitarian 
idea that the individual must be incapacitated to remove the danger he poses to the public, the 
rehabilitative idea that through mandatory counseling in prison, he will improve his life once freed 
from prison, and the specific and general deterrence ideas that his experience with imprisonment will 
encourage him to abstain from similar acts in the future and convince society to also abstain from 
engaging in such acts and thereby avoid similar punishment.  See H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND 
RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 3 (2d ed. 2008) (“[D]ifferent principles . . . [of 
punishment] are relevant at different points in any morally acceptable account of punishment.”).  Thus, 
in the sexual assault example above, punishment conveys a message that women are valuable members 
in this society, and their right to be free from physical and emotional assault in the most intimate of 
settings is worthy of protection.  If such conduct routinely went unpunished, rapists’ conduct would be 
affirmed, and in so doing, lawlessness toward women in particular, but likely violence in general would 
be encouraged.  Moreover, the message of women’s diminished worth would be stark.  But see 
ROBINSON, supra note 199, at 3–6 (asserting the “dangerousness of the unarticulated ‘laundry list’ 
approach” of general purposes of punishment). 
201 See DRESSLER, supra note 186, at 16 (contrasting retributivism with utilitarianism). 
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encourages the law-breaker to follow the law and thereby to choose 
pleasure over pain, affirmance encourages the law-breaker to break the law 
because there is much pleasure and little or no pain.  Likewise, just as 
general deterrence conveys that lawlessness has a price, affirmance 
reminds others that criminal law is weak against the forces of the rich and 
powerful and thus encourages lawless complicity, or simply, lawlessness.   
Affirmance raises concerns not fully addressed under the deterrence 
theory of punishment.  When the richest and most powerful echelons of 
society enjoy affirmance of their crimes through non-prosecution, the rule 
of law erodes as all citizens face added temptation to skirt laws and 
regulations.  After all, if the privileged are above the law, then the sway of 
the rule of law morally diminishes for all.
202
  Similarly, when the most 
powerful may act with impunity to enrich themselves at the expense of 
society in general, their continued control over society’s most concentrated 
sources of economic wealth (public corporations and large banks, for 
example) becomes downright hazardous in ways beyond the conception of 
mere deterrence.  Wealth achieved through the criminal abuse of powerful 
economic actors can crash capitalism, destroy ecosystems, and disperse 
great risks to human health and safety.
203
  Despite the accrual of great 
wealth—even hundreds of millions of dollars—to individuals controlling 
these economically powerful institutions, the deadweight loss to society 
may amount exponentially to billions or trillions of dollars, as shown again 
and again.  Affirmance comprehends these enormous knock-on losses, as 
well as the loss of moral suasion inherent in the rule of law, in ways that 
extend beyond mere deterrence.   
Affirmance of elite crime with outsized payoffs (and outsized costs to 
society) tells elites and their successors that crime pays even though 
society may suffer deadweight losses that far exceed the profits of elites.  
                                                                                                                          
202 In fact, confidence in the rule of law in America has declined since 2007, hurting 
competitiveness.  According to the World Economic Forum, the U.S. ranks fiftieth in confidence in 
politicians and fiftieth in government’s ability to deal with private sector at arms length.  This 
contributed greatly to the United States’s most rapid erosion in competitiveness worldwide.  WORLD 
ECONOMIC FORUM, THE GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS REPORT 2011–2012 23–24 (2011), available at  
http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GCR_Report_2011–12.pdf. 
203 Although this Article’s focus is on the financial crisis of 2008, tragedies such as the Deepwater 
Horizon BP oil rig explosion and massive oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico in 2010 drew worldwide 
attention both for the well-publicized negligent conduct of BP, Transocean, and Halliburton; the depth 
of the harm, killing eleven workers in the explosion and causing environmental destruction in the Gulf 
of Mexico and communities on its shores; as well as the financial costs for clean-up and losses to 
businesses in the vicinity.  See NAT’L COMM’N ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL & 
OFFSHORE DRILLING, DEEP WATER: THE GULF OIL DISASTER AND THE FUTURE OF OFFSHORE 
DRILLING: REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT 129–31, 173 (2011), available at 
http://www.oilspillcommission.gov/sites/default/files/documents/DEEPWATER_ReporttothePresident
_FINAL.pdf (discussing the response to the “worst environmental disaster America has ever faced”).  
The commission concluded that the companies took a series of hazardous steps which appeared to be 
motivated by economic concerns, and noted regulatory failures in oversight.  Id. at vii–viii.  
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Because the offenders’ criminal profits enhance their economic power, 
affirmance promises far more costs in the future.  Traditional notions of 
deterrence fail to account for the impact of dangerously distorted 
incentives at the apex of our system.  They further fail to account for the 
corrosion of the rule of law arising from high-profile advertisement of the 
profitability of even the most costly lawlessness among our governing 
elite.  Unlike ordinary street crime, which is largely a zero-sum game, the 
power, position, and influence of economic elites inflicts massive knock-
on costs to society generally.  Law and the punishments for breaches 
thereof convey social meaning.
204
  As discussed below, failure to punish 
conveys meaning as well; one of those meanings is affirmance. 
V.  SOCIAL MEANING AND THE EXPRESSIVENESS OF LAW 
The construction of criminal laws to convey these purposes of 
punishment is so well-accepted in American society that when legislators 
create new criminal laws, they do not necessarily identify which theories of 
punishment are furthered by the new legislation.  Instead, the social 
meaning is understood; by labeling an act as “criminal,” society intends to 
convey its disapproval of the conduct, to apply the negative label of 
“felon” in perpetuity,205 and to subject the criminal actor to limitations on 
his liberty or other punishments as identified by the government on behalf 
of the society it governs.
206
  Criminal laws empower the government to 
label and punish individuals in a meaningful way such that they can 
                                                                                                                          
204 See Lessig, supra note 168, at 951–52 (describing how actions convey social meaning).  Lessig 
defines “social meanings” as  
the semiotic content attached to various actions, or inactions, or statuses, within a 
particular context.  If an action creates a stigma, that stigma is a social meaning.  If a 
gesture is an insult, that insult is a social meaning. . . . [Use of the term “social”] 
emphasize[s] its contingency on a particular society or group or community within 
which social meanings occur. 
Id. 
205 See, e.g., MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF 
COLORBLINDNESS 2, 4 (2010) (discussing the loss of voting rights, employment opportunities, and 
other elements of disempowerment arising from criminal conviction, in the specific context of race). 
206 See HART, supra note 200, at 6 (explaining why society punishes criminal offenders).  Because 
of the social meaning attached to labeling one a criminal, an alternative for those entities with financial 
means is to invest in lobbying politicians to deem common corporate misconduct as “regulatory 
violations,” thereby avoiding the “criminal” label.  See CLINARD, supra note 177, at 22 (discussing a 
study of corporate crime focusing on the largest publically owned corporations in the United States); 
SUTHERLAND, supra note 177, at 13–14, 45–47 (reasoning that violations of laws concerning restraints 
of trade, misrepresentation in advertising, patent infringement, and unfair labor practices under the 
National Labor Relations Law constitute crimes); George Hoberg, North American Environmental 
Regulation, in CHANGING REGULATORY INSTITUTIONS IN BRITAIN AND NORTH AMERICA 305, 313–14 
(G. Bruce Doern & Stephen Wilks eds., 1998) (discussing changing labels to replace environmental 
“crime” with permits or licenses to pollute).    
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constrain individuals from breaching these laws.
207
  The strength of a social 
meaning is that it is so accepted as a part of a culture that the 
understandings or expectations associated with the idea “appear natural or 
necessary.”208   
A.  Contesting the Criminal Label 
The lack of discussion regarding the purpose of punishing a particular 
criminal act highlights the invisibility of the social meaning attached to the 
criminal label due to society’s accepted understanding of why we 
criminalize and punish.  Lawrence Lessig, in The Regulation of Social 
Meaning, thus observes the following two points:   
The more [understandings or expectations] appear natural, or 
necessary, or uncontested, or invisible, the more powerful or 
unavoidable or natural social meanings drawn from them 
appear to be.  The converse is also true: the more contested 
or contingent, the less powerful meanings appear to be.  
Social meanings carry with them, or transmit, the force, or 
contestability, of the presuppositions that constitute them.
209
 
At common law, traditional felony crimes, such as murder and rape, 
were described as “malum in se,”—that is, “wrong in itself.”210  Such 
crimes were recognized as inherently evil.  Other offenses, typically 
misdemeanors at common law, were described as “malum prohibitum,” or 
“a wrong prohibited.”211  The term describes offenses that are illegal not 
because they are inherently immoral, but rather because the law expressly 
defines the offense as illegal.  Regulatory offenses are often described as 
malum prohibitum because they “regulate” society rather than prohibit 
immoral conduct.
212
  Many regulatory offenses are consequently not 
treated as criminal offenses, but rather as violations of law.  If a criminal 
label is attached to such an offense, it may be a misdemeanor and the 
                                                                                                                          
207 See Lessig, supra note 168, at 955 (explaining that social meanings constrain individuals).  
The passage of laws, both criminal and non-criminal, are inherently political; the true question is 
whether laws are the result of social consensus or powerful interests.  See Snider, supra note 177, at 49, 
55 (discussing the social and political legitimization of corporate crime); see also FCIC REPORT, supra 
note 2, at xviii (reporting that the Commission was not surprised that “an industry of such wealth and 
power would exert pressure on policy makers and regulators” to “weak[en] regulatory constraints on 
[financial] institutions, markets, and products”).  The Commission observed, “From 1999 to 2008, the 
financial sector expended $2.7 billion in reported federal lobbying expenses; individuals and political 
action committees in the sector made more than $1 billion in campaign contributions.”  FCIC REPORT, 
supra note 2, at xviii, 55. 
208 Lessig, supra note 168, at 960.   
209 Id. at 960–61 (emphasis added). 
210 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1112 (Rev. 4th ed. 1968). 
211 Id. 
212 See id. at 1045 (explaining that many regulatory violations are described as “mala prohibita”). 
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punishment is likely to be a fine or perhaps minimal jail time.  
Crimes such as drug dealing are arguably regulatory in nature, in that 
they regulate society.  Most illicit drugs outlawed by current U.S. federal 
criminal laws were not criminalized initially.
213
  Nevertheless, drug dealing 
is a felony under federal law, and after thirty years of the “War on 
Drugs,”214 it carries a social meaning of inherent immorality today.  
Likewise, corporations were not subject to criminal laws at first because 
they are legal entities rather than humans.
215
  Yet, unlike drug crimes, the 
prosecution of corporations and their corporate leaders for economic 
crimes has been persistently attacked as anti-business
216
 and as waging 
class warfare.
217
  The white-collar defense bar has been persistent in its 
criticism of the extent of federal prosecution of corporations and their 
executives, with some notable success.
218
  The Principles of Federal 
Prosecution of Business Organizations require prosecutors to consider the 
potential impact of prosecution on investors and employees, and to 
consider non-criminal alternatives to prosecution for both the corporation 
and the individual.
219
  Drug dealers do not warrant such consideration.   
                                                                                                                          
213 For example, Coca-Cola was named after one of its key original ingredients: cocaine.  MARK 
PENDERGRAST, FOR GOD, COUNTRY AND COCA-COLA: THE DEFINITIVE HISTORY OF THE GREAT 
AMERICAN SOFT DRINK AND THE COMPANY THAT MAKES IT 29–30 (2000). 
214 See ALEXANDER, supra note 205, at 49 (discussing the Reagan Administration’s “war on 
drugs”).  In 1982, only two percent of the U.S. population believed that drugs were the most important 
problem in the United States.  The “War on Drugs,” however, spurred a dramatic increase in funding to 
combat the drug trade (from $33 million in 1981 to over $1 billion in 1991), and drug offense related 
incarcerations soared from roughly 41,000 people in 1980 to about 500,000 people thirty years later.  
Id. at 49, 59.   
215 See N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 493–94 (1908) 
(rejecting the common law view that corporations are not subject to criminal laws); DAVID O. 
FRIEDRICHS, TRUSTED CRIMINALS: WHITE COLLAR CRIME IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 57–58 (2d ed. 
2004) (describing the historical development of corporate crime).  
216 See, e.g., John S. Baker, Jr., Reforming Corporations Through Threats of Federal Prosecution, 
89 CORNELL L. REV. 310, 338 (2004) (“As the trial of Arthur Andersen indicates, however, ‘white-
collar’ guilty pleas are suspect . . . [because] it is difficult to know how many guilty pleas reflect actual 
guilt as opposed to perjured pleas proffered to lessen the time, expense, and anxiety of the ordeal.”); 
supra note 157 (discussing the Arthur Andersen case). 
217 See Baker, supra note 216, at 350–51 (asserting that “executives [who] took actions on behalf 
of corporations [and their executives] that appeared to be ‘very bad,’ even though not criminal,” are 
“easily demonized” because the “media obsession” with “their luxurious lifestyles make it easy to 
caricature them as greedy people who achieved their elite status through wrongdoing rather than [h]ard 
work”). 
218 See id. at 310–11 (characterizing corporate and criminal defense lawyers’ objections to 
prosecution for white-collar crimes). 
219 See U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL, supra note 13, § 9-28.300 (stating that prosecutors should 
consider “collateral consequences, including whether there is disproportionate harm to shareholders, 
pension holders, employees, and others not proven personally culpable, as well as impact on the public 
arising from the prosecution”); id. § 9-28.1100 (“Non-criminal alternatives to prosecution often exist 
and prosecutors may consider whether such sanctions would adequately deter, punish, and rehabilitate a 
corporation that has engaged in wrongful conduct.”).  Non-criminal alternatives to prosecution are also 
a consideration under the principles in deciding whether to prosecute individuals.  See id. § 9-27.250 
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Even in the face of a potential global financial meltdown triggered by 
the reckless practices of investment banks, mortgage brokerages, and 
insurance giant AIG, Treasury Secretary Paulson resisted efforts to impose 
regulations that would limit future misconduct.
220
  Key provisions of the 
Dodd-Frank Act,
221
 which were imposed to protect against future 
misconduct, have been vigorously attacked as anti-business and have been 
resisted from within the government as well as from the strongest players 
in the financial markets.
222
  Whether the success of contesting the 
regulation and prosecution of elite actors in the financial market meltdown 
is a consequence of a persuasive message, or sheer financial control of the 
message and electoral funding, is disputed.  Nevertheless, in a political 
climate where being a politician tough on crime has been a consistent 
winner, the pullback from pursuing fraud claims against the corporate 
titans who personally benefitted from the reckless policies they employed 
at the major financial institutions is discordant. 
B.  Fair Play and the Negative Message of Inequality 
Perception of fairness in the law is critical to compliance with the 
law.
223
  Indeed, the perception that one is foolish for complying with the 
law when others flagrantly disregard it without consequences undermines 
the retributivist’s moral imperative to comply with law.224  Animal 
                                                                                                                          
(“In weighing the adequacy of such an alternative in a particular case, the prosecutor should consider 
the nature and severity of the sanctions that could be imposed, the likelihood that an adequate sanction 
would in fact be imposed, and the effect of such a non-criminal disposition on Federal law enforcement 
interests.”). 
220 See PAULSON, supra note 40, at 260 (describing his first person account and efforts “to resist 
pressure on [executive] compensation restrictions” at companies receiving government bailout money).  
221 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 12 U.S.C. § 5301 (2012). 
222 See, e.g., Jean Eaglesham, As Business Takes Aim at Dodd-Frank, Battle Shifts to Courts, 
WALL ST. J. (July 29, 2011), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405311190477230457647031393
3175814.html (reporting on efforts to attack Dodd-Frank in the courts); Tamara Keith, New Consumer 
Protection Agency Faces Opposition, NPR (July 21, 2011), http://www.npr.org/2011/07/21/138550502
/new-consumer-protection-agency-faces-opposition (describing efforts opposing the Consumer 
Protection Bureau created by Dodd-Frank).  
223 See PAUL H. ROBINSON & JOHN M. DARLEY, JUSTICE, LIABILITY & BLAME: COMMUNITY 
VIEWS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 202–03 (1995) (positing that people are less likely to comply with the 
law if it is seen as unjust); TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 25 (1990) (asserting that 
people may not distinguish between the favorability of outcomes, fairness of outcomes, and procedural 
fairness when accessing justness of outcomes under the law). 
224 Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 VA. L. REV. 349, 358–
59 (1997).  Professor Kahan relies upon empirical studies suggesting  
a strong correlation between a person’s obedience [to law] and her perception of 
others’ behavior and attitudes toward law. . . . [A] person’s beliefs about whether 
other persons in her situation are paying their taxes plays a much more significant 
role in her decision to comply than does the burden of the tax or her perception of 
the expected punishment for evasion. 
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behaviorists have observed in a number of species an evolutionary fair play 
at work.
225
  Confidence is diminished when members of the group perceive 
that the rules are unfairly applied.
226
  Studying the same social behaviors in 
these empathetic animals exemplifies that the survival value of “fair play” 
in evolution, as it developed early on the evolutionary scale, is widespread 
and prominent.
227
 Research by social scientists supports the conclusion that 
world religions incorporate and encourage fair play which, in turn, permits 
advanced societies to engage in market growth and other aspects of a 
complex society.
228
  Beyond the social meaning of why we punish is the 
                                                                                                                          
Id. at 354; see also Harold G. Grasmick & Donald E. Green, Legal Punishment, Social Disapproval 
and Internalization as Inhibitors of Illegal Behavior, 71 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 325, 327 (1980) 
(“[N]o commentator writing from the deterrence perspective has suggested that legal force is the sole 
mechanism of control . . . . Rather, what is emerging . . . is a model of social control containing three 
inhibitory variables—internalization of norms, threat of social disapproval, and threat of legal 
punishment . . . .”).  Thus a taxpayer may conclude adherence to the law is “more servile than moral,” 
when others fail to reciprocate in the societal compact to pay their fair share of taxes.  Kahan, supra at 
358.  Indeed, an announced crackdown on the unrepentant tax cheat has been shown to have the 
unexpected effect of less compliance rather than more compliance, as the announcement confirms that 
the taxpayer truly is carrying an unfair share of the tax load due to the unwillingness of other 
community members to contribute and the government’s failure to enforce the law.  See Sheffrin & 
Triest, supra note 18, at 212–13 (asserting that publicizing “the tax gap increases the degree to which 
others are viewed as dishonest” and suggesting that this in turn will result in increased noncompliance). 
225 See DE WAAL, supra note 18, at 5 (“There is exciting new research about the origins of 
altruism and fairness in both ourselves and other animals. . . . By protesting against unfairness, 
[humans’ and monkeys’] behavior supports both the claim that incentives matter and that there is a 
natural dislike of injustice.”).  De Waal recognizes that “one can’t derive the goals of society from the 
goals of nature,” but observes that “nature can offer . . . information and inspiration.”  Id. at 30.  
Animals recognize when one of its members refuses to observe the cultural rules of fair play of the clan 
and then they work to communicate to the rebel to either conform or exit the group.  See FRANS DE 
WAAL, OUR INNER APE 201 (2005) (exemplifying this principle with an example of a time when a pair 
of apes were the first ones to come inside the zoo to eat after being beaten the previous night for 
refusing to come in and thus keeping the others from eating).  
226 See DE WAAL, supra note 225, at 187–88 (illustrating this truth with a test of two monkeys 
where one bartered and was given a favorite food, grapes, and the other was given cucumber and lost 
interest and became agitated); Frans B.M. de Waal, How Animals Do Business, 2 SCI. AM., Apr. 2005, 
at 73, 78 (same).   
227 See DE WAAL, supra note 225, at 4–7 (focusing on “the role of empathy and social 
connectedness” instead of the “selfish side to our species”).  But see Joseph Henrich et al., Markets, 
Religion, Community Size, and the Evolution of Fairness and Punishment, SCI. MAG, Mar. 19, 2010, at 
1480, 1480 (reporting on study spanning fifteen diverse populations suggesting that modern 
prosociality regarding fair play and punishment “is not solely the product of an innate psychology, but 
also reflects norms and institutions,” such as larger-scale market integration and world religions, “that 
have emerged over the course of human history”). 
228 See Henrich et al., supra note 208, at 1481 (“If markets and world religions are linked to the 
norms that sustain exchange in large-scale societies, we expect that experimental measures of fairness 
in anonymous interactions will positively covary with measures of involvement in these two 
institutions.”).  A marked indicator of higher intelligence in humans is empathy, a capacity to 
imaginatively project a subjective state upon another and vicariously experience another’s feelings.  
See DE WAAL, supra note 18, at 65–69 (acknowledging one Swedish psychologist’s assertion that “we 
don’t decide to be empathic—we simply are”).  The capacity to understand others also creates an 
ability to harm or deceive another deliberately because cruelty relies on the propensity to imagine how 
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meaning attached to who we punish and who we do not.
229
      
Professor Dan Kahan examined the connection between social 
influence, social meaning, and deterrence from crime, concluding that law 
can shape “how individuals’ perceptions of each others’ values, beliefs, 
and behavior affect their conduct, including their decisions to engage in 
crime.”230  Thus, there is the broadly observed phenomenon that while a 
community may generally support prosecuting and punishing one who 
murders another individual, lynchings were permissible forms of 
community activity in some parts of the United States, typically with no 
criminal charges brought against the perpetrators of the violence despite 
thousands of complicit spectators attending these spectacles of lawlessness 
and disorder.
231
  The failure by law enforcement to subsequently pursue the 
instigators of the lynchings for criminal acts committed before witnesses 
from the very community in which they lived conveyed a clear social 
meaning to everyone in that community about the value of persons of color 
in the eyes of the law.  That those crowds did not rise up against the 
neighbors who performed the lynchings demonstrated that the conduct was 
culturally tolerated in the community, and that the law sanctioned 
punishing some without due process while absolving thousands without 
charges.   
Though the days of lynching are largely behind us, the law continues 
to express the social meaning of a community through the manner of its 
enforcement.  The use of racial incongruity as a basis for reasonable 
suspicion, in conjunction with Terry stops,
232
 permits law enforcement to 
express the message that neighborhoods have a color, and that some 
                                                                                                                          
one’s own behavior affects another.  See id. at 210–11 (asserting that “taking another’s perspective is a 
neutral capacity: It can serve both constructive and destructive ends” and that “[c]rimes against 
humanity often rely on precisely this capacity”).  Many animals exhibit their aptitude to empathize, 
which reveals identical social behaviors to humans and is an avenue to understanding our own human 
social behaviors, such as bonding, forming alliances, and conflict resolution.  See id. at 122–25 
(“[A]dvanced empathy requires both mental mirroring and mental separation.”).   
229 See ROBINSON, supra note 199, at 2 (“[E]ach purpose of punishment when used as a 
distributive principle gives a quite different distribution of punishment.”).  
230 Kahan, supra note 224, at 350.   
231 See Leslie Friedman Goldstein, The Second Amendment, the Slaughter-House Cases (1873), 
and United States v. Cruikshank (1876), 1 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 365, 386–90 (2008) (describing the 
widespread anti-black violence in the antibellum South and the limits of the federal government’s 
capacity to curb such violence in the absence of state government will); see also Kahan, supra note 
224, at 353–54 (identifying looting and riots as other mob activities that draw individuals without prior 
criminal records or with differing socio-economic backgrounds from those who live in the affected 
area).     
232 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968) (holding that law enforcement may stop and question 
individuals under the lesser standard of reasonable suspicion). 
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individuals belong there and others do not.
233
  For those who fail to discern 
this meaning—most often law-abiding minorities who are forced to suffer 
the indignity of a police encounter, potentially with a frisk, or even 
handcuffs—the lesson is hard-learned.234  The message to stay out of 
certain neighborhoods and away from certain people may be delivered less 
violently than in the past, but as Professor Bennett Capers observes, the 
“stops, coming from the state, suggest a public discounting of worth, an 
asterisk on our protestations of equality, a caveat to our rhetoric about 
applying strict scrutiny to the state’s use of racial distinctions.”235 
Discretionary enforcement of law that conveys a negative message of 
inequality that some law-abiding citizens are less valued concurrently 
conveys the message that some citizens are more valued.
236
  Every citizen 
contact with the discretionary features of the criminal justice system 
strengthens or erodes the meaning of a legally ordered society.
237
  When 
the conduct rises far beyond the reasonable suspicion necessary for law 
enforcement to stop and make inquiry in the moment, and instead amounts 
to widespread reports of fraud for which the prosecutor is able to make a 
carefully considered decision, the social meaning in choosing to forgo 
prosecution of elite crimes is unmistakable.
238
 
                                                                                                                          
233 See I. Bennett Capers, Policing, Race, and Place, 44 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 43, 72 (2009) 
(acknowledging that many minorities when choosing a neighborhood will be risk adverse, choosing 
neighborhoods that are predominantly minority, “where they are less likely to face a hostile police”). 
234 See id. (“[W]hen the police patrol neighborhoods and use racial incongruity as a factor for 
initiating an encounter or a stop and frisk, it sends the expressive message that neighborhoods have a 
color.”). 
235 Id. at 68 (citation omitted); see also id. (“[L]aw-abiding minorities in predominantly white 
communities face disproportionate stops by and encounters with the police, and law-abiding whites in 
minority communities face disproportionate stops by and encounters with the police.  The officers in 
effect function as de facto border control, deciding who is scrutinized, stopped, questioned, or frisked.”  
(citations omitted)).   
236 See William J. Stuntz, Race, Class and Drugs, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1795, 1835 (1998) (noting 
the disparate sentences for crack and cocaine, and how that disparity is a direct bias against “black drug 
crime”). 
237 See Brown, supra note 13, at 1306–07 (showcasing that the negative effects of street crime 
laws and enforcement choices are felt most strongly by disadvantaged communities, in particular low-
income minority communities). 
238 See Matt Taibbi, Outrageous HSBC Settlement Proves Drug War Is a Joke, 
ROLLINGSTONE.COM (Dec. 13, 2012), http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/blogs/taibblog/outrageous-
hsbc-settlement-proves-the-drug-war-is-a-joke-20121213 (asserting that failure to prosecute HSBC for 
brazen money-laundering of Mexican drug cartel money and international terrorist-associated 
organizations and accepting comparatively low civil settlement fine on the “absurd ground” that 
prosecuting the financial institution “might imperil the world financial system” removes any “moral 
authority” by the government to prosecute minor drug crimes and pursue asset forfeitures); Brown, 
supra note 13, at 1308 (illustrating that prosecutors may, in order to avoid social harm, decline criminal 
punishment for civil remedies against a fraudulent health care provider if it is the lone provider in a 
community). 
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C.  Modeling Subversion of the Rule of Law 
Members who disregard legal restrictions and are not punished become 
models of bad behavior that are then followed by others who no longer 
perceive a negative risk to misconduct.
239
  Social learning theory posits that 
modeling—learning by observation and imitation—occurs after the 
observer is exposed to a certain behavior.
240
  First, the observer must have 
the capacity to understand the significant features of the behavior, such as 
consequences.
241
  Second, in order to reproduce the behavior, the observer 
must encode the observed information into long-term memory for later 
retrieval if he is capable of reproducing the behavior.
242
  Most importantly, 
the final factor in modeling behavior is the observer’s motivation, or 
reinforcement, where he anticipates a positive result, or reward for the 
observed behavior.
243
  Once modeling is encoded and the negative 
reinforcement of a positive result or reward becomes engrained behavior, 
the risk is a breakdown of the social order, so that there is a loss of good 
behavior from previously law-abiding citizens.
244
  Thus, bad behavior 
modeling eclipses the threat of retribution for violation of the law, 
affirming that one can flaunt the legal threat and get away with it.
245
  
Illegal conduct that appears occasional and isolated may become prevalent 
if prosecution is not vigorously pursued.
246
  
                                                                                                                          
239 See Albert Bandura, Social Learning Analysis of Aggression, in ANALYSIS OF DELINQUENCY 
AND AGGRESSION 203, 212 (Emilio Ribes-Inesta & Albert Bandura eds., 1976) (“[I]t has been shown 
that exposure to models engaging in threatening activities without adverse consequences has 
disinhibiting effects on observers by extinguishing their fears vicariously.”); Kahan, supra note 224, at 
356–57 (“If individuals perceive that their neighbors are freely dealing drugs or routinely evading their 
taxes, they are likely to infer that the risks of such behavior are small and the potential rewards high.”).   
240 Bandura, supra note 237, at 206.  
241 See id. (asserting that “some people do not gain much from example because they fail to 
observe the essential features of the model’s behavior”). 
242 See id. (“Past modeling influences achieve some degree of permanence if they are represented 
in memory in images, words, or some other symbolic form.”). 
243 See id. at 216 (“Unfavorable discrepancies between observed and experienced outcomes tend 
to create discontent, whereas individuals may be satisfied with limited rewards as long as they are as 
good as, or better than, what others are receiving.”).   
244 See DE WAAL, supra note 225, at 202–03 (asserting that one’s disbelief in reciprocity is “an 
out-and-out negation of why we humans live in group, of why we do each other any favors at all”).   
245 See Brian Mullen et al., Jaywalking as a Function of Model Behavior, 16 PERSONALITY & 
SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 320, 324, 327 (1990) (finding a statistically significant increase in illegal 
jaywalking by individuals exposed to disobedient models, with at least one perspective of data analysis 
suggesting “something uniquely powerful about the disobedient model”).  Lawlessness is contagious so 
that a law-abiding individual is more likely to break the laws when in the presence of peers who break 
the law.  See ALBERT BANDURA, AGGRESSION: A SOCIAL LEARNING ANALYSIS 104–07 (1973) 
(reviewing studies suggesting interdependence in violent crimes such as hijackings and abductions); 
Kahan, supra note 224, at 354–55 (citing studies indicating that instances of mob violence and looting 
are often “interlinked” and “responsive to the decisions of other individuals”). 
246 See, e.g., Stephen Joyce, Insider Trading Violations Now Evolving into “Actual Business 
Model,” Official Says, 43 SEC. REG. & L. REP. 589 (2011) (“Insider-trading conduct is changing from 
relatively small, single episodes of illegal behavior to an ‘actual business model,’ where rings of 
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For those who benefited from excessive fees generated through 
subprime mortgage lending and risky credit default swaps, disregard for 
longstanding rules and practices became so profitable that they ignored the 
greater risks they were taking to achieve those profits, while others 
followed this profit model in the hopes of achieving its promised 
rewards.
247
  Once the bad behavior became widespread and its monumental 
costs manifested in the financial crisis of 2008, the federal government 
focused on stopping the panic in the financial markets rather than 
punishing the initiators of the conduct.
248
  The urgent need for a financial 
fix was optimal for the initial wrongdoers, since the attention shifted from 
those at fault to those able to assist with the fix.
249
  With so many actors 
misbehaving, those who financially benefitted most deflected 
responsibility by laying blame for systemic failure at the doors of others—
such as the credit rating agencies that failed to appropriately rate risk and 
the regulators that failed to investigate or appropriately sanction 
misconduct.
250
  Nevertheless, the failure to counteract these models of bad 
                                                                                                                          
sophisticated businesspeople from several distinct industries repeatedly break the law to reap huge 
illicit gains, Securities and Exchange Commission Associate Regional Director David Rosenfeld said 
March 11.”). 
247 See Floyd Norris, Eyes Open, WaMu Still Failed, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 2011, at B1 
(recounting how, in 2008, Washington Mutual (“WaMu”) became the largest bank failure in American 
history).  Although internal officers warned the CEO, Kerry K. Killinger, and the board of directors of 
impending disaster from risky lending practices, and regulators were made aware of the problems as 
early as 2006, no efforts were made at the bank to reign in risk and regulators resisted taking any 
enforcement action until it was too late.  Id.  WaMu “had identified Countrywide Financial as a model 
to emulate, and any other course would have surrendered market share, not to mention immediate 
profits that financed huge paychecks for executives.”  Id.; see also RAMIREZ, LAWLESS CAPITALISM, 
supra note 70, at 24–25, 191–93 (describing the reckless loan practices at Countrywide Financial and 
the role that CEO Angelo Mozilo played in its demise).  
248 See PAULSON, supra note 40, at 253–62 (describing his push for an immediate bailout and his 
insistence that Congress did not have the luxury of debating appropriate consequences for the financial 
industry due to the impending financial meltdown after the collapse of Lehman Brothers, which he 
declared as “the economic equivalent of war”). 
249 Paulson resisted suggestions that any bailout legislation include compensation restrictions, 
asserting that banks would be unwilling to accept bailouts if such conditions were in the package, and 
he wanted to “encourage[] maximum participation” in the bailout so that the banks would unload the 
toxic assets.  Id. at 260. 
250 See, e.g., U.S. FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, HEARING ON SUBPRIME LENDING AND 
SECURITIZATION AND GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED ENTERPRISES (GSES) 8 (Apr. 8, 2010) (statement of 
Charles Prince, Former Chairman and CEO of Citigroup, Inc.), available at http://fcic-
static.law.stanford.edu/cdn_media/fcic-testimony/2010-0408-Transcript.pdf (asserting the “precipitous 
nature” of “dramatic[] downgrad[ing]” by the rating agencies of  “widespread holdings” of “securitized 
products . . . led to the general recession,” rather than excessive risk taking by the banks); see also 
Mark J. Flannery et al., Credit Default Swap Spreads as Viable Substitutes for Credit Ratings, 158 U. 
PA. L. REV. 2085, 2089–94 (2010) (describing the evolution of credit rating agencies in the United 
States, the conflicts of interest undermining the credibility and integrity of the ratings system that arose 
from regulatory dependence on credit ratings and issuer-based fees for ratings, and the consequential 
slow response by the private rating agencies to negative information regarding rated companies that 
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behavior further affirms the misconduct while permitting wrongdoers to 
remain at the apex of the U.S. financial system. 
Legislatures may authorize the use of criminal sanctions in statutory 
language, but the use of these sanctions depends upon their application by 
administrators of the law.
251
  This Article focuses not on the propriety of 
the rules—that is, criminal laws—but rather on their use or non-use by 
prosecutors and the consequential expressive message affirming criminal 
misconduct.  The oft-stated maxim that “no one is above the law” ignores 
the “unsavory details . . . about the specific content of laws or about who 
makes them, interprets them, and applies them for what purposes.”252  If 
laws are perceived as being applied unfairly so that persons of wealth or 
power are permitted to operate above the law, the rule of law is 
undermined.
253
 
Affirmance of the crimes of the rich and powerful sends an 
                                                                                                                          
have been identified as failing to alert investors to the underlying risks of companies involved in the 
2008–2009 financial crisis). 
251 Harry V. Ball & Lawrence M. Friedman, The Use of Criminal Sanctions in the Enforcement of 
Economic Legislation: A Sociological View, 17 STAN. L. REV. 197, 199 (1965). 
252 Holmes, supra note 13, at 123. 
253 The “rule of law” is a general notion defined in myriad ways, some of which are contradictory.  
See Horwitz, supra note 24, at 153–54 & n.4, 155–56 (citing numerous examples by authors both 
acknowledging the differences in definition of “rule of law,” as well as contrasting authors’ 
definitions).  This Article recognizes that at a minimum, the “rule of law” encompasses Richard 
Fallon’s summary of five elements generally present in modern definitions of the rule of law: “the 
capacity of legal rules to be understood, efficacy, stability, the supremacy of legal authority, and the 
availability of impartial legal procedures.”  Richard H. Fallon, Jr., “The Rule of Law” as a Concept in 
Constitutional Discourse, 97 COLUM.  L. REV. 1, 8–9 (1997) (emphasis added).  Fallon described these 
concepts as follows: 
(1) The first element is the capacity of legal rules, standards, or principles to guide 
people in the conduct of their affairs.  People must be able to understand the law and 
comply with it.  
(2) The second element of the Rule of Law is efficacy.  The law should actually 
guide people, at least for the most part.  In Joseph Raz’s phrase, “people should be 
ruled by the law and obey it.”  
(3) The third element is stability.  The law should be reasonably stable, in order to 
facilitate planning and coordinated action over time. 
(4) The fourth element of the Rule of Law is the supremacy of legal authority.  The 
law should rule officials, including judges, as well as ordinary citizens.  
(5) The final element involves instrumentalities of impartial justice.  Courts should 
be available to enforce the law and should employ fair procedures. 
Id. (citations omitted).  This Article would extend the fifth element’s “impartial justice” to go beyond 
employing fair procedures by courts to include fair practices by prosecutors that are impartial to the 
political or financial status of the citizens.  See RAMIREZ, LAWLESS CAPITALISM, supra note 70, at 
186–91 (summarizing a continuum of views defining the rule of law from Justice Holmes’s view of the 
rule of law “as mere scrivener to elite power,” to Friedrich Hayek’s view that “the rule of law be fixed 
and announced in advance,” and proposing a “more durable” rule of law that “secure[s] important legal 
and regulatory infrastructure from elite subversion” that limits “the economically mighty [from 
imposing] massive costs on others and society generally”). 
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unmistakable message: despite the obvious and extensive harm they cause 
to many, elite criminals are above the law and will not pay a price to 
society for disrupting its rules and imposing suffering on others.  Elite 
criminals are assured that they can take risks with other people’s lives or 
livelihoods, their money or their environment, and reap great rewards in 
costs savings, hefty salaries, generous bonuses for short-term gains in 
profits, promotions, or corporate board appointments.  When their crimes 
cause harm, consequences are unlikely to reach them personally; at most, 
the organizations they control suffer great losses—deadweight losses well 
in excess of any benefits they harvest.
254
  Even if some individual 
economic harm is incurred, the benefits will far outweigh those costs.  
Affirmance assures economically powerful elites that their harvesting of 
illicit profits will continue unabated.   
D.  Expressing the Message of Affirmance in Elite Crimes 
In one of the earliest cases imposing imprisonment sentences on 
individuals engaged in economic crimes,
255
 “[t]he court described the 
defendants’ conduct as a shocking indictment of a vast section of our 
economy that flagrantly mocked the image of the economic system of free 
enterprise which we profess to today as a free-world alternative to state 
control and eventual dictatorship.”256  Then-U.S. Attorney General Robert 
Kennedy characterized the defendants’ conduct even more starkly, as a 
“serious threat to democracy.”257  Elites tend to attract attention.  Their 
profits also reflect their degree of power.  Huge payoffs amplify the 
message of lawlessness for profit.  Declining to prosecute elites for profit-
gorging crimes is bound to publicize the profitability of crime in a way that 
does not apply in the case of ordinary street crime.  Thus, the affirmance of 
                                                                                                                          
254 See RAMIREZ, LAWLESS CAPITALISM, supra note 70, at xv (describing how the subprime 
mortgage crisis yielded millions for corporate managers, but cost trillions to firms through the taxpayer 
bailout of those firms); George W. Dent, Jr., Academics in Wonderland: The Team Production and 
Director Primacy Models of Corporate Governance, 44 HOUS. L. REV. 1213, 1245–47  (2008) 
(discussing how CEO primacy in corporate governance permits numerous opportunities for corporate 
managers personally to benefit financially through legal and fraudulent means at the expense of the 
corporation and its shareholders); Narayanan et al., supra note 74, at 1600–01 (concluding that 
executive options backdating led to an average loss per firm of about $389 million, while the average 
potential gain from the practices to the benefiting executives in each firm was less than $500,000).   
255 United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 1960 Trade Cas. ¶69,699 (E.D. Pa. May 13, 1960) 
(often referred to as the “Electrical Equipment Antitrust Cases”).   
256 Ball & Friedman, supra note 251, at 198 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
257 Id. (citing JOHN G. FULLER, THE GENTLEMEN CONSPIRATORS: THE STORY OF PRICE FIXERS IN 
THE ELECTRICAL INDUSTRY 175–76 (1962)) (recounting a television interview of Attorney General 
Robert Kennedy on the subject of civil action against industrial electrical equipment manufacturers for 
damages suffered by the government related to a price fixing scheme by the private corporations). 
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elite crimes uniquely threatens the rule of law.
258
 
When a prosecutor elects against criminal prosecution, the general 
public does not have internal access to that decision and, consequently, 
given the multitude of considerations factoring into the decision, cannot 
fairly assess whether the cost of moving forward with a criminal 
prosecution is outweighed by the benefits of a decision to drop the case, 
move forward with a civil case instead, impose a regulatory fine, or 
negotiate a settlement short of full prosecution.  Thus, the prosecutor must 
be aware of the long-term consequences of affirming crime including its 
social meaning.  
Perception becomes reality in the long run.  Elites who violate the law 
and benefit greatly from those violations without incurring personal 
punishment model bad behavior for others.  Observers that perceive a lack 
of fair play will assess for themselves whether the costs outweigh the 
benefits of adhering to the rule of law.
259
  Ironically, those who follow the 
law and forgo corrupt profits may actually be at a competitive 
disadvantage relative to those who break the law.
260
  The inequality in 
profits and market power due to illegitimate practices causes the bad actors 
to drive out the good.
261
  Rejection of the social order ensues as each actor 
                                                                                                                          
258 See, e.g., Nate Raymond, Rakoff Again Blasts SEC Settlements Where Defendants Admit No 
Wrong, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 24, 2011 (reporting on remarks by U.S. District Court Judge Jed Rakoff 
regarding the practice in SEC civil settlements that allege “terrible wrongs” but allow defendants to 
avoid admitting or denying guilt and concluding that “[t]he disservice to the public inherent in such a 
practice is palpable” (quoting SEC v. Vitesse Semiconductor Corp., 771 F. Supp. 2d 304, 309 
(S.D.N.Y. 2011))).  
259 See SORKIN, supra note 42, at 14 (describing Lehman Brothers’s temptation to over-leverage 
“like everyone else on Wall Street” by borrowing money to increase the returns on risky investments, 
despite the knowledge of the great riskiness of the undertaking).  Both Lehman Brothers and Merrill 
Lynch had modeled their investment risk-taking after Goldman Sachs.  Id. at 28, 144. 
260 See WILLIAM K. BLACK, THE BEST WAY TO ROB A BANK IS TO OWN ONE: HOW CORPORATE 
EXECUTIVES AND POLITICIANS LOOTED THE S&L INDUSTRY 2 (2005) (explaining that CEO “control 
frauds” manipulate the external controls over CEO power by “shop[ping] for accommodating 
accountants, appraisers, and attorneys”).  
261 See id. at 40 (illustrating how control frauds during the S&L crisis were “routinely able” to 
find auditors from top-tier firms willing to give them clean opinions “even when they were deeply 
insolvent and engaged in massive accounting fraud”); NAT’L COMM’N ON FIN. INST. REFORM, 
RECOVERY AND ENFORCEMENT, ORIGINS AND CAUSES OF THE S&L DEBACLE: A BLUEPRINT FOR 
REFORM, A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES 76 (1993) (same); 
FCIC REPORT, supra note 2, at xxv, 147–50 (describing the carelessness with which Moody’s 
corporation assessed risk in rating structured financial products).  “[I]ssuers [of credit default 
obligations (“CDOs”)] could choose which rating agencies to do business with, and because the 
agencies depended on the issuers for their revenues, rating agencies felt pressured to give favorable 
ratings so that they might remain competitive.”  FCIC REPORT, supra note 2, at 150.  The revenues 
from structured products, including mortgage-backed securities and CDOs were lucrative; from 2000 to 
2006, Moody’s “revenues surged from $602 million to $2 billion and its profit margin climbed from 
26% to 37%.”  Id. at 149.  In 2006, Moody’s rated thirty mortgage-related securities as triple-A (its 
highest rating) every day; in early 2010, only six private-sector companies received the triple-A rating 
from Moody’s.  Id. at xxv.   
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pursues misconduct due to competitive pressures.
262
  Crime becomes 
socially acceptable, even socially compelled, much like the lynch mobs of 
the past.
263
 
The top executives who manage these corporations sit in particularly 
powerful seats because they direct the financial heft of the corporations 
they govern.
264
  During the financial crisis of 2008, the federal government 
bailed out financial institutions before regulators had an opportunity to 
assess the viability of the institutions and before investigators could assess 
whether fraudulent conduct had led to the crisis.  Professor Bill Black, a 
senior regulator
265
 during the Savings and Loan debacle of the late 1980s, 
examined the risk of moral hazard, or adverse incentives, in the financial 
markets.
266
  Nobel Laureate Joseph Stiglitz has also pointed out that moral 
hazard attaches to bank bailouts.
267
  Ordinarily, a bank or lending 
institution that has insufficient funds to pay its depositors or creditors 
would be placed in conservatorship so that it could be financially 
reorganized.
268
  Typically, one consequence would be replacing 
management while shareholders faced losing their equity interest, a risk 
recognized by the shareholders when purchasing shares.
269
  In his book, 
Freefall, Professor Stiglitz asserts that the 2008 government bailout of the 
                                                                                                                          
262 See, e.g., House of Cards—Original Documentary (CNBC television broadcast 2009), 
available at http://video.cnbc.com/gallery/?video=1145392808&play=1 (including interview of 
mortgage broker admitting that if he had required full documentation from loan applicants when others 
were requiring no documentation, his business would have folded because customers would have gone 
elsewhere); George Ackerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Qualitative Uncertainty and the Market 
Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488, 488 (1970) (expounding the theory that when “buyers use some 
statistic to judge the quality of prospective purchases,” “returns for good quality accrue mainly to the 
entire group whose statistic is affected” and sellers are incentivized to market poorer quality goods, 
resulting in a general reduction in the quality of goods available and in the size of the market). 
263 See, e.g., Chad Terhune et al., Mortgage Mess: Shredding the Dream, BUSINESSWEEK. (Oct. 
21, 2010), http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/10_44/b4201076208349.htm (reporting on 
rampant fraudulent conduct in mortgage loans and foreclosures, as well as the involvement by many in 
the mortgage lending business, including large banks).  Reporting on the reaction to the need to address 
the crisis quickly, the authors observed: “The longer it drags on, the more the foreclosure crisis 
corrodes Americans’ faith in their financial and legal systems.  A pervasive sense of injustice is bad for 
the economy and democracy as well.”  Id.; see also Norris, supra note 247 (reporting that the regulators 
looked the other way, investigators were ignored by their bosses, internal auditors were pushed aside, 
and the board passed resolutions but “did nothing to stop the rot”).  
264 See RAMIREZ, LAWLESS CAPITALISM, supra note 70, at 12.  
265 See Public Policy Issues Raised by the Report of the Lehman Bankruptcy Examiner: Hearing 
Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 111th Cong. 123–24 (2010) (statement of William K. Black), 
available at http://financialservices.house.gov/media/file/hearings/111/printed%20hearings/111-
124.pdf (listing Black’s regulatory roles during the S&L crisis). 
266 See BLACK, supra note 260, at 6 (“Moral hazard is the temptation to seek gain by engaging in 
abusive, destructive behavior, either fraud or excessive risk taking. . . . This is not unique to S&Ls; it is 
in the nature of the corporation.”). 
267 STIGLITZ, supra note 17, at 16–17. 
268 Id. at 116–17. 
269 Id. at 121.  
 924 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:865 
financial industry, like the bailouts of the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s, signals 
the banks that they need not worry about risk management because the 
government will “pick up the pieces.”270  This assurance permits the least 
prudent bankers to continue or to repeat their reckless practices.
271
   
The moral hazard that the bankers’ incentives to act responsibly are 
weakened if they know they will be bailed out by the government because 
they are too big to fail and this risks not only the need for future bailouts 
that will be even greater in magnitude than the generous bailouts from 
2007 to 2009, but also risks “our sense of fairness and social cohesion in 
the long run.”272  Stiglitz observes that even those operating in the financial 
markets objected to the bailouts as favoring the mega-institutions at the 
expense of other institutions that may have been more pragmatic in their 
investment strategies.
273
  Indeed, the whole market may become distorted 
as the bailed out banks benefit from lower costs of capital due to the 
recognition of “tacit government support.”274 
That AIG sat in the eye of the financial crisis storm was unsurprising 
given that the company and its former CEO, Hank Greenberg, had avoided 
criminal punishment for past financial practices.
275
  As AIG’s financial 
                                                                                                                          
270 Id. at 135.  In the bank bailouts of 2007 to 2009, the government opted to avoid 
conservatorship for those too big to fail.  Id.  Earlier bailouts by the Federal Reserve after the collapse 
of LTCM and later, Enron, gave rise to a new term by analysts to describe the behavior, “the Greenspan 
put.”  FCIC REPORT, supra note 2, at 60 (quoting First the Put; Then the Cut?, ECONOMIST, Dec. 16, 
2000, at 81).  This term was shorthand for “investors’ faith that the Fed would keep the capital markets 
functioning no matter what.”  Id. at 61; see also John C. Coffee, Jr., The Political Economy of Dodd-
Frank: Why Financial Reform Tends to Be Frustrated and Systemic Risk Perpetuated, 97 CORNELL L. 
REV. 1019, 1048 (2012) (describing the implicit government subsidy in easy loans at lower interest 
rates for too-big-to-fail banks due to the perception that the government would not let them fail). 
271 STIGLITZ, supra note 17, at 118, 135; see also FCIC REPORT, supra note 2, at 61 (raising the 
question of whether the financial industry took on more risk because of the expectation that the Federal 
Reserve “would keep the capital markets functioning no matter what”). 
272 STIGLITZ, supra note 17, at 39. 
273 Id. at 39, 118. 
274 Id. at 118. 
275 In 2003, AIG settled a civil action with the SEC for a $10 million fine, based upon aiding an 
Indiana cell phone distributor in hiding $11.9 million in losses and then lying to the SEC about its role.  
SORKIN, supra note 42, at 155.  In 2004, AIG settled civil and criminal charges for its role in shifting 
bad loans off the books of PNC Financial Services.  Id.  The firm entered into a deferred prosecution 
agreement with the DOJ and agreed to a thirteen-month probationary period for AIG Financial 
Products Corporation (one of its operating units).  Id.  In 2005, AIG Financial Products Corporation 
was involved in another accounting scandal for inflating AIG’s cash reserves by $500 million, resulting 
in the resignation of its CEO, Maurice Raymond “Hank” Greenberg.  Id. at 160.  Although considered 
by New York’s Attorney General, no criminal charges were filed against Greenberg or AIG.  Id.  In 
February 2008, AIG was required to adjust loss estimates for November and December 2007 from $1 
billion to more than $5 billion.  Id.  AIG and Greenberg are noted for their strong financial support of 
political candidates and the ready access it has provided them, as well as supporting favorable 
legislative initiatives, and opposing unfavorable regulations.  See Leonnig, supra note 42 (reporting 
that Greenberg’s Starr Foundation “gave $500,000 to support a November 2006 report by the 
Committee on Capital Markets Regulation [that recommended] fewer criminal prosecutions of 
businesses”). 
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situation faltered, it brought Greenberg back as its chairman emeritus to 
draw on Greenberg’s relationships with wealthy investors to shore up its 
financial distress and hopefully buy the company some time as it faltered 
under the weight of AIG Financial Products Corporation’s credit default 
swaps obligations.
276
   
The AIG Financial Products Corporation was founded in 1987 in a 
deal between Greenberg and Howard Sosin, who fled investment firm 
Drexel Burnham Lambert for the deeper pockets of AIG,
277
 leaving before 
Drexel Burnham pled guilty to violations of federal securities laws in 1988 
and agreed to a $650 million fine, with the investment firm ultimately 
collapsing in bankruptcy due to Michael Milken’s “epoch-defining” junk 
bond scandal.
278
  Sosin brought thirteen Drexel employees with him to AIG 
Financial Products, where they operated a high leveraged unit with similar 
success to the prior Drexel operation.
279
 
Notably, Joseph Cassano, who headed up AIG Financial Products and 
is credited with pushing AIG into underwriting credit default swaps,
280
 was 
one of those thirteen employees who had previously worked for Drexel 
Burnham Lambert during Michael Milken’s reign of the junk bond 
market.
281
  After Sosin left AIG Financial Products in 1993,
282
 Cassano 
remained and was promoted to chief operating officer.
283
  Cassano 
eventually took the helm as CEO, earning a reported $280 million during 
his eight-year tenure at AIG Financial Products.
284
  In December 2007, 
Cassano had assured investors that “it is very difficult to see how there can 
be any losses” in the CDS portfolios,285 without revealing that AIG had 
                                                                                                                          
276 SORKIN, supra note 42, at 280.  On the very day Hank Greenberg was being deposed by the 
New York State Attorney General’s office regarding previous questionable accounting practices at 
AIG, AIG settled a $4.3 billion lawsuit it had filed against Greenberg for about $860 million so that it 
could announce that Greenberg was returning to AIG as its chairman emeritus.  Id. at 272, 280.  
277 SORKIN, supra note 42, at 155–56. 
278 FRIEDRICHS, supra note 215, at 161.  Milken pled guilty to six felony charges for securities 
fraud and conspiracy.  Id. at 162.   
279 SORKIN, supra note 42, at 156. 
280 Id. at 157.  By February 2008, AIG’s outside auditors, PricewaterhouseCoopers, concluded 
that Cassano was not “open and forthcoming” in the valuation of risk taken on by AIG, and AIG was 
required to revise its 2007 estimates of losses in November and December from $1 billion to more than 
$5 billion.  Id. at 160–61.  Although AIG’s CEO Martin Sullivan wanted to fire Cassano, he agreed to 
keep Cassano on as a consultant at $1 million per month.  Id. at 160–62. 
281 Id. at 156. 
282 Robert O’Harrow, Jr. & Brady Dennis, The Beautiful Machine, WASH. POST, Dec. 29, 2008, at 
A1, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/12/28/ 
AR2008122801916.html?nav=rss_email/components&sid=ST2010062905395.  
283 SORKIN, supra note 42, at 156. 
284 David Voreacos & Elliot Blair Smith, Cassano’s Statements on AIG Probed by Prosecutors, 
People Say, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 26, 2008), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&s
id=a6m_BOe9Ftk4&refer=news. 
285 Joe Cassano, President, CEO, AIG Fin. Prods., Am. Int’l Grp., Remarks at the Am. Int’l Grp. 
Investor Meeting (Dec. 5, 2007), available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/16785264/AIGTranscript200
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posted $2 billion in collateral to Goldman Sachs to cover losses.
286
  Nor did 
Cassano inform those investors that AIG had overstated its earnings by 
$3.6 billion.
287
  Cassano was forced to resign in 2008 after the catastrophic 
losses of billions of dollars
288
 when the subprime mortgage derivatives 
began to hit and gave rise to the need for the company to report a multi-
billion dollar loss.
289
 
Rather than face criminal charges due to a record of financial 
misconduct,
290
 AIG received the benefit of a $182 billion bailout from the 
federal government in 2008 and 2009.  Cassano was also given a  
$1 million monthly consulting fee upon resigning as CEO and walked 
away with millions in earnings.
291
  The federal probe into AIG and 
Cassano’s role in the financial crisis resulted in the unusual announcement 
that no criminal charges would be brought against AIG executives.
292
 
In 2010, a new scandal emerged as banks—some of which had been 
given government bailouts—used forged or fraudulent documents in courts 
to support home foreclosures.
293
  A group of banks had collectively created 
                                                                                                                          
71205T13301.  Cassano made a similar statement at the prior investor meeting on August 9, 2007, 
insisting that the credit default swaps were not a problem: “It is hard for us, without being flippant, to 
even see a scenario within any kind of realm or reason that would see us losing $1 in any of those 
transactions. . . . We see no issues at all emerging.  We see no dollar of loss associated with any of [the 
CDO] business.”  FCIC REPORT, supra note 2, at 268.  Despite those assurances, the following day 
AIG posted $450 million in cash to Goldman Sachs in response to its prior collateral calls.  Id. at 265–
66, 268. 
286 FCIC REPORT, supra note 2, at 272. 
287 Id. 
288 See David Ellis, US Takes Another Crack at AIG Rescue, CNNMONEY.COM (Mar. 3, 2009), 
http://money.cnn.com/2009/03/02/news/companies/aig/index.htm (reporting a $99 billion loss for 
2008); Reuters, A.I.G. Reports Record Quarterly Loss of $5.29 Billion, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 29, 2008, at 
C2 (reporting largest loss in its eighty-nine year history after reporting a write-down of securities 
exposed to bad mortgage investments).   
289 Voreacos & Smith, supra note 284. 
290 See Matthew Karnitschnig et al., U.S. to Take Over AIG in $85 Billion Bailout; Central Banks 
Inject Cash as Credit Dries Up, WALL ST. J., Sept. 17, 2008, at A1 (reporting government imposed 
conditions on the first $85 billion of bailout funds extended to AIG in September 2008); Nocera, supra 
note 67 (reporting on Cassano’s record of financial misconduct); Plumb, supra note 42 (noting the total 
amount of  bailout funds extended to AIG was $182 billion). 
291 Voreacos & Smith, supra note 284. 
292 Efreti, supra note 64 (reporting that federal prosecutors had focused the investigation on 
Joseph Cassano, head of AIG’s London-based Financial Products unit).  New York Federal Reserve 
Chairman Timothy Geithner reportedly visited with then-New York Attorney General Andrew M. 
Cuomo and discussed AIG.  Morgenson & Story, supra note 23.  Although Cuomo’s investigation into 
the financial crisis and its aftermath continued, no charges were filed against AIG prior to Cuomo’s 
departure from the office for his newly elected position as Governor of New York.  Id. 
293 Complaint, State v. Bank of Am. Corp., Case No. A-10-631557-B XXV (D. Ct. Clark Cnty., 
Nev., Dec. 17, 2010), available at http://www.s355160796.onlinehome.us/_oneclick_uploads/2012/03/
state-of-nevada-vs-bank-of-america.pdf (containing initial claims by the Nevada attorney general 
against Bank of America and related companies  regarding the use of fraudulent documents used to 
foreclose on homeowners); Gretchen Morgenson, A Swift Deal May Not Be a Sound One, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 13, 2011, at BU1 (reporting on the bank settlement being negotiated between state attorneys 
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an organization known as Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems 
(“MERS”) and used it as the designated mortgagee in home loans rather 
than the actual beneficiaries of the loans.
294
  By doing so, the banks 
avoided additional filing fees required to lawfully record mortgage 
assignments or transfers.
295
  As Professor Christopher Peterson observed, 
the mortgage finance industry set about to create an entirely new national 
system of public land title recordkeeping without seeking legislative 
reform.
296
  Instead, “the mortgage finance industry circumvented the state 
and national debate that normally precedes significant legislative 
change.”297  When loans began to fail, banks realized that the failure to 
properly document the transfers left them potentially without recourse in 
the foreclosure process.
298
  Consequently, forged documents and fraudulent 
affidavits in support of foreclosure actions were created and submitted to 
courts in support of foreclosures.
299
  Despite unquestionably fraudulent 
                                                                                                                          
general and Bank of America and its subsidiaries to address improper loan-servicing and foreclosure 
practices); Rauch & Baldwin, supra note 64 (reporting that the biggest U.S. mortgage lenders in the 
United States “are being investigated by 50 state attorneys general and U.S. regulators for foreclosing 
on homes without having proper paperwork in place or without having properly reviewed paperwork 
before signing it”); 60 Minutes: The Next Housing Shock (CBS television broadcast Apr. 3, 2011), 
available at http://www.cbsnews.com/video/watch/?id=7375936n (reporting on Docx, a company hired 
to sign fraudulent mortgage ownership documents prepared for use by banks in home foreclosures—
because the original documents were unavailable—on behalf of numerous banks, including Wells 
Fargo, HSBC, Deutsche Bank, Citibank, U.S. Bank, and Bank of America); see also infra note 303. 
294 See Christopher L. Peterson, Foreclosure, Subprime Mortgage Lending and the Mortgage 
Electronic Registration System, 78 U. CIN. L. REV. 1359, 1361–63, 1368–70 (2010) (describing the 
creation of MERS, its role in the mortgage industry, and its questionable legal role with respect to 
recording mortgages and bringing foreclosures).  MERS, created by Mortgage Bankers Association of 
America member companies, is listed as the mortgagee (MERS claims it is a nominee) on the publicly 
filed documents, and any transfers of the ownership of the mortgage loan are recorded internally in a 
computer data system, rather than with the county property recorder’s office.  Id. at 1361–62.  “Sixty 
percent of all new mortgage loan originations are recorded under MERS’s name, and more than half of 
the nation’s existing residential loans are recorded under MERS’s name.”  Id. at 1373–74.  In addition 
to avoiding further fees to the recorder’s office, MERS has also attempted to bring foreclosure 
proceedings in its name, rather than the true owner’s name.  Id. at 1362–63, 1372–73; see also Richard 
Eskow, Pictures of MERS, Part 1: Corporate Documents Illustrate the Mortgage Shell Game, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 20, 2010, 09:20 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/rj-eskow/pictures-of-
mers-part-1-c_b_769181.html (listing a who’s who of MERS owners, including AIG-UG, Bank of 
America, Citimortgage, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, GMAC, HSBC, Merrill Lynch, Nationwide, 
Washington Mutual (JP Morgan), and Wells Fargo). 
295 See Peterson, supra note 294, at 1362 (“By paying MERS a fee, the parties to a securitization 
lower their operating costs.”); Toluse Olorunnipa, Marshall C. Watson’s Law Firm to Pay $2 Million to 
Settle Foreclosure Investigation, MIAMI HERALD, Mar. 25, 2011, available at 
http://foreclosuregate.prosepoint.com/story/marshall-c-watson%E2%80%99s-law-firm-pay-2-million-
settle-foreclosure-investigation (reporting on the charges against one of eight law firms implicated in a 
Florida investigation into shoddy foreclosure practices). 
296 Peterson, supra note 294, at 1406. 
297 Id. at 1405. 
298 See id. at 1375–80 (suggesting that MERS does not actually own legal title to the loans 
registered on its database and may not have standing to bring foreclosure actions).   
299 60 Minutes: Mortgages: Walking Away, supra note 48. 
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conduct, federal regulators investigating the misconduct in foreclosures 
entered into consent orders against the fourteen largest mortgage servicers, 
who agreed to address problems in fraudulent loan documentation and 
understaffed and undertrained foreclosure operations without admitting or 
denying any wrongdoing.
300
  As one critic from the National Consumer 
Law Center observed, “These consent orders are worse than doing nothing 
. . . they give the appearance of doing something while giving banks 
control of the process.”301  Indeed, such agreements are worse than 
nothing.  They affirm unlawful conduct, encourage others to follow 
unlawful actions, and undermine the rule of law by once again expressing 
the message that the wealthy and powerful remain above it.
302
  Indeed, 
early reports in the wake of the foreclosure fraud settlement indicate that 
the lost documents and failures to modify loans continues.
303
  
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The affirmance effect appears evident in the subprime mortgage 
lending, the financial market crisis of 2007 to 2009, the generous fees and 
bonuses awarded for creating a financial Armageddon, the fraudulent loan 
documentation to support foreclosures, and the failure to pursue criminal 
charges against any of the major actors or their legions of supporters in the 
legal, accounting, and credit rating fields despite evidence of financial 
fraud.
304
  In contrast, foreclosures continue unabated, except to the extent 
                                                                                                                          
300 See Alejandro Lazo & E. Scott Reckard, Changes Ordered in Home Seizures; Foreclosure 
Probe Settlement Includes Fines, Compensation, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 14, 2011, at C21 (reporting that 
regulators from the Federal Reserve, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Office of Thrift 
Supervision, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. assured critics that their settlement “wouldn’t 
interfere with a wider-ranging investigation conducted by state attorneys general and other federal 
agencies, including the Justice, Treasury and Housing departments and the Federal Trade 
Commission”); Morgenson, supra note 293 (discussing the consent orders).  The DOJ and forty-nine 
state Attorneys General have also reached a $25 billion settlement agreement.  Press Release, U.S. 
Dep’t of Justice, Off. of Pub Affairs, Fed. Gov’t & State Att’ys Gen. Reach $25 Billion Agreement 
with Five Largest Mortgage Servicers to Address Mortgage Loan Servicing and Foreclosure Abuses 
(Feb. 9, 2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/February/12-ag-186.html. 
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POST, Aug. 7, 2012, available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/08/08/foreclosure-settlement-
fails-mortgage_n_1754018.html (reporting on continued failures by Bank of America to address 
chaotic mortgage lending practices that include lost documents, and empty assurances). 
304 A full assessment of whether elements of the financial crisis of 2007 to 2009 in fact warrant 
criminal prosecution or strongly suggest an error of prosecutorial discretion is beyond the scope of this 
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that bankers do not want to write down the losses and further reveal the 
extent of their financial plight,
305
 while social programs such as healthcare 
are cut
306
 under public pressure to balance a federal budget devastated by 
the cost of the bailout.
307
  With such lopsided consequences, it is easy to 
predict that leaders in the financial industry will continue to probe for 
opportunities to further violate laws in the pursuit of fortune
308
 or will use 
their fortunes to rewrite laws to their favor,
309
 that others will follow in 
their path,
310
 and that those not in the top 1% who take in nearly one-
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307 See id. at 400 (explaining that the federal government’s response to the financial crisis 
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10:20 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/04/13/obama-deficit-speech-medicare-tax-
increases_n_848479.html (“President Obama coupled a call for $4 trillion in long-term deficit 
reductions with a blistering attack on Republican plans for taxes, Medicare and Medicaid.”).  
308 See Steven A. Ramirez, Dodd-Frank as Maginot Line, 15 CHAP. L. REV. 109, 119, 130 (2011) 
(asserting that the Dodd-Frank Act, created to address the financial banking crisis and mortgage 
collapse of 2008, will not prevent future financial crises); The 7.30 Report: Troubles Ahead for World 
Economy (ABC broadcast July 27, 2010), available at http://www.abc.net.au/7.30/content/2010/s29658
91.htm (providing transcript of interview with Nobel Laureate Joseph Stiglitz during which he predicts 
another financial crisis because the core problems of the crisis—too-big-to-fail banks, excessive risk-
taking, and lack of transparency—were not addressed, and because the banks used their political power 
to protect derivative activity that generates large profits but puts America at risk).   
309 See FCIC REPORT, supra note 2, at xviii (concluding that the financial industry “played a key 
role in weakening regulatory constraints on institutions, markets, and products”). 
310 Derivatives trading continues today, despite the $182 billion bailout of AIG and the global 
financial crash.  Insured commercial U.S. banks held a total of nearly $231 trillion in derivatives in the 
final quarter of 2011, with the top five commercial banks dominating in derivatives: Goldman Sachs, 
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(2011), available at http://www.occ.gov/topics/capital-markets/financial-
markets/trading/derivatives/dq411.pdf.  As of 2011, the international derivatives market reached nearly 
$1.7 quadrillion, up from $1.66 quadrillion in 2010.  Press Release, Craig Donner, DTCC Testifies in 
Support of Bipartisan Legislation to Ensure Transparency into OTC Derivatives Markets (Mar. 28, 
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quarter of all U.S. income and hold 40% of U.S. wealth
311
 will continue to 
lose faith in the rule of law. 
Social meaning in law has evolved to the point that certain individuals, 
white-collar fraudsters in particular, believe they face little risk of criminal 
punishment for decidedly criminal acts.  When these criminals reframe the 
debate on prosecutorial discretion by highlighting the costs to society of 
punishing corporations or their leaders,
312
 or by characterizing the pursuit 
of justice as a political act of retribution
313
 rather than as a reasoned 
decision to deter future conduct, they obfuscate their perverse influence 
upon prosecutorial discretion by speaking in terms of decisional factors 
that are largely deemed appropriate in this realm.  Allowing money, 
opportunity, or politics to influence discretionary charging decisions, 
whether real or perceived, conveys social meaning that undermines 
effective government, models bad behavior, and reinforces rewards, 
creating a moral hazard for future wrongdoing.  Before prosecutors refrain 
from charging, they need to factor in the idea of “affirmance” in exercising 
prosecutorial discretion so that an offensive approach to such criminality is 
constructed and conveys a new social understanding for those in politically 
or financially powerful positions.
314
  Prosecutorial discretion is broad, but 
there is a need to compel the government to impose criminal punishment 
upon these law-breakers so that they are constrained by the law to the 
benefit of society.  These laws and the enforcement of them have meaning.  
Moreover, failure to enforce some laws can undermine the confidence in 
all laws.
315
  Prosecutors must recognize the social compact formed by law-
abiding citizens who obey and respect the laws and expect nothing less of 
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312 See, e.g., Finder & McConnell, supra note 174, at 3 n.8 (discussing the disaster of Arthur 
Andersen’s indictment); Peter Spivack & Sujit Raman, Regulating the ‘New Regulators’: Current 
Trends in Deferred Prosecution Agreements, 45 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 159, 165–66 (2008) (discussing 
Arthur Andersen’s criminal indictment and the collateral consequences to the thousands of employees 
as necessitating alternatives “somewhere in between the ‘all-or-nothing choice’ between indicting (and 
destroying) a company and giving it a complete ‘pass”’).  
313 See, e.g., Baker, supra note 216, at 337–38 (referring to prosecutions after the collapse of 
Enron and WorldCom).  
314 See Lessig, supra note 168, at 961–63 (discussing how social meaning of laws influences 
actions). 
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the rest of society.
316
  
Affirmance of the crimes of the powerful means they retain the power 
to impose tremendous costs into the future through their continued control 
of massive firms and the incentives facing others holding such power.  A 
petty thief may steal again when not prosecuted, but it is a zero-sum game 
in which the gain to the thief is approximately equal to the loss to the 
victim.  In contrast, a bank CEO can engage in fraud that can result in 
deadweight losses so great that they threaten to crash the global financial 
system.  A petty thief that evades prosecution has virtually no impact on 
the rule of law, but a CEO that evades prosecution through prosecutorial 
declination is an advertisement capable of tempting millions to skirt the 
law.  Today, America flirts with financial and corporate elites who behave 
as if they are above the law, and with a public that holds the legal system 
in contempt.  As such, affirmance may lead to future economic lawlessness 
and catastrophes.
317
  The DOJ’s systematic declination to prosecute crimes 
connected to the financial crisis of 2007 to 2009 amounts to an affirmance 
of those crimes and invites continued lawlessness in the financial sector 
and beyond. 
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